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SYNOPSIS
The work undertakes an examination of Indian metaphysical
theories and their relationship :to ethical ideas and moral
conduct, as these operate in Indian thought. Special
account is taken of the samkhya, advaita and visistadvaita
systems, the metaphysical conceptions presupposed in these
systems, and the ethical theories proposed by them.
The peculiarities characteristic of each system in terms of
both metaphysics and ethics are set out and examined in terms
of the vital concepts of dharma, karma and mok~a. It is
demonstrated that, in the case of each system the original
classical formulations, as supported by a relatively con-
sistent dialectic through the centuries down to modern times,
in fact accentuate and harden the distinctions among the
systems . se fuat 1he three systems appear to be supporting
distinctly differing patterns of ethical behaviours.
The safukhya is seen to be supporting a somewhat simplistic
model of life-denying ethics as flowing from its metaphysical
premises, while the visistadvaita, with its clear accent on
theism, gives the impression of a more positive attitude in
ethical thought and practice. Its ethical concerns, however,
are seen to be markedly individualistic in character and
operation.
The advaita system, with its singular peculiarity of a split-
level theoretic orientation, is seen to vac~te between
a negative withdrawal from life, and a mor-e positive concern
towards life in the world. The complex character of advaita
metaphysical constructs, in their relation to the more
~ractical aspects of life, are seen to be related to the
operation of some stresses and tensions reflected at the
individual and social levels.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. STATE~mNT OF THE PROBLIDfl
Metaphysical speculation and ethical concerns are two
. broad and overlapping areas in Indian culture, with a long
and varied history behind them. Each of these fields deve-
loped many internally divergent forms and modes over the
centuries. While in the west these two developed into
distinct and relatively specialised disciplines, in India,
because of its strong religious colouring, ethics remained
as closely bound to metaphysics as word is to thOUght. . In-
deed, it is often difficult to distinguish in the literature
whether the central concern of a writer is an ethical one
or a metaphysical one. 1 This close interaction and virtual
crossbreeding between ethics and metaphysics, as a feature
of Indian culture, suggested, in comparison to western
philosophy, the necessity for developing a tradition of pure
metaphysics in Indian philosophy.
The generally felt lack of systematic distinction between
metaphysics and ethics in classical Indian thought has
largely been sought to be corrected by Indian scholars them-
selves, beginning with Radhakrishnan, from the first quarter
of this century.2 Yet, in the field of ethics, the funda-
mental principles that operate as the motive springs of
behaviour have not been as systematically isolated from their
metaphysical backgrounds.
2
The Indian classical philosophical world is characterised
by a large variety of metaphysical systems (and sUb-systems)
that clearly compete for domination of the mind of man.
There are relatively few studies undertaken with the clear
purpose of isolating the ethical concomitants of the vary-
ing metaphysical doctrines. As the present study seriously
addresses this problem, it may be classified as a study in
"differential ethics".
In the nature of the case, this study is also a serious
philosophical enquiry into the principles that govern human
behaviour, at least with respect to the three selected
systems of thought. The writer repudiates the contention
that the different schools of Indian philosophy are merely
complementary aspects of a single overall philosophical
position. It is accepted that the schools belong to a
single general tradition, so general that complementariness
must be precluded for the purpose of considering them as
part of any systematically organised, meaningful whole. 3
It is accepted that the various schools do belong together,
but they so belong more as a result of a commonly accepted
methodology, and a certain common~ffi of metaphysical out-
look which gives them the unity of a tradition~bound conglo-
merate, than as the result of any commitment to a set of
specific philosophical ideas.
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At any rate, the present work is designed to be presented
in the true philosophical traditions of classical Indian
thought, in that it accepts the different schools as inter-
preted by those recognised by a successive line of experts
to be the chief expositors of the respective schools. This
entails the assumption of a dialectical.confrontation among
the various schools, which is consistent, relatively uniform,
and meaningful within the terms of the postulates adopted
by the proponents. The writer is also of the conviction
that such vital differences in metaphysical standpoints must
necessarily be correlated with equally vital differences in
ethical theory. Thus, this study is not much concerned with
descriptive ethics or norms of social behaviour, (i.e with
what Indians do) . though it is admitted that these features
I
of Indian social behaviour do tend to blur the distinctions
w~ are attempting to reveal.
Any dialectical method must be based on objectivity, and
this is demonstrated in Indian thought with regard to the
most cherished social conventions and values. And it is
this feature of the acceptance of a common method based on
objectiVity, that gives it philosophical validity, and
commands our attention, and admiration, even from this dis-
tance in time.
Should the tradition of dialectic in classical Indian
thOUght be weak, the aims of the present study might be
rendered largely futile in terms of the referents.
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Alternatively, from a more general philosophical point of
view, the aim would become merely academic. The real
position is, however, that the dialectics among the schools
run deep and strong, and often attain impassioned levels,
as even a cursory view of the ~'at~~~~~i or the K~4anl!­
Kh~4a-Khadya reveals. A study in differential ethics is,
therefore, very much to the point, and it may be seen as an
extension of the grand thought-traditions of classical
India.
This is one reason for the validity of the present work.
The writer is also of the opinion that, in any field of
behaviour, a knowledge of the precise nature of human
motivation adds to the meaning of human action. Under-
standing the meaning of human action is not, and should
not be, a merely superficial inquiry. There should be a
concerned endea:vourto uncover the patterns of thought
underlying overt action. The more these patterns are under-
stood, the more does human nature and the meaning of
human behaviour become revealed to us. Therefore, from
the perspective of intrinsic validity also, the study is
in the true tradition of high culture, and it must add to
our sense of the stature of man.
Again, it is worthwhile for the development of Indian
Philosophy to prosecute research that necessarily empha-
sises the role and importance of pure metaphysics. In
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pleading for a greater development of this field, several
modern Indian scholars envisage an alignment of Indian
Philosophy with Western Philosophy. The writer is of the
opinion that such an ambition,if realised, would be untrue
to the Indian tradition (as will become evident in later
sections of this research), for it will necessitate the
excision of material that give to Indian Philosophy much
of its peculiarity. For example, the manner in which we
are constrained to deal with the notion of "free will"
(as a consequence of the theory of Karma) is decidedly and
uniquely Indian in character. The present study entails
to a significant extent, a serious treatment of metaphysi-
cal presuppositions after the fashion of "pure metaphysics,"
and it will be readily conceded on all sides that this is
of value in itself.
In the ethical field too, several problems will be address-
ed, conjointly with the related metaphysical standpoints.
For example, the proliferation of heterogeneous metaphysi-
cal viewpoints that form part of the Indian cultural canvas,
and the competing demands they make upon the allegiance of
man, inevitably result in perceived tensions in several
areas of ethical concern. With characteristic perspicacity,
Prof. Zaehner gives us an account of some of these problems
with reference to major ethical notions. 4 By isolating
the major ethical concomitants from their metaphysical
ground, this study advances our understanding of the nature
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of these tensions, and suggests possible directions for
their resolution.
1.2 AIMS OF THE STUDY
This study aims at deepening our understanding of the rela-
tionship between metaphysical theory and ethical conduct,
against the background of Indian philosophical and religious
systems. The world of Indian thought and practice is a vast
one, being made up of several heterogen~;traditions which,
by identifying with core clusters of thought, have develop-
ed their distinctive ideologies over several centuries.
Indian philosophical systems are in various waYs deeply
connected with the religious consciousness, and while it is
relatively easy to speak of distinctive metaphysical concepts,
the ethical correlates of these concepts are lost in a maze
of interrelationships in the total development of the cul-
tural traditions over many centuries. This study aims at
clarifying these interrelationships to our perception and
evaluating the relative influence of the metaphysical and
ethical concepts.
Indian philosophy, ancient, classical, medieval and modern
. ,
and their attendant cultural and religious actualities have
been the subject of indological-style research for about
the last hundred and fifty years. In relatively recent
times, however, Indian culture, generally going under the
" . - "
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names of Vedanta and Hinduism, has increasingly become a
relevant factor in the cultural actuality of the western
world. If the production of new literature is anything to
go by, this is a aontinu~ng trend.
In South Africa, by virtue of a settled, and significant
Indian population component, the reality of Indian culture
is a demonstrated fact. In addition, academic studies con-.
cerning Indian culture are being prosecuted apace at several
South African universities.
All culture everywhere is dynamic, never static. But this
is more so with Indian culture, as it has rather loosely
operating ethical modes that impart to it the quality of a
growing way of life more than a fixed pattern of thought
and practice. One of the aims of this study is to isolate
and consider the nexus between the characteristic thought
of Indian culture and the . dynamic modes of practice that
arise from it.
The advaita and visi~~advaita are prevailing metaphysical
systems that form the core and undoubted substratum of pre-
sent day Indian culture. Whether we look upon this as Ve-
danta in philosophical wise, or as Hinduism in terms of
practical actuality, their relevance to the cultural situ-
ation is overwhelming. Their vital connection to present-
day thought and practice can be discerned in use of lang-
uage and turn of phrase in the cultural circles of the day.
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The modern neo-Hinduistic movements are thus intimately
related to these systems. Movements such as the Rama-
krishna Mission, Divine Life Society, Chinmaya Mission,
Hare Krishna Movement, etc. are regularly producing lite-
rature whose terms of reference lie largely in those
systems scrutinised in this study.
The .~imkhya system of philosophy stands to Hindu culture
today but a small step removed from the Vedantic school,
and many of its suppositions and metaphysical concepts have
been incorporated into the Vedantic schools. What it re-
tains in point of ideological difference has been richly
exploited in the dialectical confrontations of the late
classical and medieval periods of Indian culture. It
offers a fruitful area for comparisons and makes for keener
appreciation and evaluation of the relevant metaphysical
presuppositions and ethical practices.
METHOD
The method to be adopted in fulfilment of the aims of the
study will be that of an objective philosophical research,
involving a clear, factual examination and analysis of the
metaphysics of the systems concerned, together with their
related ethical formulations, followed by an objective,
logical evaluation of the interrelations between them.
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1. First, an account is offered of the general background
of thought and practice as reflected in the primary scrip-
tural texts and traditions. Close attention will be given
to the Upani~ads, the Bhagavad Gita and the Br~lSutra, ~.
as these are not only the texts in which later developments
are rooted, but they are also variously interpreted in the
systems. Since the systems of Vedanta take their immediate
inspiration and direction from these texts, the texts them-"
selves have to be noted as being in a vital and living con-
tact with the Vedintic systems under examination, and their
derivations.
2. A close examination is undertaken of the metaphysical
systems of ~amkhya)~dvaita, and ~isi~~advaita as these
have given varied readings and interpretations of the
traditionsl texts.
3. An objective study is undertaken of t~e primary ethical
institutions relevant to the three systems, and as these are
interpreted and operated in the ethico-religious actuality
of the Indian tradition.
4. Finally, a discussion is undertaken of the major issues
that arise from the aforementioned investigations, during
which some of the traditional interpretations and tacit
assumptions regarding the interrelationships among meta-
physics, ethics and the religious consciousness are
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systematically challenged. In this discussion due emphasis
is laid on the concepts of God and ultimate reality, the
g",d
soteriological concept of spiritual freedom,~concepts re-
lating to moral effort and ethical striving.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the subject of study
has many religious overtones and invites an approach based
on sentiments. The study is therefore undertaken in a
scientific spirit, and interpretations will be restricted
to the results of an examination based on objective criter-
ia and what the facts reveal.
1. 3 SOME RELEVANT FEATURES
DIFFICULTIES OF INTERPRETATION
The Indian tradition, which is the product of more than
four thousand years of development, represents a rich and
complex fabric of many diverse elements which could be cla-
ssified and categorised according to several different
patterns arbitrarily chosen by the authors. The predilec-
tions of the researcher can easily dictate the type of mould
into which he wishes to press the wealth of brimming data
connected with Indian thOUght and culture. 5
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To some thinkers the whole development of this culture has
high and serious meaning of a unitary nature,6 while to
others it represents an amalgam of incoherent beliefs and
practices, intermixed with elements of literary and intell-
ectual achievements, which, within their own parameters,
represent relatively isolated and unrelated cultural modes.
In this latter formulation, the whole tradition can in no
way be considered a well-structured complex giving evidence
of design or homogeneity.
Since Indian culture has had a beginning in a remote anti-
quity; since the earliest literary records are presented in
a somewhat archaic .form of Sanskrit, such that competent
scholars are not in any easy agreement about the precise
thoughts represented therein;7 since these records them-
selves, that is, the Vedic Samhitas as a Whole, appear to
disclose to us several stratified layers of thought pertain-
ing to several generations of thinkers8, it is difficult to
present the complex whole in any systematic manner and de-
tail, without the treatment reflecting a significant degree
of bias on the part of the interpreter.
Yet, in fairness to the Vedic texts, it must be stated that
-t he Samhitas show remarkable evidence of high culture and
literary achievement. We may not always feel inclined to
ascribe to these compositions the quality of true religious
revelation, as in the following view:
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"They are not, then, the spiritual
outpourings of the heart of primitive
man at the dawn of history, as has
sometimes been suggested; (yet) they
are the achievement of highly
developed religious system", 9
and still feel constrained to admit their remarkably high
degree of "literary craftsmanship".
Nevertheless it cannot be denied that many of the hymns are.
clearly inspired by a deep sense of the Divine, and cannot
fail to inspire in turn the sensitive thinker even today.
Their high and lofty purpose, supported often by an obvious
but archaic symbolism, has led the noted scholar Sri Auro-
bindo to the conclusion that the period of Vedic poetical
compositions represented the acme of Indian civilization,
and that the most precious thoughts of that civilization
are the secret and mystical doctrines of highly evolved
seers bequeathed to us in the clothing and deceptive ap-
pearance of common language.'O The language used is cer~
tainly meaningful at the physical level, but there is
discernible a deeper strata of meaning in which mystic
doctrines lie hidden. 11 Most Indological researchers,
however, decline to follow the formulations of Aurobindo.
Consistent with the naturalistic and developmental thesis
of interpretation, Radhakrishnan, commenting on Aurobindo's
interpretation, says:
"It is not likely that the whole
progress of Indian thOUght has been
13
a steady falling away from the high-
est spiritual truths of the Vedic
hymns." 12
1.3.2. THE CULTURAL ROOTS
We have already noted that Indian civilization has been
the result of several varying and heterogeneous elements
being thrown together and which became worked up into
some form of unity in spite of their differences. We
therefore cannot say that all the chief features of this
civilization owe their origin to the Vedic literature.
This also asserts that all the chief features of the Vedic
Aryans have not come down into classical Indian tradition
in the form in which they are reflected in the ancient
texts.
Nevertheless, the ancient Vedic literature itself is vast,
and the Indian tradition that developed thereafter is
immense as it is varied. And it has to be noted that it was
the ancient Aryans who, through their Vedic literature,
"imposed a distinctive order and character upon the Vedic
Age't.'3 This distinctive order has been maintained more
or less in unbroken fashion down the ages. And, although
we are certainly justified in saying that Dravidian and
other elements entered, and even the coloured later
tradition, these elements have no distinctive historical
records, and whatever of myths and legends they possessed
14
by way of oral tradition, are unstable, inchoate and indefi-
nite. It was therefore left to the vast and precisely
defined Aryan tradition, as reflected in the Vedic liter-
ature, to impose form, order, organisation and unity, not
only upon the culture of the Vedic Age, but upon the
succeeding generations in India and "which has served to
undergird every aspect of the civilization.,,14
Although Indian culture is of a heterogeneous nature with
varied beliefs and practices, we are constrained to main-
tain that, in the main, in so many details of daily life,
thought and practice, and in many aspects of the larger
measures of philosophical system-building : we have to
acknowledge the Vedas as the source of them. 15 Seen in
this light, the Vedas must be reckoned, even as a body of
literature, none of the most magnificent achievements of
the human spirit in any place or time. Collectively
referred to as the Veda, it is these writings that provided
the roots for the later growth of the Hindu tradition". 16
It must become apparent therefore, that the larger world-
views and philosophical systems are also traceable to the
Vedic .Samhi t a s . 17 This should not commit us to any definite
account of the ancient Veda, which, as already noted, due
to its great antiquity cannot reasonably be construed to
represent philosophical thought anywhere near the degree of
speculative sophistication of later times. "Whatever we may
15
think of them, half-formed myths or crude allegories,
obscure gropings or immature compositions, still they are
the source of the later practices and philosophies of the
Indo-Aryans.,,18
It is probably the case that the common masses of Indians
have never been at any time in history in actual contact
with the Vedas as their scriptures, let alone have any
clear knowledge of their contents. 19 Conceivably, even the
~r8.hmin priests who perform the rituals to the accompaniment
of the chanting of the mantras are on the whole unaware of
the actual oontents and ethical teaohings of these texts.
Yet the thor~gnness with which the intellectuals and
cultural leaders of every age have been imbued with the
sense of values attributed to the Vedas, must be seen as
the prime faotor through whose agenc~ an unbroken oontinuity
of oulture and tradition have been passed down the oenturies.
In this sense, in every age, Indian civilization refleots a
form of Vedio culture.
The Vedio texts are extant in four distinct groups, mown
aSJ!.g Veda, ~~~~~Veda, ~ajur Veda. and Atharva Veda. Of
these, Indologists affirm the first three to be the original
triad, with the last gaining aoceptanoe at a later time,
though it appears to contain much material reflecting non-
Aryan influences. 20 The term "yeda" signifies Divine
Knowledge, and, from the religious point of View, it is
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affirmed that this Knowledge is eternal and uncreated,
",nitya" and "apauru~eya". It is also styled "Sru.ti", that
which is heard by the ancient seers, the j~is, who are said
to have received the revelation in some form of mystic
meditation. It is from this eternally existing Vedic
Knowledge, as the seed, that the universe is created. 21
All the four Vedic texts are further subdivided into four
sections - Samhitas, B~s, Ar~yakas and Upani~ads,
of which the Saiahitas (or ~antras) are the oldest, being
the collection of chants of the earliest seers of the
tradition. The Br8.h.maJ;las, as the name implies, are the
texts specially pertaining to the priests, and they supply
the detailed minutae of sacrifices and ceremonies, leaving
little room for the exercise of personal devotion reflected
in the earlier Samhitas. The Ar~yakas or forest treatises
are mainly a transitional literature to the period of the
Upani~ads. The Upani~ads, meaning secret doctrine, are the
teachings and meditations of the pnilosopher seers. The
different Brahma.J;la, Aranyaka and Upani~ad texts are tradition-
ally attached to one or other of the four Samhita texts.
The SaMhitas are themselves vast, comprising about 20 000
verses altogether. However, the~g Veda Safuhita is the most
ancient as well as the most important, for it supplies much
of the material of the other collections. The ~g Veda
S~ita consists of over 10 000 verses or mantras arranged
in over 1000 hymns or sUktas. Many of these hymns are
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remarkable for the philosophical and moral insights they
display, and tt •••••• it is only right and proper to think
that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree of civil-
ization l1 22 as reflected in these hymns. Max Muller sees in
the hymns of the ~~Veda two distinct historical periods,
one reflecting the free and spontaneous outpouring of emotion
in songs, and the other a period of mechanical systematisation
and sacrifices. 23 Other researchers discern further periods,
and the consensus is that lithe hymns of the !lg Veda are
neither the productions of a single hand nor do they belong
to a single age. They were composed probably at different
periods by different sages, and it is not improbable that
some of them were composed before the Aryan people entered
the plains of India tl • 24 The materials of the collection are
only incidental to the main characteristic, which is offering
prayer and praise to a number of gods or devas, conceived
in the fashion of natural phenomena. Radhakrishnan observes:
"When the Aryans entered India they found
that, as at present, their prosperity was
a mere gamble in rain. The rain-god
naturally became the native god of the
Indo-Aryans." 25
There is a good deal of "freshness and simplicity and an
inexplicable charm as of the breath of the spring or the
flower of the morning about the first efforts of the human
mind to comprehend and express the mystery of the worldtt,26
yet there are grades of quality in the seriousness of sense
and significance of thought that they display. Even the
early Indologists clearly perceived that the whole ~g Veda
Sainhi ta t'presents to us the development of religious con-
ceptions from the earliest beginnings to the deepest
18
apprehension of the godhead and its . relation to
man".27 The variety of subject-matter of the -hymns, and
the different levels of sense and significance they reflect
are interpreted by most scholars as the clear evidence of
.
an evolution in the philosophical capacities of the poets.
The religious tradition, however, affirms that it is the
Providential God that gives to man, at different stages of
his growth, that teaching that corresponds to his spiritual
capacity, and the different levels of spiritual development
reflected in the hymns are not due to artifice and skill in
creating the hymns. 28 .
1.3.3 THE RELIGIOUS MILIEU
The importance of the comprehensive religious milieu in all
discussions concerning Indian tradition and culture as a
whole is evident in the rich and complex philosophical
speculations and their close interweaving with religious
thought and practice. Both present an appearance of unity
in spite of their many-sidedness. 29 While philosophy and
religion often appear as two distinct streams running
parallel to each other, they also appear frequently to
commingle in a unitary pattern of activity, each indisting-
uishable from the other. 30
To say that religion is the "master passion" of the Indian
mind is to utter a half-truth, and the complementary lies
certainly in the field of philosophy. These two vital
19
areas of culture-religion and philosophy, "have been so
J
deeply ingrained in the minds and lives of the Indian
people that not even virtual slaver~-politicallyand
economically.. could prevail against them. ,,31 And such
has been their commingle that both disciplines issue in a
way of life in terms of their respective morality and
ethics~2 Since the practical life of ethical behaviour is
a characterising feature of religious culture, although the·
motives that underlie such behaviours are often traceable
to philosophical issues, it has to be admitted that
religious modes of behaviour constitute the operational
media for the philosophic endeavour. Indian philosophy is,
on the whole, conduct-oriented, and "classical Indian
philosophy may be characterized as philosophies of life".33
A peculiar feature of this whole tradition, religious and
philosophical, is that it looks to no single founder. 34
Further, research appears to support the contention that it
may look to no single group of founders even, for it is
more the agglomerative and cumulative result of the contri-
butions' of several cultural strains, and of several disting-
uishable layers of thought, each one building upon the
previous one, and in its turn reshaping the received tradition.
I~ is now an established consensus among Indologists that
the chief feature of classical Indian culture is largely the
result of the amalgam between the Aryan or purely Vedic·
tradition, and the pre-Aryan or indigenous Dravidian culture. 35
20
This is stated to be clearly demonstrated in "the worship
of the ithyphallic symbol of Lord Shiva and the worship of
the Mother-Goddess in later Hindu religious thought,
although these do not figure in the Vedic religion".36 And
Vedic texts are often cited as being antagonistic to some
of these practices. 3?
The religious milieu within whose elastic parameters
successive and variant systems of thought have been thrown
together is the very ground which has rendered the Indian
cultural tradition volatile and unstable across the centuries,
and has endowed it with those tensions in its ethical beliefs
and practices which this study seeks to elucida~e. How this
tradition, which is more an amalgam and a patchwork of con-
tending interests, "a huge, uncoordinated, and enormously
complex corpus of beliefs and practices",38 has managed to
survive the stresses of time and succeeded in presenting
the appearance of some form of cultural unity, which is the
more remarkable considering the historical, political, and
social upheavals suffered by this culture throughout the
classical period and after, may be understood in terms of
both the religious and the philosophical elements. This
culture is "even today, after nearly four thousand years,
still in the melting pot. It is a vast collection of
unorganised beliefs which criss-cross throughout its course
of development n • 39
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Along the religious dimension it is to be noted that the
unity of Indian culture has been maintained over long
centuries through the perpetuation of the myth that the
diverse, and even the contradictory and conflicting ele-
ments of Indian culture, have their source in the texts
of the Vedas. 40 Both historians and philosophers have
recognised mutually contradictory elements in Indian
c~lture,41 and have shown the inappropriateness of many
features of classical Indian religious beliefs to the notions
presented in the Vedas and the Upani$ads. 42 Yet the most
seemingly opposed beliefs and practices have been accomodated
to the purely theoretical notion of being covered by Vedic
~anction•. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to discern in this
circumstance the operation of a genuine cultural need,
evidenced early in the history of India, for the expression
of some form of religious unity which was invariably filled
by extending to the Vedas a comprehensiv~ sanctioning
authority in all religious matters.
In the distinctive area of philosophy, classical Indian
culture shows a development as diverse as may be discerned
in the whole of the western philosophical tradition. Not
only is the Indian philosophical tradition a complex one,
but it harbours systems of thought that have been dialect-
ical combatants for long centuries. This has been so not
only within the Hindu religious traditions, but also extends
to the important Buddhist systems, all of which legitlmately
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fall within the pale of Indian philosophy. As these schools
have been embroiled in wordy warfare and debates through
many generations of scholars, and as the utilisation of a
more or less common store of vocabulary cannot by itself
account for genuine unity, as the terms are invariably
understood in special senses in conformity with the specific
scholastics of the schools, it has been convincingly argued
that Indian philosophy is endowed with a genuine unity by
virtue of the development and acceptance of a common
methodology. 43 The centrifugal forces working for the
dis:w;ption and disintegration of the relatively unstable
ground of the classical philosop~ical tradition, have been
successfully controlled and held in check by the universal
acceptance of a general methodological framework. The
unity lies not in content, but in method. This process of
methodological unity has been hardened by tradition with
the passage of time, and, due to the interweaving of
philosophical with religious beliefs, is in turn reinforced
by the religious or semi-religious milieu in which the
tradition operates.
1.3.4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH
The rise of philosophical! enquiry appears to us to have had
peculiar yet rational grounds, so far as the earliest
literary records are concerned. While tradition-oriented
thinkers hold to the view of "the primary plenary spiritual
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experiences of India's sages and seers,"44 those of more
independent thought assert that the Vedas offer us the
products of human thought about the ultimate questions of
life. 45
It seems to us that the ancient thinkers felt somehow that
it was not possible to arrive at metaphysical truth through
the process of reasoning. Truths can only be intuited or
mystically realised in the silent depths of the heart. The
ancient seers speak with conviction because of their mystic
realizations. But even they often speak in halting language
and faltering accents when they are giving an account of the
great mystery of Ultimate Reality. Between the experience
itself and the expression of it there lies a huge gulf, and
the Rsis of the Vedas were compelled to countenance this
~
fact in many ways.
But the matter of importance in this, for our purposes here,
is the doubts this situation raised in the minds of the seers
about the construction or expression, even in metaphysical
terms, of any thought system that could truly represent the
Ultimate Truth.
It is not only the inadequacy of language, it is the very
inadequacy of human thOUght to penetrate the barrier, that
created the tormenting situation of doubt and despair. "The
fact that the Vedas contain a good deal of puzzlement over
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the nature of truth and that some of the hymns even despair
of the possibility of. man and even God, ever solving the
mystery of divine reality makes it impossible to believe
that the poets are claiming that anything was disclosed to
them by an act of revelation from above.,,46
The anguished cry of the poet who wants to know the truth
of things is clearly expressed in the following:
"Who knows for certain? Who shall here declare it?
Whence was it born, and whence came this creation?
The gods were born after the world's creation,
Then who can know from whence it has arisen?
None knoweth whence creation has arisen
and whether he has or has not produced it.
He who surveys it in the .hi ghest heaven
He only knows, and haply; he may not knowS tI 47
This is genuine metaphysical doubt. It is not the fancy of
naive minds, but the concerned expression of philosophical
doubt about matters high and serious, matters- that affected
the daily beliefs and activities of large numbers of devoted
souls. That it forms part of daily activities may be
discerned in the beautiful refrain:
"Which God shall we worship with our oblation"48
Paradoxically, the feeling of futility concerning human
thought unravelling the deepest mysteries, the doubts
concerning the ability of philosophy to penetrate through to
the metaphysical truth, constituted the very ground which
gave rise to further philosophising, and on which were later
erected some of the most stupendous metaphysical constructions
-of ultimate reality the world has seen, ttresulting unquestion-
25
ably from the innate intellectual curiosity of the Indian
mind",49 and whose foundations can be seen laid in the
earliest literature. 50
Whatever view one takes of the meaning of Veda, therefore,
its support and inspiration for the development of thought
is undeniable. 51 The great importance that individual
thought and independent opinion was accorded in the ancient.
traditions of India are reflected in the concept of ".manana, tt
which has been raised to the level of an article of faith,
as it were. 52 The process of philosophical and religious
development of the individual is regarded as following the
steps of n srava.I).am, tt t'mananamt' and "nidhidhyasanam" - hearing,
reflection, and realization. Even in the religious tradition,
therefore, the student is under no obligation to accept the
pronouncements of the teacher unquestioningly,53 indicating
the value attached to a true philosophical approach.
Every Indian philosophical tradition is aware of the need
to approach the problems of thought with keen objectivity.
The general term for philosophy that has become not only
hallowed in the tradition, but also operates in a comprehen-
sive fashion covering the most primitive perceptions of
things to the deepest spiritual intuitions is ttdarsanatt• 54
It is an insight into reality, and this may refer equally
to a spiritual intuition or the validity of a metaphysical
thought-system. All the Indian systems are traditionally
referred to as tfdarSanas.tt55
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Another term of ancient usage is "anvlkfilikltl, denoting a
close re-examination of the propositions under scrutiny,
as also '~mlma.msa", reasoning, and "nyaya" logical discuss-
ion, all underscoring the thoroughness and seriousness of
the philosophical approach in Indian tradition.
1.3.5 THE DIALECTICAL TRADITION
It has been pointed out that the development of the
philosophical approach has not arisen merely as a result
of the early Indians' need to come to terms with their
environment, but rather ~s the result of the perception
of metaphysical problems. Furthe~ these experiences of
"genuine metaphysical doubt which were expressed through
the free exercise of reason, were closely related to
religious and cultural concerns regarding the nature of
Ultimate Reality and man's relations with it. 56
In the nature of the case, therefore, the methods of
resolving these doubts, the speculative adventures under-
taken in respect of them, and the types of answers that
became current during the classical period, were as
complex and varied as the SUbjective ideals and inclinations
of the thinkers could allow. The sense of freedoInwith
which the ancient Aryan thinkers were imbued in all their
interpersonal relationships and cultural ways, as reflected
in the Rg Vedio poetry, appears to have survived at least
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with respect to the freedom of mind so richly manifested in
later India's philosophical traditions. 57 Therefore a
modern western writer could say: "The Indian mind is made
up of more varieties of religion, more philosophies and a
greater complex of cultural practices than most any other
major civilization in the worldn• 58 And the same writer,
quoting Hiriyanna as saying: ttA striking characteristic
of Indian thought is its richness and variety. There is
practically no shade of speculation which it does not
include;59 supports it with the remark: ttThe longer one
studies Indian philosophy, the more one realises the
accuracy of that observation". 60
Such a rich and complex array of diverse points of view
could not develop without some guiding principles that
could bring about order and method among the different
viewpoints. From relatively early times there arose the
nvada" tradition, the tradition of the art of philosophical
disputation, and this art crystallised in the development
of the ~y-aya or logic school of thOUght. 61 Although this
school, like others that developed alongside of it over
the centuries, put forward specific perspectives in ontology
and ethics, its special and unique status is due to the
elaboration of the vada tradition, in which it developed
no less than 16 categories concerned with debate and
argument.
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The rise of a school such as the Nyaya, specifically con-
cerned with the rules of debate and argument, immediately
point to the contemporaneous rise and existence of many
contending schools of thought, whose very existence must
have created the conditions necessary for a school of
logic. The many and varied perspectives, contending
against each other on matters of theology, ontology,
belief and practice, continued to co-exist in an atmosphere
of tension and relative stability, in which only the
accepted rules of debate and validation could provide the
medium of survival. This is the great dialectical tradition
of India, whose literature is witness to the fact of almost
endless vigorous and spirited argumentation among the various
schools and sub-schools across several centuries. 62
As the debates progressed and the philosophical positions
of the schools matured and settled down in terms of vital
propositions, the broad outlines of the larger traditions
appeared naturally to mark out a kind of graded scheme, so
far as the orthodox schools were conserned. 63 Thus the
Nyaya-Vaise~ika, the Samkhya-Yoga and the Mlmamsa-Vedanta
were paired and arranged in that order, suggesting a
gradual sophistication in terms of acceptance of a supreme
divine principle.
Sometimes it has been suggested that the orthodox systems
reach their culmination in Agvait~ Ved~n~~64 but it must be
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stated that this position is maintained by all the schools
in respect of their individual superiority and is therefore
untenable from a historical point of view:
"Such an attempt goes against the individuality
of the philosophical systems. Ea~h system
claims a certain autonomy and finality, and
to look upon them as steps to Vedanta is not
a satisfactory reflection." 65
On the other hand, several Indian thinkers have been betrayed
into a position of "misty vagueness, lazy acceptance and
cheap eclecticism," as Radhakrishnan puts it. 66 Eclecticism
is the view that the differences of detail and approach
are of secondary importance.
The eclectic view sometimes bases itself on the doctrine of
"adhikara-bheda," differences suited to the capacities of
men. 67 But this view is tantamount to making one or other
of the systems the final and culminating one, and again
cannot be accepted on the grounds of historical objectivity.
Further, such a view would tend to destroy the rationale of
dialectics as it would shift focus from purely doctrinal
opposition to the consideration of an assessment of the
relative position of a doctrine on a scale of values. But
the history of the dialectical tradition shows keen and
long-drawn out contests about individual metaphysical
issues and their exegetical validity on the basis of
accepted texts. The most that can be allowed for the
"adhikara-bheda" view is that it becomes just another
issue to be dialectically contested. At any rate, it must
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be pointed out that the doctrine of "adhikara-bheda" would
require the demonstration of a great deal of commoness
among the systems, and quite th~ opposite is in fact the
case:
"As regards the views held by the various
schools of philosophy in India about the
ontological status of the world and the
self, they are so bewilderingly diverse
that it would amount to the most
objectionable oversimplification to hold,
as has often been held by writers on
Indian philosophy, that there is a funda-
mental agreement among them." 68
Ninian Smart refers to Indian electicism as the "eirenic"
doctrine, and he maintains that it is part of the holistic
approach that became fashionable in Indian philosophical
circles. He writes:
"Another reason for the holistic approach
is that among the orthodox, that is, the
Hindu schools, it became fashionable to
hold. the eirenic doctrine that they
represented different emphases in the
delineation of the same underlying truth.
There were religious reasons for this
pacific and in some respects very
unphilosophical view. • •••• the
eirenic doctrine is neither justifiable
nor characteristic of Indian philosophy
during its most argumentative and
flourishing period". 69
1.3.6 VEDANTA AND INDIAN CULTURE
It is pertinent to advise a corrective with regard to the
general and sweeping mann~r in which many accounts of
Indian philosophy and culture tend to colour their
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treatment with somewhat subjective views. On the one hand,
they presume that the history of Indian philosophy is
largely the history of the Vedanta aspect of it. On the
other hand within the Vedanta tradition, they give pride
,-
of place to theSWnkara school of Vedanta, often maintain-
ing the underlying presumption that it is the pinnacle of
the philosophical development of Indian thought, and tend-
ing to reduce the value, importance and historical role of-
-- ,the non-Samkara schools.
Regarding the former view, it may well be accepted that
after the popularisation of Vedaota by Safukara, the
Vedanta tradition assumed an overwhelming importance
both among philosophical circles as well as in society as
a whole70; but prior to Samkara it is almost certainly the
case that the great school of Purva MiniaIDsa, with its fixed
pattern of relationships between men, priests and gods,
such as impose order and regularity on man's behaviour,
and judging from the immense breadth of the Brabm~a
literature and the rather patent and characteristic
protest it suffered in the Upani~ads, must have had a
decisive hold on men's minds and the thinkers of the
period. It is almost certain that the ~a~~hy~ categories
and presuppositions, together with Buddhist epis~emology
and metaphysics, must have ruled the day prior to Safukara.
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Hiriyana says:
"The ascendancy at one stage belonged
conspiciously to Buddhism, a.n~ it
seemed it had once for al.l gamed
the upper ,hand."71
If we accept as evidence, and there is no reason not to,
Samkara's most consistent dialectics against these two
schools of Samkhya and Buddhism, we have to presume that
they represented formidable contende~s against Vedanta both
I '
prior to, and during the time of Sainkara. Speaking about
the relative importance of the entire Vedantic tradition,
including its sources, Charles A. Moore emphasises:
"The Vedas, the Upanisads and the Bhagavat
Gita, along with one extreme Veclantin,
Samkara, have dominated the Western
'picture' of Indian Philosophy, but they
do not constitute anything like the whole
or the essence or even, as often contended,
the basic spirit of the almost infinite
variety of philosophical lconcept s , methods
and attitudes that make up the Indian
philosophical traditionlt • 72
This is hard criticism indeed, and if our judgement is too
much clouded by the dominant position of Vedanta over the
last ten centuries, we might tend to reject bis claim. Yet
the facts, speak clearly, and we are looking in this matter
; "
at the pre-Samkara situation.
But when we turn our attention to the post-Samkara picture
of the Indian philosophical scene, we are again in danger
o~ making~ easy and oversimplified judgement. There is
no doubt that advaita Vedanta has been the most dominant
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school of this age, but certainly it would be wrong to
identify it with the whole of VedBnta. 73
If we offer some respect to history, and note that, within
a few centuries after Sari:lkara, Islam was becoming a ,domi nant
political force, we shall not be too hasty in minimising its
influence in social and religious thought, and in the
philosophical tendencies that underly them. Islam's severe
theism, and even monotheism, in all probability spurred on
the already existing theistic elements to fuller and more
significant expression among the thinkers of the day. As
Radhakrishnan puts it, the philosophic expression of a
people cannot be seen apart from the historical and social
context in which it has its origin and development.74 And
indeed, the burgeoning Saiva and Vai~ava theistic trends,
often reaching severe and dogmatic levels of expression,
beginning just after.the time of Ra.manuja and continuing
into the time of the Madhva and Valla~ha schools, may not
be without their historical and social inspiration. We can
therefore agree with Moore again when he says that, while
the Vedantic tradition as a whole was the dominant school
of philosophy and religion, we must also concede the fact
of:
" •••• the very much greater emphasis on
theism rather than Absolutism in the
spiritual tradition as a whole."75
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1.3.7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY & RELIGION
In the Indian tradition as it has developed since the hymns
of the Vedas, philosophy and religion appear to have been
demarcated as two relatively independent, yet closely
related disciplines.
As noted earlier, the perception of doubt regarding
metaphysical reality, and the subsequent speculative ad-
venture towards the resolution of the doubt-situation is
what gives to philosophy its distinctive quality. In
considering the notion of lack of conviction in philoso-
phical knowledge, Saxena asks:
"Is it because of the object of philosophical
knowledge or because of the method of philo-
sophical knowledge or because of both? To a
certain extent it can be said that, since
philosophical knowledge concerns itself with
the ultimate origin and end of the whole of
reality, and wants to grasp it, with man's
finite mind, an ultimate skepticism about it
is involved in the very nature of the
rational situation." 76
This precisely defines the nature of philosophy. The
metaphysical system - building that a philosopher feels
compelled to engage in, and the ethical directions that he
derives from his constructions of reality, are still true
functions of philosophy, in as much as they are dictated
by a rational and logical approach to the perceived
problems. The Indian philosophical tradition has remained
consistently true to this pattern, in spite of the fact
that philosophy operated on the theological concepts
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provided by religion. We may note the words of Radha-
krishnan in this connection:
"Though philosophy in India has not as a rule
completely freed itself form the fascinations
of religious speculation, yet the philosophical
discussions have not been hampered by religious
forms. The two were not confused."??
While religious 'i ns i ght s provided, so to speak, the
stock-in-trade of both philosophy and religion, and
while this fac~ in turn imparted to Indian Philosophy an
intensely practical concern, the Indian philosophical
systems developed highly elaborate epistemologies which
acted as the logical bases for their respective meta-
physics and ethics. And this created the necessary
conditions for the tradition of dialectical debates that
characterises much of classical thought.
We must note that although religious interests were often
obviously the centre of interest in debates, the form and
method were distinctly philosophical. Philosophy as a
whole, itself became goal-oriented, and its goal~ variously
given as "mokf?a" or "~reyastl coalesced and merged with the
accepted goals of religion. As philosophical thinking was
inspired by the perception of metaphysical doubt, philo-
sophical conceptions of Ultimate Reality were continuously
adapted to the religious requirement, and religion had the
happy advantage in India of a philosophical corrective for
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its excesses. Radhakrishnan says:
"The common criticism that Indian thought,by
its emphasis on intellect, puts philosophy
in the place of religion, brings out the
rational character of religion in India".78
In concluding this section, we may say that philosophy
and religion share a commonness between them that is a
unique feature of Indian thought; yet the divisions
between the two areas cannot be blurred. While the
concepts operated upon are often the same, and while
the origin and the goals of the two disciplines may be
expressed in similar terms, it is philosophy alone that
applies a distinctive method for the resolution of
perceived problems, while religion must be seen as the
pursuit of ethical norms. Our study of the three
selected systems will reveal that even in the case of the
advaita tradition, our definition of religion holds true.
We should consider that, if highly elaborate dialectical
systems arose and were sustained over long periods of
time, they must have been seen to have important practical
bearing on life and its problems. Hence it is under-
standable that Indian philosophy is pragmatically oriented.
It means that it is close to life.
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In this chapter the general background of Indian thought
and culture is presented with special reference to the
major texts of the tradition, . viz. , the Upanisada , the
Bhagavad GIta and the Brahma S1itra. The ideas embodied
in these texts are presented objectively, without assum-
ing any necessary connection between them and the
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CHAPTER 2 THE GENERAL BACKGROlITfD
2. 1• THE MAJOR TEXTS
Many and varied are the streams of thought that have flowed
out from the ancient texts of the Vedas and Upani~ads. And
many have been the systems of thought that have sought to
demonstrate their logical and philosophical consistency
with the thought of the ancient Veda.
We have already noted above that the roots of almost all
later traditions of thought are to be traced to the most
ancient Veda, that is, to the SaIDhita or Mantra, sections of
it. In a philosophical undertaking such as the present
project, it is important not only to maintain a general
objectivity but also to take as much care with words and
phrases as with ideas, so as not to transgress the evidence
or contradict the experts, without a reasonable show of
authority or philosophical consistency.
In this connection it is important to note at this juncture,
that the orthodox Indian or Hindu view of the ancient texts
is that they are a revelation from God in every detail, and
a large band of orthodox opinion holds that the term
"apauruf?eya" signifies, not that the Vedas are independent
of God Himself, but that they transcend every form of human
origin. On the other hand, it is the opinion of represen~
tative scholars, both Indian and Western that an undeniable
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development of ideas i.e. the actual process of such
development, can be traced in the earlier Vedas and in the
Upanisads.
The savant Max Muller says that in the ancient Veda:
" ••• in many cases the development of
names and concepts, their transition
from the natural to the supernatural,
from the individual to the general,
is still going on••••• "1
He further states that this process can be clearly seen also
with respect to one of the most important terms, ttdeva",
whose original meaning was simply brightness. In this sense,
it bec~e the general term of reference for all those
phenomena that displayed obvious brightness, such as the
day, the dawn, the spring, etc. Soon it came to refer to
the quality common among all the referents, and eventually,
some kind of power that is immortal and transcends these
various manifestations. 2
Similarly in the texts of the Upani~ads also, we have to
notice this tendency of development. 3 The all important
concept of deva runs through the Upani~ads and splits
itself into two most prominant concepts - Brahman and Atma.
In both cases, taking the Upani~ads as a whole, we are
struck by such varying approaches to these two ideas that
several scholars have concluded that -over several centuries,
the sages of the Upani~ads were earnestly seeking a solution
to the questions regarding these key concepts. Dasgupta
says:
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"The Upanil;iads present to us the
history of ,t hi s quest and the
results that were achieved".4
Since the Upani~ads base themselves on spiritual experience
and not on the conventional constructions of philosophy,
they become "a repository of diverse currents of thought,,5
about fundamental questions ·of life.
While there is much that is contradictory both in theme and
treatment between the Upani~ads and the immediately preceding
period of the Brahm~as,6 yet it must be accepted as the
more remarkable that the Upani~ads are in so many important
ways the direct inheritors of the older Veda, for the quasi-
speculative thoughts of the ~g Veda, after riding through
the barren formalism of the Brahma~a~, reach majestic heights
of daring and challenge in the Up~~i~ads. So much so that,
in spite of its lack of system with regard to-its own major
ideas,? and lack of systematic treatment of modern Western
categories of philosophy as an academic discipline, we may
yet be justified in declaring them "the foUntain-head of
all Indian Philosophy,8 "the source of all philosophy that
arose in the world of Hindu thought tt • 9
The concern of the present study, is a consideration of the
three major schools of .Samkhya, Advaita VedEinta and
Visi~tadvaita in relation to the ethical models they advance.
The term "Vedantatt primarily refers to the Upani~ads,
considered as the conclusion and as the climax of the
. d' t h' 10Upan1~a 1C eac 1ngs. The Vedantic canon consists of
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three texts or the PRASTHANA-TRAYA, made up of the
ppani~a<!.51, Bhagavad GIta. and l?rahma sutra. 11
The Bhagavad Gita and the Brahma Sutra are often regarded,
in relation to the Upani~ads, as works that take up the task
of setting forth the Ilpandsaddc doctrine in a systematic ">.
way.12 While this ordering of the thoughts of the Upani~ads
is considered the primary interest of the Brahma Sutra, the
Bhagavad Glta has received ambivalent treatment in terms of
srut~ status or status as revealed scripture.
The Brahma Sutra is firmly entrenched in the Vedantic tradi-
tion as the "Nyaya Prasthana" or the scripture representing
the logical views not only of Baaaray~a, but of the entire
list of the classical Upanisads. 13
The Bhagavad Gita is accepted as the text representing the
9mrti literature14 or secondary sources, since it is fixed
in the body of the Mahabharata, itself a §m:t:t~ text, and
accepted as the best of the Sm~ti texts by most non-dualist
teachers. It has to be noted that the Bhagavad Gfta has
constructively enjoyed the status of a primary religious
text, both as a member of the triple canon of Vedanta, as
well as in its own right. 15 So far as the theistic thinkers
are concerned the GIta has been regarded as divine revela-
tion and therefore as a Sruti text. It is easy to see that
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the three texts of the Upani~ads, Gita and Brahma Sutra must
supply at least the framework for the metaphysical
formulations pertaining to the schools of Vedanta. 16
When we come to the ~amkhya school of thought, in relation
to a consideration of its authoritative texts, we have to
- /
give primacy of place to the Sarnkhya Karika of Isvarakr~~a,
as the text that stands at the very head of this entire
development. Yet, and perhaps of great value, is the
consideration of some aspects of the Upani~adic teaching as
they might be related to Samkhya doctrines. 17 We may take
the lead from Dasgupta when he says:
/"
"There are also passages in Svetasvatara
and particularly in Maitrayani from
which it appears that the S~ya line
of thought had considerably developed,
and many of its technical terms were
considerably in use."18
And this line of thought is firmly supported by Nakamura
when he says:
"Again, we see in the works of later
centuries of the Samkhya school that,
insofar as it tries to demonstrate
that its own theories are based upon
the Vedas, it frequently quotes
passages from the Upani~ads. And it
seems that such a tendency existed in
the Samkhya school from fairly ancient
time_"19
Though most commentators are agreed that pure Samkhya con-
clusions are not the order of Upani~adic thought, it cannot
be denied that some of the principal Upani~ads like the
Ka~ha20 and the M~~aka21 suggest links with the Samkhya.
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Radhakrishnan says:
"The Upanil?ads do not support the theory
of a plurality of purusas, though a
natural process of criticism and
development of one side of the doctrine
leads to it."22
And the same judgement may be made with regard to the
Bhagavad Grta also. 23 Although the GIta does not clearly
support the Samkhya doctrines as a whole, it cannot be
denied that many of its verses can be made to appear in
direct line with Samkhya conceptions, both of puru~a and
prakrti.24 These features suggest strongly that, long
before the philosophical formulations of the classical
period had become established, perhaps earlier than the time
of the fixing of the Upani~adic texts, Samkhya had been a
strong contender in the field of metaphysical doctrines.
We can clearly see, therefore, that the general philosophi-
cal background and the ma jor doctrinal directions for the
. S~mkhya and the Ved~nta schools had been fixed very early
in the history of Indian thought, much earlier than the time
/' .
of Sankara. The metaphysical presuppositions seen in the
sophisticated formulation of the Vedanta find their pre~
cursors in the texts of the Upani~ads, Bhagavad Glta and
Brahma Sutra, while the authentic Samkhya thought may be
traced through the Samkhya Karika of Isvarakr~~a, with
strong echoes in some portions of the Upani~ads, such as
the "Being" doctrine of the Chandogya Upani~ad when
realistically interpreted. We shall turn to a consideration
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of these texts and attempt to trace out the essentials of
their metaphysical thought unfettered by the later classical
formulations. A reasonable acquaintance with these basic
texts is essential for a proper appreciation of the
specialised doctrines into whose services they were later
pressed.
2.2. THE UPANISADS
In the Indian tradition the Upani~ads are generally referred
to as the Vedanta. Taken in its literal sense, the word
Vedanta means that which comes at the end of the Vedas. And
the Upan~~ads, which for.m the end-portions of the Vedas, are -
thus taken to be the Vedanta. In this sense Buddhism or
SaIDkhya may be said to have a Vedantic colouring since their
doctrines can partly be traced to the Upani~ads.25
In an important sense, not opposed to the above, the
Upani~ads are called the Vedanta because a broad band of
traditional thought ascribes to them the essential wisdom
of the Vedas as a whole. Insofar as any system of thought
draws significant inspiration from the 'Upani~ads , it has
often been regarded as part of the larger Vedantic tradition.
Bloomfield has observed:
"There is no important form of Hindu
thought, heterodox Buddhism included,
which is not rooted in the Upanif?ads."26
The importance of the study of the Upani~ads for almost all
varieties of Hindu thought, therefore, is an unchallengable
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truism.
Indological researchers have not been quite in agreement
about the relative chronology of the different Upani~ads.
Indian tradition, as given in the Muktika Upani~ad, gives
the number of them as 108. 27 Most of them belong to
comparitively recent times and are obviously not genuine.
In the later Indian tradition, those which have been
commented upon by the founders of the schools are generally
considered the important ones, and these are known as ~he
classical Upani9ads.
28
We may thus esumerate thirteen principal Upani~ads, which
have vitally affected the course of the development of
Indian philosophy a~d ethics. These are B~hadaranyaka,
Chandogya, Aitareya, Kaul?Itaki, TaittirTya, Kena, Isa, Katha,
Munqaka, Ma~4ukya, Maitri, Prasna and Svetasvatara. After
taking a detailed account of the classification of the
Indological researchers in this field, Nakamura 29 concludes
by placing the first seven of this list in a relatively
early period (pre-Buddhistic), while the latter six are
considered post-Buddhistic. This scheme is largely similar
to the one arrived at by Radhakrishnan in his earlier work,30
but who shifts the Ka~ha into the pre-Buddhistic period in
his later work. 31 Radhakrishnan suggests that the develop-
ment of the principal ~pani~ads occurred over about 700




Indian tradition holds that the Upani~ads maintain a
continuity with the older sections of the Vedas. 'Modern
scholarship has tried to show that there has been a marked
divergence in several important respects between the older
and the classical tradition as given in the Upani~ads.
Radhakrishnan says:
"We find in the Upanif;3ads an advance on
the Samhita. mythology, Brahmal).a hair-
splitting, and even Ar~yaka theology
•••• The authors of the Upani~ads
transform the past they handle, and
the changes they effect in the Vedic
religion indicates the boldness of the
heart that beats only for freedom_"32
The central tendencies of the Upani f3ads are stated to be an
indifference to the plural divinities of the Sarhhitas in
favour of a more unified conception of God, and a much
greater emphasis on the importance of the individual. 33 On
the whole It seems that such views reflect much truth, but
they also tend to become exaggerated, for the Upani f3adic
expressions are often impressive and arresting. As Dasgupta
says:
"These are not reasoned statements,
but utterances of truth intuitively
perceived or felt as unquestionably
real and indubitable and carrying
great force, vigour and persuasive-
ness with them_"34
The passion and enthuism evident in the Upani~ads tends to
give the impression that they are giving us a new message
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of salvation. And because this message is conveyed in
rationally satisfying language and convincing analogy, its
appeal is more immediate and intimate. Yet it should not
be forgotten that the Upanisads are embedded in a tradition
of which they are still very much a part. Radhakrishnan
says that the two oldes~longest and most important
Upanisads, Chand~ and Brhadaranyaka, largely belong to
the earlier ~rahmanas.35 Dasgupta avers that the bulk of
the Brahm84a, Ar~yaka and p'panisad material "gradually
grew up in one process of development and were probably
regarded as parts of one literature. 36 It can therefore be
appreciated that the Upani~adic teachings cannot be radically
different from the earlier tradition. Ma i nkar says:
"It can be perhaps granted that the
Upanisadicthinkers seem to make an
impression on our minds of being
taller than their Vedic predecessors,
but this is because they stand on
their shoulders."3?
This states the case very nicely. And Aguilar has shown
rather convincingly also that the ancient Veda reveals a
metaphysic not different in essence from that of the
Upani?ads, if once we understand the symbolism of the
myths. 38
It may well be that the Sarnhitas represent the same
spirituality as the Upani~ads, though we are unable to
penetrate it fully for its lack of rational language. If
it is so, then the real break with tradition . comes with the
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Brah.'I!lanas and their "soulless mechanism of idle rites and- .- _._...--_. __._ ~ ~---, , _.~
pedantic ceremonialismtl • 39 In many- ways, therefore, the
Upani~ads represent a return to the spirit of the most
ancient Veda. But it is a reform with some significant
shifts of emphasis.
2.2.2. 1ITSTICAL ORIENTATIONS
The Upani~ads present in eloquent language teachings about
the hidden, unseen Reality. Their purpose is not to explain
the mechanical workings of the universe or a scientific
explanation of things, though their keen search for
spiritual reality disallows them from following unscientific
lines of thought in a dogmatic way. Although Upani~adic
thought is often referred to as philosophy, it is philosophy
only in a loose sense of the term. The sages of the
Upani~ads speak out of the depths of their spiritual
experiences, and these experiences are necessarily of things
transcendent and not mundane. They strive to present
spiritual truths in rationally understandable language, and
because such attempts are more or less consistent throughout
the classical Upani~ads, they give evidence of a unity of
purpose and a vivid sense of spiritual reality. Even if it
be accepted that the earliest sections of the Veda use
mystical language to convey spiritual truth, the kind of
language employed and the myth and symbol used operate an
effective bar agaist the rational understanding. The
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Upani~ads, on the other hand, consciously operate in
rational terms to convey the truths imbibed in spiritual
experiences. Spiritual truths are beyond the reach of'
thought which is an activity of the mind; yet it is the
rational approach that gives satisfaction to our longing to
understand. In this regard Radhakrishnan says of the
Upani?ads:
"They reveal to us the wealth of the
reflective mind of the times. In
the domain of intuitive philosophy
their acheivement is a considerable
one. Nothing that went before them,
for compass or power, for suggestive-
ness and satisfaction can stand
comparison with them. Theirphilosophy
and religion have satisfied some of the
greatest thinkers and intensely spiritual
souls." 40
The impossibility of giving a rational account of the
spiritual experience leads the Upani~ads to deep mystical
learnings. What we are given are spiritual insights or
illuminations in quasi-rational terms. In order to get to
the actual experiences, or as near to them as possible, we
have to follow the leads and suggestions more with our
feelings than our thoughts. The Upani~ads themselves teach
that thought can takeus -:to the gates of truth, but cannot
secure entry. From the point of view of an academic
approach therefore, our approach to the teachings of the
Upani~ads has to be in terms of rational reflections upon
the suggestions given, and reasoned metaphysical
constructions as these are supported by the texts themselves.
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The later systems of philosophy attempt to do just this.
Mystical orientations are seen in the very word "Upanil?ad".
'A compound of three terms upa(near) ni( do.vn) sad(sit), it
means that pupils are expected to be in close proximity to
their preceptors to hear the teachings. But it also refers
to a spiritual proximity, a closeness and intimacy such that
the teachings thus imparted could only have meaning for
those who are spiritually initiated, who are fit to receive
the teachings. 41
In the Upani~ads themselves the term is taken to mean a form
of secret teaching, and Hiriyana thinks that this is the
original meaning of the term. 42 Others think that the
meaning of secret teaching developed later in the further
development of the tradition. 43 The Chandogya Upani~ad
refers to the teachings imparted by the teacher as "~uhya
adesa", secret dOQtrine44; the Ka~ha refers to the teachings
as tlvedanta paramam guhyam," the highest secret of Vedanta. 45
The Chandogya has the story of Indra approaching Prajapati
for instruction, and he is ~sked to remain serving the
teacher for 3 periods of 32 years, and, after a further
period of five years ~rajapati delivers to him the highest
knowledge of the 8elf. 46 The exacting standards thus
imposed are indicative of the requirement of fitness on the
part of the student as well as subtlety of the teaching.
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The Upani~ad further says that the teachings regarding the
Highest Reality may be imparted by a father to his son or
to a trusted pupil, and not to anyone else, even if great
treasure were offered in payment. 47 The Svetasvatara warns
against teaching the doctrine to an unworthy person. 48 The
Br~adar~ya~~ gives the precise example of Yajnavalkya
taking his pupil by the hand and leading him aside in order
to impart to him the secret doctrine. 49
In consonance . with these .mystical orientations, the
Upani~ads promote their doctrines through sYmbols and
formulae. One of the most ancient symbol is the mono-
syllable ~, which stands mostly for the highest ineffable
truth. The Chandogya says that Prajapati, through a
strenuous process of meditation, brought forth the syllable
~, which is identified with all eXistence. 50 The Prasna
identifies it with both the lower and the higher aspects of
Brahman. 51 Th~K~1h~52 declares A~ to be best and highest
support of man's striving, as well as the imperishable goal
of all spiritual effort. The M~~aka calls it the great
weapon of the Upani~ads (aupani $adam maha astram) and,
comparing it to a bow, teaches that the Atma should be
mounted on it as an arrow, which can then attain to Brahman
as the mark. 53 The Mao4Ukya gives the most elaborate
treatment of this mystic symbol and identifies it with the
very highe st state of Transcendent Reality. This syllable
is presented in the Upani$ads both as the goal of religious
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strivin~ as well as the most efficacious means of securing
c..>
such a goal. 54 In the Indian tradition it has been the
unbroken belief that the syllable ~ is unmatched by any
other holy formula for sacred potency and for efficacy.55
Another well-known formula is tltajjalan" which stands as a
symbol for Ultimate Reality seen as the source, sustenance
and goal of the world. 56 The Q1:J.a£L<!Qgy§., also has the famous
formula "tattvamasi," identifying the empirical self of man
with that "subtle essence" which is the basis of the
physical universe. 57 In later literature this formula is
revered as one of the "maha vakyas", great sayings.
2.2.3. DIVERSITY OF VIEWS
Symbols and formulae, like myths, are not stable units of
thought. They cannot operate like mathematical formulae do,
in a fixed and predictable mar~er. The symbols and formulae,
and the mythological anecdotes of which the Upani~ads are so
full/naturally affect the apprehensions of truth at
different times and under differing conditions. The
Upani~ads themselves therefore exhibit a state of fluidity
with regard to their conceptions, and which has provided the
grounds for varied theological developments of later times. 58
The Taitti:r::iya tells us that "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and
Infinity" in one place,59 and then identifies Brahman
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progressively with food, vital breath, mind, intelligence
and bliss. More strikingly, the Taittiriya ascribes
creation to Non_Being,60 while the Chandogya, after
considering the view asserts that "In the beginning, Being
alone existed, one only, without a second".61 Mainkar says
that we have to accept such contradictory views as a
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feature of the Upani~adic texts. And when we consider
that the authors of these texts are spread over several
generations, "one feels that the conflict of ideas was
inevitablen • 63
2.2.4. REASON AND SPECULATION
The very diversity of thought that we meet with in the
Upanisads indicates the spirit of free inquiry that they
upheld. Speculative reflection is given full rein, and
there is no region of sanctity where human reason cannot
penetrate. While in the Sarnhitas we see the beginnings of
the expression of doubt and uncertainity, in the Upani~ads
the tradition is sustained and prominant. There is no
philosophical systematization of the nature of argument,64
yet the earnest search for truth based on the reasoning
powers of the human mind reaches great heights of
speculative daring. This is clearly evident in the keen
pursuit of a thesis logically argued out as found in the
discussion between Udd~laka Ar~i and his son svetaketu. 65
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Even the hallowed conceptions of the gods of earlier
tradition are not immune from the penetrating searchlight
of reason. Thus Yajnavalkya, in answer to a student's query,
jocularly reduces all the gods to "one and half" and finally
to one. 66 Not only do the Upani~ads refashion the old
conceptions, but they also feel themselves free enough to
take liberties with those conceptions.
The gods are further reduced to mere subserviance and
powerlessness before the great Brahman, against whose power,
as residing even in a blade of grass, the traditional gods
could not prevail. 67 The Aitareya, makes the gods mere
bodily functions, and, at best, different aspects of the
self of man. The conception of a variety of gods was
certainly firmly rooted in the earlier tradition, and,
although the Upani~ads do not annihilate them, they succeed
in transforming them out of all significance in the
interests of a true spiritual monism. 68
Indian tradition is strong that the Upani~ads are part of
the Veda, being a continuous line of development with the
most ancient texts. It therefore holds that these two
sections teach more or less the same doctrines. 69 This
holds true in spite of the traditional divisions into
karma-k~~a and jfiana-ka~4a. It also holds true in the
sense that every traditional school mai~tains this unity of
interpretation, so far as its own dogmatic stand is concerned.
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Thus several different schools derive differing
interpretations although they work on the same textual
materials. These wide differences in interpretations are
due to the nature and content of the Upani~ads themselves,
which not only encourages human reasoning on spiritual
matters, but themselves engage in speculation of various
th~
kinds. Noting that despite"traditional view that "the
Upani$ads as Revealed Texts teach the same doctrine," and
that varied interpretations have been given of them,
c. Sharma further states:
"The problems discussed in them as well
as their unique style make them liable
to many interpretations. All their
teachings are not equally prominent.
Some are mere flashes of thought; some
are only hinted at; some are slightly
developed; some are mentioned by the
way; while some are often repeated,
emphasised and thoroughly dealt with."70
The rich variety of interpretations of the Upani~ads are
therefore directly-related to the contents of these texts
themselves. 71 This study is concerned with two major
Vedantic schools of thought, the ~dvaita and the
Vi~~sta~~~ita, and the S8.rilkhya, all of them closely related
to the Upani~ads yet featuring widely opposed doctrines.
In spite of the fact that "germs of diverse kinds of
thoughts are found scattered over the Upani~ads which are
not worked out in a systematic manner,,,72 it is fair to
point out that most Indian and Western scholars over the
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last one hundred years or so have been enamoured more with
the advaita system of Sarikara and which has been erroneously
regarded as the chief or true system of Vedanta. Since
Vedanta by definition is not only the concluding portions
of the Veda, but also the conclusions of them, that is,
their aim and essence, and therefore covers the entire range
of Vedic literature, it can by no means be taken for granted
that the advaita, with its emphasis on maya and rejection
of the doctrine of works, can be counted as the
representative Vedantic system. It is common sense wisdom
to heed the words of Dasgupta in this connection:
"Under these circumstances it is necessary
that a modern interpreter of the
Upani~ads should turn a deaf ear to t he
absolute claims of these exponents, and
look upon the Upani~ads not as a
systematic treatise, but as a repository
of diverse currents of thought."?3
2.2 .5. TnO KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE
The Upani~ads as a whole clearly represent a search,
conducted in various different ways, after an Ultimate
Reality which is itself represented in several different
ways. However this Ultimate Reality is spoken of, whether
in terms of the Divine Self of man or in terms of the
objective world, it always represents a type of knowledge
or cognition that is fundamentally different from all other
types of knowledge or cognitions. Thus the Mundaka
. "
distinguishes between tllower knowledge tt and "higher
60
knowledge." The lower knowledge is that which is derived
from the Vedas and related studies, while the higher
knowledge is that through which the indestructible Brahman
is known. 74
The ~handogya also places all objective learning, even
learning about Vedic lore} on a lower plane. Approaching
Sanatkumara for holy teaching, the renowned Narada confesses
that he has learnt all the Vedas, related scriptures and
many diverse subjects, yet he was in a state of grief; he
was "only a knower of verbal texts, not a knower of Atman,,~75
The knowledge of the Ktma is spiritual knowledge, not mere
learning, and it is stated to be different from all other
forms of knowledge. 76 Knowledge of both the secular and the
sacred, so long as it is attained through ordinary modes of
perception,fails to give spiritual insight; only the
knowledge of the Atma, realised in intuition, can take one
"beYiond grief".
The general Upani~adic condemnation and strictures against
Vedic knowledge is to be taken as largely referring to the
Brahm~ic interpretation of it. The grossly ritualistic
view of the Veda is that activities should be undertaken for
the sake of accumulating heavenly merits. The immediately
preceding Brahm~ic period weighed heavily upon the
Upani~adic sages as the period that significantly distorted
the spirit of the mantras by insisting upon the formalistic
institution of sacrifices motivated by a desire for heavenly
The Mundaka makes
___~~ '1' __ .. __•. • ,,_
61
rewards. It is this sacrificial Vedic knowledge that the
sages of the Upani~ads protest against.
this quite clear:
"Verily, these sacrifices are frail
rafts ••••• The fools who acclaim
this as the highest good certainly
fall again and again into the domain
of old age and death." 77
The higher knowledge, para vidya, is generally stated to
be the knowledge of the Atman or the Brahman. While the
aparavtdya may be enumerated and spoken about directly
through the medium of language, the para vidya cannot be
so commurri.cat.ed s In relating it through normal verbal
methods and understanding it through perceptual modes~
its saving character is lost, although a satisfying
mental construction might be made of it. 78 Therefore
the Upandaads are more or less agreed that this knowledge
is inexpressible, as the actual experience is ineffable.
The Kena directly admits its non-teachability:
"The eye cannot approach It, neither
speech nor mind. We do not therefore
know It, nor can we teach It. It is
different from what is unknown tl • 79
The text relegates all knowable entities to the realm of
the finite, while the higher knowledge, the knowledge 6f
the Atman, is beyond all empirical categories, and hence
unteachable. Hiriyana refers to an example from Sankara's
commentary on the Brahma Sutra, of a student who repeatedly
enquired of his unresponding teacher about the nature of
Brahman. Finally the teacher answers: "P'pasanto'yam Atma,n
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the Self is silence. 80 The higher knowledge cannot be
brought within the sphere of words and language because
it is not a knowledge of things; it is not a knowledge of
any type of existence which can be an object of thought.
As Radhakrishnan puts it, it is a knowledge of that which
is "beyond the sphere of prediction. n 81 Inexpressibility,
however, does not mean absolute unknowability, for it is
the very purpose of the Upani~ads to make it known. 82 Just
as the lower knowledge is different from the higher know-
ledge, so also is there a difference in attaining to the
two types of knowledge. Empirical knowledge is gained
through operating the sensory modes of perception that are
directed outwards from the self as subject. The intuitive
mode of perception on the other hand, which is based on
spiritual training, is alone appropriate to a knowledge
of the Transcendental Self. The Ka~ha says:
"The self-existent Lord created the senses
defective, with an outward disposition,
and so man sees outwardly and not the inner
Self. Some wise man desiring immortality,
turns his gaze inward, and beholds the
. -t"anne.r A man • 83
The Upani$adic seers operate on the presumption that
genuine spiritual knowledge is different from rational
reflection about it and that the capacity for attaining
to it is shared by all men. 84
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2.2.6 CREATION AND THE STATUS OF THE WORLD
With regard to the created universe and the manifold world
of experience presented to the senses, we may say that the
Upanis;ads genarally set forth the view of "fundamental
realism", as opposed to "radical realism". Fundamental
realism is a neutral position between the kind of realism
expressed by a common sense view of the world, and the
idealistic view that says that the world of experience is
a mere appearance that somehow arises on absolute Godhead
as its ground and basis.
Fundamental realism implies that the world of objects are
real, but they do not exhaust reality. Reality is imparted
to them by that which, in the nat~re of the case, cannot
be disclosed to the senses nor to the finite mind of man.
Though reality is reflected in the worldly things, it is
immeasurably greater in every way. Fundamental realism
neither rejects nor accepts different orders of reality.
It is a plain statement of Upani~adic teachings that God
is the fundamental reality in all things. Paul Deussen
has elaborated the thesis that the Upanisads teach that
the world is an illusion superimposed on Brahman, the
Absolute Reality.85 Radhakrishnan in countering this
view, advocates that the Upani~ads teach the relative
reality of t~e world; that the multiplicity of the
sensible world, though real in itself, is not the highest
reality. Dasgupta feels that it is doubtful if the sages
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of the Upani~ads had any conscious purpose of promoting
the idea of relative reality of the world: He says:
" ••••• the sages had not probably any conscious
purpose of according a reality to the pheno-
menal world but in spite of regarding Brahman
as the highest reality they could not ignore
the claims of the exterior world, and had
to accord a reality to it." 86
The diverse approaches of the Upani~ads, their apparent
diversity of doctrines, the different contextual senses
in the use of the term 'sat' and 'asat',87 and the several
different terms that are used to stand for ultimate reality,
all these are due to the characteristic unsystematic nature
of the Upani~adic teachings.
The Upani~ads generally ascribe positive reality to all
things by characterising them as invested with the stuff
of spiritual reality. Thus the Chandogya Upani~ad says:
"Sarvam lthalvidam brahma," "All this is indeed Brahman".88
Spiritual reality is all pervasive, just as the self, once
dissolved in the water, may be experienced in every part
of the water. 89 Spiritual reality is also the seed and
source of all things, as the imperceptible subtle essence
that grows into and manifests the huge banyan tree. 90
The Upani~ads generally give direct suppo~ to the emanation
theory of creation, which states that the world is produced
out of the being of Brahma, has its support in Brahma and. ,
will ultimately be reabsorbed into Brahma. 91 The M~~aka
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states it in the most unambiguous and dramatic way:
"Just as a spider puts forth and draws
back its web; just as the herbs sprout
on the earth; just as the hair grows on
a man's body - so also from that Imperish-
able Being this universe springs forth". 92
The M~4aka also gives the analogy of the fire and sparks
asserting that the manifold beings return to their source
in the Imperishable Brahman. 93 This is the cosmic view
of creation, in which the greater emphasis is laid Qn the
manifold character of the universe and an unmistakeable
tendency towards some form of realism.
The other significant tendency in the Upani~ads is repre-
sented by those passages that discourage the perception
of plurality and emphasise the transcendent unity of ultimate
reality.94 The Brhadar~y~~ says:
"Here there is no diversity whatever;
he who sees diversity, as it were,
goes from death to death."95
Similarly also the Chandogya deprecates all finite things
and declares that happiness lies in the infinite alone. It
further asserts that all finite objects are but mere names,
their basis (spiritual reality) alone being real. 96 . The
B~hada.r~yaka declares all finitude to be merely "nama-ru:pa,"
name and form, the Self alone being worthy of attainment. 97
These passages are interpreted as tending to the idealistic
view, in that they emphasise the relative insignificance of
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the phenomenal world. This defines the acosmic view of
creation, and for some authors implies the extreme
idealistic doctrine of illusion. 98 Radhakrishnan asserts
that the Upanisads do not support the doctrine of world
i11usion. 99 We should note that the doctrine of illusion
together with the related idea of orders of reality, do not
necessarily follow from the Upani~adic passages.
The Upani~ads clearly presuppose some kind of evolution
doctrine regarding the production of the manifold universe
and various life forms, though it cannot be said that they
are interested in a precise scientific presentation of the
facts. While all things are ultimately derived from Brahman
in the fashion of a process, as implied in terms such as
"gjate" (projects), "~ambhavate" (grows), "J?rabhavate"
(issues forth), ".prajaY-a.!'!'ti,e" (are produced), such created
things are categorised into the organic and the inorganic. 100
The earliest account of inorganic matter is given as fire,
water and earth,101 which is finally settled as the five
primordial elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth,
h " h d" t th T ·tt· ~ 102 f" 11 "W a c , accor arig 0 e al lrlya ana y glve "\ rise to
man through herbs, food and seed. The order of the
appearance of the elements suggests the production of the
gross from the sUbtle, implying that Brahman is the source
of all. 103
Th 0.h-' 104 ," . d 1 . f f .e J anaogya U1Vl es 1. e orms 1.nto three classes _
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a~~aja (born from egg), jIvaja(born alive), and udbhijja
(bursting through the soil), while the Aitareya adds a
fourth category, svedaja (born from sweat). 105
In general, we may say that this scheme of the categories of
real things is presupposed by all the classical Upanisads,
and in this sense we are justified in speaking of the
Upanisads as a single body of literature. It is as if the
sages draw from a traditional fund of conunon lore those
ideas which are best suited to ·a statement of their views. 106
2.2.7. ULTIM~TE REALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
The general Upanil?adic conception of the individual
personality is that it is an agent (karta) and an enjoyer
(bhokta) whose essential nature is that of a psychic entity
or soul. The individual's biolo~ical or involuntary
~ . v
activities are controlled by the breath factor (prana),
while the conscious life is controlled through the mind
(~~~as). Mind is a broad enough term to include the
unconscious activities of dream and sleep, but it generally
operates at the conceptual level (buddhi or vijnana), and
at the sensory and motor levels through the organs of
knowledge and action (.~nanendriY~e:l and ~~~e..rJ.<!.!'J:Y~~).
The pure psychic entity, that is, the soul-in-itself, is
generally termed Atma, while the individual personality or
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living entity is known as ~iva. The term jiva defines the
five-fold encumbrance of material trappings, from the
grossest to the subtlest, which, in its total operation,
finitises the Atma and gives it its jIva identity• .This is
the doctrine of the sheaths or kosas elaborated in the
TaittirIya. 107 The outermost sheath is the food sheath made
up of the aforementioned five basic elements of all things;
within that is the breath sheath, the mind sheath, the
intelligence sheath)and the bliss sheath is the innermost
one. Operating at the level of the three lower or outer
sheaths invests the j~V ~ wi th a distinct material
personality, while operating at the level of the two inner
ones gives it a more spiritual orientation.
Transcending even the innermost sheath establishes the jIva
in its essential spiritual nature as the Atman. Sometimes
the term tPuru~a' is used to stand for Ktma. In defining
the Ultimate Reality the Taittiriya says:
"That from which these beings are born,
that in which they live, and that into
which they enter at their death, that
is Brahman".108
The cosmic or objective view of reality is what Brahman
stands for,while Xtman signifies the inner, psychical
principal of being within man and within all things. 109
Therefore, it is stated: "Brahman is Atman".110 The entire
fabric of the manifold universe has originated from Brahman
as the ultimate reality, and yet the soul, the inner essence
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of all things is itself Brahman, the~n~a~~~~ or inner
controller. 111 The objective and the subjective sides of
creation reflect the transcendence and imm~ence of God.
The texts emphasise the diversity and plurality of the world
t ' 'I ' t' 112as well as its unity without attemp ~ng a reconc~ ~a ~on.
The definition of ultimate reality as "satyam jnanam anantam
Brahma,,113 brings out the comprehensive character of the
Brahman-Atman synthesis. ~atyam refers · to the truth-value
of the equation, t~~~am to its immediate certainty in man's
consciousness, and anarrta j,s · its infinity in space and time.
Ultimate reality is neither Brahman viewed as the
objectivally apprehended plurality of the phenomenal world,
nor the vitalizing principle by itself, neither the
transcendent nor the immanent, but that which comprehends
both in a higher and total unity, which is yet expressed as
the inner essence. Hiriyana says:
"The enunciation of this doctrine
marked the most important advance
in the whole history of India's
thought. 1t 114
The fundamental realism of the Upani~ads may thus be stated
as expressing the non-dual essence which is the Brahma-Atman
equation. The famous expression 'satyasya satyam', the real
of the real, indicates the deeper ontological realism in all
things and in the human individual. 115 There is np denial
of the plural universe, though there is a definite
heightened awareness of man as a psychologically operating,
conscious entity, for -it is only in the deeper, ontological
. r
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levels of man's being that the reality of Brahman can
be experienced. 116 The Upani~ads further assert that
the actual experience is not a negative psychological
condition, but a positive condition of supreme bliss. 117
The Taittiriya explains the highest spiritual experience
in terms of the idea of .~andam , bliss or transcendental
, joy. 118 Man's deepest aspirations are not cut , off
in Brahman, but find their expression and fulfilment in
it. The tone of this line of thought is that the human
personality as we know it has some form of ultimate
significance. Radhakrishnan holds that ~ven if we consider
ananda to be the highest conception of spiritual experience
available to logical thought,it must be conceded that the
term ananda is also used in the Upanif?ads "as a synonym for
final reality". 119
2.2.8 THEISTIC OUTLOOK
Theism as the belief in a wholly transcendent God who
excludes the world from His being and who stands over and
against it as .t he other, must be conceded, upon pressure
of facts, to be wholly absent in the Upani~ads. The
philosophy of fundamental realism, of a belief in a
transcendent power that is at the same time tlthe real in
all reals,tl the inner essence that is the controlling and
and directing factor, necessarily precludes a strict form
of theism.
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The transcendent and otherness aspect of Godhead, even when
seen as the Atman, in the sense that it does not strictly
stand for the plurality of things, is not the general
Upani~adic position. 120 On the other hahd, the pantheistic
conception that Brahman has manifested itself into the
world of phenomenal reality is equally untrue to the
Upanisads, in the sense that phenomenal creation does not
affect God's integrity, it does not exhaust Him, it does
not bring about a change in His being. Radhakrishnan says:
"In the Upani$ads we come across pas-
sages whi ch declare that the nature
of reality is no t exhauste d by the
world pr ocess ••••••• God is gr ea t er
than t he un i ver s e , whi ch i s Hi s work . "
121
Accor di ng to Dasgupta t her e are t hree distinct currents
in Upani ~adi c t hought. One i s t hat the Atman or Brahman
is t he sole reality; the second is the pantheistic creed
that identifies the universe with Brahman. And the third
cur r en t js thr~t of t heism which looks upon Brahman as the
Lord controlling the world." 122
A characteristic of the theistic outlook is that the
supreme is infinitely greater than man as he is, as he
finds himself in the phenomenal world, making it possible
for him to worship and admire that Supreme. The Taittirlya
establishes t hat even t he blis s of Brahman is majestic and
utterl y superior to human blis s, . t hough the f act of the
comparison gives hope to man and restores confidence in
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the eternal bond between man and God, an essential of the
Upani$adic theistic position.
The Upanisads use the concept- of a 'personal' God just as
frequently as that of the 'impersonal' absolute. On the
whole, the sages do not seem to particularly show any
preference in their use, but depend on the theme they are
123 The Upanisads are replete with connotations
pursuing.
of personality applied to Brahman, such as "In the beginning
this world was the Self in the shape of a person"1 24 "He
desired, let me become many, let me be born; He performed
auterities •••• "; 125 "Beyond the manifest is the Person,
all-pervading and without any mark whatsoever. t1126 The
idea of personality is used in a translogical sense, but
it cannot be denied that, within the presuppositions of
fundamental realism, it provides some basis for Upani~adic
theism. Bowes is firmly convinced that in the matter of
the ultimate relationship between God and the individual,
the Upani~ads are indifferent to the phraseology of
"identity-experience" and "union-experience".127 She
insists that it is a mere dogmatic reading of the texts to
insist exclusively upon one or the other. The Upani~ads
generally give us the bare spiritual experiences, but no
dogmatic system. Dasgupta says that the later Vedantic
thinkers could erect the,ir, variant pltilosophies on the
Upanif?adic declarations because "these ideas were still in




Though there is no radical break with the past, the
Upani~ads undoubtedly reflect an opposition to the
religious practices advocated in the Braru~~as and the
ideas underlying them. The pervasive conception of Brahman-
-
Atman as the inner essence of all things and whose reali-
sation is to be effected in man's consciousness, is in
distinct opposition to the gods propitiated in the
Brahmanic sacrifices. The ~ena shows that the gods are
. t th . . 1 f B ahm 129 Thepowerless aga~ns e supreme pr~nc~p e 0 r an
Brhadara~yaka shows that the gods have no real existence
apart from what man wishes to accord to them. 130
The rituals associated with propitiating the gods for a
happy earthly life and heavenly rewards are openly condemned
in the Qh~~~Q~§, where the priests are compared to dogs in
a procession holding each others' tails and chanting "Aum,
Let us eat" etc. On the whole, however, the Upani~ads
interpret the rituals symbolically and give them an inward
bearing. 131
Although it is true that .Upani~adic ethics largely operate
in terms of man's subjective life, quite a significant
emphasis is placed on ethical actions and the world of
diversity. The second verse of the Isa directly advocates
wholesome activity in the world, and subsequent verses
positively deprecate withdrawal from the world. Personal
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subjective demands must be brought into a harmony with the
divine presence in the world ~round. Failure to do this is
evil and leads to spiritual regression and sotrow. 132 While
individual effort is important, it should not be opposed to
the total harmony. The good life is understood subjectively,
but it can only be practised and realised in a community
with other selves and things. Radhakrishnan says:
"The sense of otherness and multiplicity
essential to ethical life is allowed
for by the Upanif?ads."133
The Taittirly.a gives a traditional list of ethically signi-
ficant activities, which includes righteous conduct,
truthfulness, study, penence, self-restraint, sacrifice,
welfare of others and raising of a family.134 Another gives
the subjective side of ethical training as hearing of the
sacred texts (srava~a), thinking over their meanings
(~anana) and realising their truth in one's being
(midhidhyasana), and asserts the realisation of the Self as
the goal of all ethical striving. The emphasis on study and
the control of the passions suggests that the essence of all
ethical action lies in transcending the biological basis and
instinctive actions in which man's life is set. 135 The
illustration in the 9~andogya of Indra and Virocana going up
to Prajapati for instruction, and the incidence of Indra's
prolonged stay with the teacher stress the importance of
ethical preparation for the religious quest. 136
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While personal discipline is important, so far as the
Upani~ads are concerned, it is not equivalent to severe
asceticism. Otherwise social virtues and family life would
become meaningless. Radhakrishnan says:
"The false asceticism which regards
life as a dream and the world as an
illusion••••••• is foreign to the
prevailing tone of the Upanif?ads".137
The Isa says that man should continue to perform works and
live for a hundred years. 138
The Upani~adic sages teach against the background of the
prevailing system of social castes which had probably
rigidified during the Brahma~ic period. The Upanisads
significantly undermine such class distinctions and
positively preach against the idea of caste privileges as
the story of Satyakama in the Chandogya shows. 139
Radhakrishnan says in this regard:
"Brahminhood does not depend on birth
but on character"140
2.2.10. KAm1~; REBIRTH AND illrillNCIPATION
The notion of karma which probably originated in the
conception of ~~a of the ~g Veda, is transformed in the
Upani?ads into a dynamic metaphysical principle in terms of
which man's ethical life operates. From the cosmic notion
of karma in the Samhitas, through the lareely ritualistic
usage in the Brahmalf8s, i.t becomes in the Upani!:?ads the
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principle of subjective spiritual evolution. The law of
karma states that the circumstances that attend an
individual in any lifetime are dependent upon his actions,
desires and tendencies in previous lives. '!he ~~8:raQ~ says,
'man becomes good by good deeds and bad by bad deeds". 141
While the Brahma~as fostered the idea that sin and error
could be corrected by sacrificing to the gods, the Upani~ads
teach the principle of individual responsibility through the
karma doctrine. 142 Karma is not a jur.ktical theory of
rewards and punishments, but focuses on the importance of
the human will and the purity of motives in terms of which
men act. 143 It is thus the principle of causality on the
moral plane, though it does not mean mere mechanical
necessity.
The hypothesis of rebirth is taken over from the Brahma~as,- - - -- -
where rewards and retribution in heaVe!l are its chief
features, and made by the Upani9ads into a corollary of
karm~ and a means of spiritual advancement in this world. 144
The world of mortality to which the soul returns through
repeated births and deaths is rebirth. or sansara. The
~§l:.tl:l~ says:. "Like corn the mortal decays and like corn he
is born again". 145 The persistence or continuity of the
soul or psychic principle is clearly stated in the Chando~~
by comparing it with "A caterpillar that, coming to the end
of a blade of grass, catches another blade and draws itself
t . t" 146on 0 ~ •
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The Upani~adic doctrine of transmigration does
not discountenance the passage of a human soul to animal
bodies in a future birth. 147 The general terms of the
Upani~ads, however, are that of a progressive evolution of
souls through the development of character, culminating in
spiritual freedom.
The fate of the soul in final emancipation or mok~a is said
to be subtle and extremely difficult to understand. 148 True
to this declaration of Yama, the Upani~ads do not resolve
the question of the nature of final liberation. We come up
against two accounts of it - one of complete identity with
ultimate reality or God, and the other of union with Him.
Radhakrishnan is of the firm opinion that the Upani~ads
support only the doctrine of identity, of the total merging
of the jiv~ with the Brahman. 149 Such a view is suggested
in the M~~aka150 and the prasna,151 upon the analogy of
rivers losing their identity in the waters of the ocean.
The~a~1ra.ka BajlS -itBt-the jiva loses its identity "as a lump
of salt thrown into the water dissolves and cannot be drawn
out again. 1l 152
Such an identity relationship is logical to the impersonal
view of Brahman or Atman, and it may also accord with the
personalist view of ultimate reality.
The MUQ4ak~ uses the bow and arrow analogy and says that the
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individual soul becomes one with Brahman "as the arrow in
the mark". 153 The doctrine of union with God seems to be
suggested here. In the M~daka154 the idea of companionship
with God is asserted. It is impossible for logical thought
to construct the reality of final emancipation and the
Upanisads do not attempt a systematic account of it. Accord-
in~ to Radhakrishnan several different views are to be foundCl .
in the Upani~ads.155
2.3. THE BHAGAVAD GITA
The Bhagavad Gi t"ii_ or Song of God is one of the sources of
the Indian tradition, and the second member of the triple
canon of Vedanta. Its popularity as a scriptural text is
second to none in the tradition. 156 It apparently grew to
this status with great suddenness, ever since Sailkara wrote
his commentary on it. This poem of 700 verses has caught
the imagination and fancy of a host of scholars and public
figures right down to modern times. Its popularity appears
to be on the increase, both in the East and the West. The
reason for this is that it is the one text that, within its
small and manageable compass, sets forth the ancient and
varied traditions of India. Among its points of appeal must
be counted the simplicity of its message, the lilting
musical cadence of its Sanskrit verses, its attractive
ethical doctrines and its uncompromising theism.
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Many types of surgical operations have been attempted to be
performed on the Gita by Indological scholars. The early
researchers fancied the existence of an original "ur" Gita. 157
Some have seen it as the refashioned version of an Upani~adic
poem, while many have seen it as the synthetic amalgam of
diverse and mutually opposed doctrines. 158 We cannot say
for sure that all these approaches are baseless.
One of the chief features of the Glta is its presentation of
a unified global view of the ideas that were current at the
time of its composition. 159 Tradition regards the Gita as
a "bouquet of Upanif?adic flowers".160 Sailkara regarded it
as "the collected essence of the teachings of the Vedas".161
Madhusudana considered it "the nectar-like milk of the
Upani?ads".162 The strength of this tradition should engender
in us a scholarly caution, rather than blind acceptance, .
for the Upani~ads are many, contain a variety of doctrines,
and their production spans several centuries, while the
Glta is a single text. 163 It thus seems unlikely that the
Glta should faithfully represent the thought of the
Upani!?ads.
In point of fact, it is necessary to stress that the Glta
appears to reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the
thoughts of the ancient Bhagavata cult, the philosophical
tendencies of the Upani~ads, the teachings of SaIDkhya and
Yoga, the Mlmamsa view of fixed duties, and Buddhist-style
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164disdain for ~orldly goods. But the Glta has its own
special character that sets it apart from all these currents
of thought.
2.3.1 METAPHYSICAL IDEAS
The setting and background against which the Gita occurs
betrays its teachings as being more ethics than metaphysics
and the two are shown to be closely interrelated. 165 It
is a message delivered on a battle field, where a vital
course of action is being considered. It is not a
teaching given in a sylvan glade or a hermitage where deep
reflection upon philosophical issues would be appropriate.
Although it is a summons to action,166 the ground and
basis for such action is well and truly laid in the rich
and fertile metaphysical traditions of the times. 167 The
metaphysics of the Glta is therfore largely presumed; and
what of it is given is loosely presented. We cannot say
that there is no pattern in its metaphysics or unity of
168philosophical outlook. The chief metaphysical ideas
incorporated into the Glta are concerned with the
individual self and the workings of the human psyche, the
nature and operations of material reality, the nature of
spiri tual realj.tjr, the doctrine of works, nature of
Ultimate Reality, and the concept of freedom.
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2.J3.2 THE INDIVIDUAL SELF
The issues discussed in the Glta arise out of a pressing
moral problem, although the GIta does not carry out a
protracted philosophical investigation of these issues. 169
Its arguments therefore are full of presumptions which are
easily traceable to the Upanf?ads and to the SaIDkhya-Yoga
tradition.
Bearing directly upon the moral situation in which the
Glta is set, early in the dialogue the immortality of the
individual self is established. 170 Regarded in one sense
as a tltimeless monad",171 the self is both immortal in its
own right, as well as a personality complex that persists
through the rounds of births and deaths, acting out its
destiny. In this sense, the human personality carries
within itself the sense of its own immortality, though
fettered by the circumstances of the world in which it
is placed. 172 In a categorical declaration the self is
said never to have been born nor to suffer death; it is
ltunborn, eternal, everlasting and primevallt• 173
The GIta maintains the Upani?adic legacy in attempting
to be metaphysically precise about the nature of the
immortal self. Immortality of the self, because it is
a spiritual immort ality is related to a basic property
of changelessness, a property that is due to its relation-
ship to the Supreme Brahman. 174 In truth, therefore, the
individual self is a mere spectator in the world; it is
a non-doer, akartr. 175
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The characteristic feeling of the self as an agent or doer
operating in the world is due to the defining characteristic
of the world itself, which is material nature or Prak~ti.
As such it is made up of the three ~as, the qualities of
sattva (purity), ~~ja~ (activity) and ~~as (dullness).
These qualities operate in man in so far as he is a self-
conscious agent with a sense of doership. The essence of
the human psyche or jIva is the buddhi or the soul, the
highest faculty in man's psychosomatic make-up. As composed
of prak~tic constituents, the soul is perishable or disinte-
grateable. Yet it bears within it the transcendent quality
of will, that operates as a bridge to the true divine self
or Atma. 176 Besides the b~ddhi, the individual self
consists of mind, ego, senses and the physical body which
are parts of material nature, and changeful. These are the
instruments through which the inner immortal principle works '
in the world,177 according as the prak:rtic qualities are
organized at different levels of the personality.
The divine essence in man, the timeless immortal, is the
Atman , the inner divinity that is utterly transcendent to
the jiva, though the two terms are also used interchangeably.
The spiritual self is sometimes implied to be identical with




Material reality is generally termed prak~ti, intense
activity, but it is certainly not the same as the prak~ti
of ?aIDkhya. 178 All this reality is made up of the three
guoas or constituents, 179 to which all activity in the
. . t b t d 180world, and ~n man, ~s 0 e race.
Like Upani~adic thought, the Gita does not countenance a
creation ex nihilo. 181 Among the reasons for the Glta's
popularity is its eloquent declaration of this principle as
it applies both to spiritual and material reality. We read
in the second chapter:
"Of what is not, there is no being;
of what is, there is no ceasing to
be·"182
Thus lfthe Git 'a explicitly formulates the principle of ~at-
~arya-v~~a, that what -exi s t s cannot be destroyed and that
what does not exist cannot come into being."183
The chief characteristic of the eternal reality of nature is
activity, brought about -by the action of the three ~~as
which together comprise the totality of it.
Prakrti is regarded in two senses, as a power of God and as
a category from which all things have come into being. 184
The becoming of the world and its passing away is cyclic in
character, being repeated endlessly.185 Because all
becoming is from God, the GIta speaks of eight sep~rate
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forms of prak~ti as belonging to God - earth, water, fire,
air, ether, mind; intellect and ego. 186 The operation of the
~as, operating through these modes of prak~ti, is what. .
binds the individual selves and gets them mounted onto the
revolving wheel of life.
Both.the material cosmic reality and the material bodies of
selves, including all psychological functions, are born of
2.3.4. DOCTRINE OF WORKS
The idea of karma, work or activity, is associated in-pre-
Upani~adic literature with the concepts of rta and dharma,
and with the performance of rituals for heavenly rewards.
In the Upanisadic period it developed metaphysical conno-
tations of a continuing psychical bond between one life and
another, by which the jIva could evolve spiritually or
devolve into brutish characters. The GIta takes over this
concept of karma and refashions it with great skill into a
truly spiritual doctrine that has a direct hearing on man's
salvation.
The Gita holds that it is impossible for man to withdraw
from work. 187 The older ideas hold that works in the world
bind the jIva "t o a transmigratory existence. 188 Reflection
upon spiritual truth was recognised as an effective antidote
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to the binding effects of karma. The G1 t"a references reflect
th~ view of sarnnyasa as withdrawal from work. 189
The Gita's doctrine of works or karma-yoga, on the other
hand, insists upon the performance of work in such a manner
that the binding effects of it would turn impotent. Whereas
the old idea of ~arm~ carried with it the bondage of reward
or punishment, brought about by specific desires, the GIta.
preaches a doctrine of desireless work, niskama karma, by
which the consequences of ~arn:LC3...are rendered ineffective.
Radhakrishnan says:
"The Bhagavat Git"a gives us a religion by
which the rules of karma, the natural order
'of the deed and consequence, can be trans-
cended." 190
Many writers have been overly enamoured of the Glta as a state-
ment of tne secret of spiritual work. Tilak considers it
the entire secret of the Gita's teachings, Gita Rahasya.
Gandhi gave to the book the alternative name of anasakti
yoga, yoga of non-attachment. It cannot be denied that the
Glta's doctrine of works is a unique contribution to our
ideas of spiritual displine, and its beneficial effects
must be felt by all religious souls; ~til11it cannot be
said to be the whole message of the Gita.
It should be noted that the gospel of selfless action is
not a doctrine of individual salva~on alone but is related
to the concept of lokas_aing:I'~!l:~, in-gathering of people,
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welfare of the world. That this ideal is equally related
to the path of devotion and, in the Glta specifically, to
the path of knowledge also, points significantly to the
unitary purpose of the text.
2.3.5 GOD AND ULTIMATE REALITY
The Upani?adic pantheistic absolutism regarded Brahman as
the ground, substratum and substance of the entire creation,
,
of selves and material.nature alike. Their doctrine of an
inner non-dual essence leavened all distinctions into a
somewhat distinqtio~less absolute. The theistic elements
in them arise more out of the logic of relating individual
selves than out of the drift of its several metaphysics.
In the Glta, the highest Brahman of Upanisadic thought is
mostly identical with R~~~a as God, and is also seen to be
dependent on Him. 191 The concept of Brahman in the Gita
has the meanings of prak~ti, Vedas and God's essence. 192
Chapter thirteen clearly makes out that Brahman is the
essence of God in all things as well as God Himself.
The GIta is primarily a theistic text. It takes up the
metaphysically precise notions of the Upani~ads and
Samkhya-Yoga type ideas as they might be related to a
possible conception of ultimate reality, and works them
up into a unitary conception of Godhead who is at the
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same time the Supreme Person. 193 As such God is the
principle that upholds even non-dual Brahman. 194
The universal form of the Lord in the eleventh chapter is
really an eccentric demonstration of the inconceivable
infinity of God, His limitless glory. The clear state-
ments about His otherness, His immanence and His power
are dramatically revealed through the overpowering vision
which only His grace can reveal. Such a conception that
is a culmination of philosophical reflection and religious
yearning is said to be the Puru~ottama, the Supreme Lord
of the Gita, the Highest Person, on a fraction of whose
being the entire universe rests. Radhakrishnan feels that
the principle of such reconciliation is already given in
the Upani~ads.
The concept of God in the Glta is an expression of
Upani?adic immanent ism. Thus ' 'other gods' are tolerated
and brought within the compass of one all-pervading
divinity. 195
A conce~tion advanced by the Glta and which sets it apart
from the Upani~ads, is that of avatara, incarnation. K~~~a
declares that whenever righteousness declines- and evil is
in the ascendant, then, for the protection of the good and
the destruction of the wicked, He bodies Himself forth in
age after age. 196 In this doctrine the GTta continues and
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culminates a trend begun in the Sarnhitas, where Indra is
declared to come down from his heavenly pedestal and
participate in the affairs of his devotees with concern.
It is important to note that the Gl~a does not speak of
any other incarnations, at least for the duration of a
whole age, and in any case all avataras are His, making
Him, as Kr~~, the origin, support and ground of all. So
far as the text of the Glta is concerned, Kr$~a is the
Supreme Saviour of all. Thus, even the mythological concept
of Siva is made an aspect , of KTs~a,197 as also the concept
of Vi$~u.198 Any manifestation of power and glory is seen
as an infinitesimal part of God. 199 'We see in this the.
ldgical corollories of the immanentist doctrine, common to
the G'ita and to the Upani~ads.
2.3.6. DEVOTION AND YOGA
The Glta makes out that there are two types of bhakti or
devotion. 200 One is the lower, which ranges from
conventional piety to the attainment of the realisation of
Brahman as the essence of all things. To this form is
related the practises of y~ga and the spiritual liberation
they lead to. The higher bhakti is the realisation that the
individual soul, though he may be freed from the fetters of
the world, yet realises the supremacy and utter transcendence
of God and relates to Him as absolute Person or Puru~ottama.201
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It is true that "the metaphysical idealism of the Upanif?ads
~ th . t' 1"" 202 dis transformed in the G1ta into a · e1S 1C re 1910n, an
there is some evidence of identity doctrine in the G~ta in
nhrases like brahma-bhuta, brahman-become and brahma~
..L _ •.•~.
nirvanam. Yet, from the beginning of the tex~ which
features rather austere descriptions of the soul, and its
relation to God, there is a mounting sense of the glory of
Krsna as the Transcendent, culminating in the theophany of .
--->-•.....>..-
the eleventh' chapter. still, God is not totally the other,
for there is a common inner essence between man and God.
Yoga practice is considere d in the GI t a as an integration of
the out~r man with his deeper self, though the term ~Ea
itself is also used in the sense of subserving devotion. 203
Even the man of knowledge i s considered a devotee, since he
. 204
turns his face towards God.
The essence of devotion is pure love of God which also means
total surrender to Him as creature to creator. The devotee
sur r en de r s his mind to GodJ prostrates to Him in loving '
service, and strives only after Hi m. 205 Devotion is both
loyalty and love. In the Glta it becomes the highest value
since it directly leads to participation in God's nature
towards which state all other values converge. Kr~~a says
that only through love, and not t hrough any other method,
can the devotee know Hi m and "enter into Him.,,206
go
2. 3.7. FREEDOM AND SALVATI ON
The GT t a may be r eferred to a s a mOkf?a- sas t ra , a treatise
conferring emancipation. 207 In hi s famous meditation verses
Madhus~dana eulogises the Gita as the "destroyer of rebirth."
In the text itself t here are many direct references to the
theory of .~?-m~:a.:!,_a (rebirth) and the means of deliverance
therefrom.
The GIt-a places high value on the concept of · freedom. The
very conditions of the created world entrap man within the
gunas of prakr t i , and the only solution to hi s difficulties
li e~ in overcomin g t he world. One way to freedom is thus
overcomine the g~a~ of prak~ti, which is also freedom from
. th d th tt · t f . - 208from reb1r an e a a1nmen 0 n1rva~a.
The general transcendentalist-immanentist background of the
Upani~ads encourages a simple view of ultimate freedom as
the release of the soul from the trammels of flesh. In the
Glta this is unity with the supreme self or God. 209
Coupled with the concept of God as standing over and above
11 t " . 210 th . th ' "a crea aon , even a.n essence, -. ere 1S e unmi.s t akeab'Le
sense that there is a higher estate among the freed souls.
Those that are true bhaktas, who surrender to God in total
loyalty and love, attain to salvation in a more r ichly
intimate form of "entry" into God, attaining to His "Supreme
Abode" . 211 The o~fer of salvation212 and the repeated over-
tures of endearment as "lV1y devotee is dear to lV1e",213 must
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have the meaning of what the words directly say. There is
the clear feeling of qualitative difference bwtween those
who follow yogic contemplation or the path of knowledge
exclusively, and those who offer Rim all - surrendering love.
Even Radhakrishnan says, in connection with the nature of
freedom:
"•••••• some have been led to thjnk
that jnana as a path is superior
to the other methods of approach,
and that cognition alone persists,
while the other elements of emotion
and will fallout in the supreme
state of freedom. There does not
seem to be any justification for
such an opinion" 214 !
Again he says:
"The Gita is not clear on the point
whether there is any basis of
individuality in the ultimate state."215
If we take into account the GIta's fundamental-realist
metaphysics, and the account of God as the Supreme Person,
it will not be difficult to concede a condition of special
salvation within the premises of the text.
2. 4. THE BR~ffiVIA SUTRA
The sutra literature pertaining to all the schools of
classical thought aimed at preserving the peculiar thought
of each school through terse and laconic statements which
coul d easily be held in the memory. The word sutra means
thread,-and this shows that all the statements should foster
a connected Whole, whose meaning should not suffer distortion.
In the case of the Brahma St;i~.!:a.:~., especially, this style is
.
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presented to a fault, and the brevity of the statements
makes it extremely difficult to interpret the meanings.
Nakamura says that "the Vedanta philosophy from the beginning
had esoteric tendencies, and in order to prevent outsiders
from having access to its teachings a brief and enigmatic
style of writing was deliberately used. It is difficult to
216understand even a single sutra without a commentary."
The Brahma S'utra is so called because its prime purpose is
to set forth in a systematic way the teachings concerning
Brahma and related topics. It is also called Vedanta Sutra
because the Upani~ads are the chief texts that give the
teachings covering Bra~~an, and the Upani~ads are
traditionally regarded as the Vedanta. As the Upani~adic
teachings are varied and conflicting in nature, the Brahma
Sutra became the standard text in its field. P. N. Rao says:
"The importance of the Brahma Sutras is
enormous, and without them we would not
have been able to unify the definitive
message of the apparantly conflicting
passages in the Upani~ads which form the
basis of Vedknta."217
The .Sutra represents a purely theological interpretation or
a scriptural exegesis of the Upani~adic texts. 218 But,
since averaging out the apparant contradictions of Upani~adic
passages involves some subjective judgement and personal
preferance, we have to accept that the author's views do
come through in some measure. 219
The author of the Sutra is a sage known as Badaray~a, whom
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- 220Indian tradition identifies with Vyasa. Dr. S. K.
Belwalkar's theory of a multiple authorship of the Sutra is
rejected by Mainkar on the grounds of precision of form and
content. 221
The work comprises a total of 555 s~tras divided into four
chapters, of four sections each, with a number of topics
under each section.
The first chapter is called samanvaya adhyaya, the chapter
on harmony of texts. It attempts exegetical correlation to
show that Brahman or ultimate reality is the major purport
of the Upani~adic texts as a whole, though presented in many
different ways.
The second chapter is called avirodha adhyaya, the chapter
on non-conflict. In this chapter the argument of the first
chapter is reinforced systematically by countering purely
logical questions that could be raised against the first
argument, and. importantly , by a direct re futation of the
metaphysical tenets of the mlmamsa, saDkhya, v aise ~ ik~ and
Bauddha schools of thought.
The third chapter deals with various upasanas and other
disciplines for attaining release, and is called Sadh~~a
Adhyaya, the chapter on discipline.
The fourth and last chapter, called phala adhyaya, the
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chapter on f r ui t i on (of the disciplines), explains the
goal of all striving as mok~a, spiritual freedom/and
considers its nature in terms of unal Joyed bliss, together
with the states of individual souls in the state of
222release.
2.4.1 SOME I~~ORTANT TEACHINGS
Ultimate Reality
The Brahman of the Upani~ads is regarded as the ultimate
223reality, as the material and efficient cause of the world,
and it is said to be of the nature of bliss or une.Ll.r-yed
spiritual joy.224 Brahman is also considered from the
point of view of form and formlessness,225 and these ideas
being clearly supported by Upani~adic passages, the Sutra
also shows that Brahman cannot be restricted in its nature. 226
The World
The Sutra states in its very second statement that Brahman
is the "source, etc." of all things,227 thus reiterating
the general Upani~adic position that Brahman is the origin,
sustenance and final goal of all things. 228 The text appears
to uphold the transformation or evolution theory of the
world known as sat-karya-vada and even uses the term
"pari!}ama", transformation. 229 The world process is due to
mere sport, IlIa, on the pant of Brahman, without referance
to any purpose. 230 The concept of sp9rt appears to be
original with Badaray~a, and though it plays down the
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idea of desire on the part of Brahman as the creator, it
still endows Him with a positive volition, and Brahman
must be regarded in terms of a 'personal principle",231
which creates the universe out of its own material like
curds out of milk. 232
The Individual Self
The individual self is ~n agent or karta. 233 He is an
ams~ or part of Brahman,234 an intelligent principle (jna),
whose distinction from Brahman is suggested. 235
Liberation
Liberation is the goal of every individual soul. It is not
clear whether the Sutra supports the concept of jivanmukti
or liberation in life. Both devotional and meditative
practices are considered appropriate. Even the devotee and
the yogi, howeve~ need to perform the duties prescribed in
terms of dharma, that is t~jna, sacrifice, brahmacarya,
asrama-dharma, etc. for these are preparations to liberation. 236
Liberated souls do not attain to identity with God, for He
is the Highest,237 and the individual self is said to be
itara, other, than the Highest Self. 238 Finally, however,
it is not easy to say whether union of the individual with
God is "of the nature of identity or communion and fellow-
ship".239
The Brahma Sutra is heavily influenced by the teachings of
- U· d 240The Chandogya pan~sa.
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It is possible that its strong
realistic suggestions can be traced to this influence. The
theism of the Bhagavad Glta and the Bhagavatas has probably
influenced the author. 241
Tradition requires that an exegesis be conducted in terms
of six marks of authenticity, the tatparyali~gas, which are
"the accepted criteria for determining the final import of .
passages ll • 242 This has probably helped the great commentators
in arriving at consensus, though often they have given us
variant readings, turning the pithy aphorisms into the
service of their preconceived metaphysical systems. Some-
times the commentators appear to confound the sense of the
sutras rather than clarify them. 243
Among the most important commentators of the Brahma Sutra
/
have been Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva and Vallabha.
2.5. THE SAThiliHYA KARIKA
The :samkpya system is supposed by some to be coeval with the
oldest Upani~ads,244, and indeed we do find many leading
concepts of the samkhya in thesetreatises. 245 Yet we
cannot from these identifications conclude that the ~affikhya
was systematised at that time. Genuine saIDk~a concepts are
identifiable only in the Svetasvatara and the Maitri, both
of which are relatively later period Upanisads and even. ,
here the doctrines are pressed into a theistic mould. 246
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Tradition ascribes the samkhya to the legendary sage Kapila.
Although it is probable that such a sage did exist,247t he
original sutras are no longer extant, and the SaIDkhya Karika
of Isvarakrf?t?-a is "the earliest book of authority on
classical s8.Ihkhya",248 the word "karika" meaning a verse
commentary. The SaIDkhya Karika, dated 300 AD or a little
after, is taken to be a faithful representation of the
original sutras of the saIDkhya school, and the polemics foro
and against this school have been conducted in terms of the
doctrines of the Samkhya Karika. Vacaspati's Samkhyatattva-
kaumudI {light of the truth of samknya) of the 9th century AD
is an important gl os s on the Karika. In the sixty-nine
- .;
verses that are extant out of a total of seventy, Isvarakrsna
outlines the philosophical position of the samkhya school
as an uncompromising .doctrine of realistic dualism. Unlike
the Bhagavad G"ItEi, the Karika shows no ambiguity or ambi-
valence in doctrinal teachings, and we do not have any
significant differences among commentators regarding the
meaning of them. We shall therefore present the metaphysics
of this school directly in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three: The SaiDkhya System
In this chapter the basic elements of the ancient system
of s8.nikhya thought are briefly presented. Its basic
postulate of a radical dualism between the spirit and
matter principles is clearly discerned.
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Among the systems that arose in the sutra period, the oldest
is reckoned to be the saIDkhya, whose oral tradition is
surmised to reach back into deep antiquity. It is quite
possible that its oral tradition was relatively well-
formulate d, more or less parallel to the Upani~adic tradi-
tion, which, like the original sutras themselves, is largely
lost to us. 1 What we have of it in the S~kh~a Karikii is
therefore to be taken as the bare outline of its fundamental
position.
The two fundamental propositions of the samkhya system,
spiritual reality and material reality, lie embedded in its
name, which refers to a studied discrimination between these
two realities,2 and at the same time to a precise enumeraw
tion of fundamental categories into which the material world
can be organised. The fixe d total of 25 categories is of
great importance to the system, as is apparent from
Pancasikha's declaration that only a clear understanding of
the enumeration can lead to true or final deliverence,3 and
from this we may note that the fact of precise enumeration
is most likely the true burden of the term 'samkhya,.4
3.1. THE DOCTRINE OF PURUSA
The classical s'amkhya doctrine of the puruya or spirit
principle is set forth with great precision,5 and affirms
the utter transcendence of this principle over the material
Yet it is universal experience
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world. The world of aggregates is in fact in the position
of an instrwDent that subserves the purposes of the spirit.
Material entities may conceivably be supposed to serve the
pur~oses of other material entities, but this would lead to
an infinite regress, for the system holds ttlat material
collocations, being differentiated in themselves, have to
serve the purposes of an entity that is not so constituted.
6
Since material nature is by definition regarded as non-
conscious, its existence would be inexplicable if it were
not experienced or "enjoyed" by another. This other must
be of the nature of spirit which alone can be the principle
of consciousness and therefore the coordinator of the mani-
fold experiences of the empirical personality.? Then there
is the yearning in the human heart for the peace of ka~~~lya,
aloofness from material things, of spirit dwelling by itself.
Peace is not the product of man's relation with things
material, and it has to be attained by a total rift with all
nature. Pure spiritual being, or puru~a, therefore stands
vindicated as a vital and necessary category of existents.
The existence of the category of puru~a is determined
through inference, since it is not and cannot be an abject
of perception. In the samkhya scheme all the faculties of
mind as well as body are constituted of basically the same
material nature. None of the faculties, therefore, not even
the mind or the higher discriminative intellect, can be
"t d " "t 8POSl e as pure splrl •
that every person asserts his own consciousness of objects.
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These experiences are veridical both psychologically and
objectively. This fact of universal individual experiences
leads saIDkhya thought to an important conclusion regarding
the concept of puruya. There must be a plurality of spirits,
purusa bahutvam, for if there were only a single puru$a,
there would be no variation in the experiences of different
individuals, and with the birth of one individual, all would
be born, with the death of one all would die. 9
Puru$a is pure spirit and utterly opposed to all materiality.
It is neither all pleasure nor even bliss. It is devoid of
any and every characteristic, but its nature is absolute
pure consciousness. 10 It is also said to be of the nature
of unfailing changeless light, sadaprakasasvarupa,11 for it
is through the light of puruya that objects in the mind get
illumined. Dasgupta says:
"The special characteristic of self is that it
is like a light, without which all knowledge
would be blind • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • the presence
of this principle in all our forms of know-
ledge is distinctly indicated by inference. 1I ,2
Being pure spiritual consciousness, the puru$a is devoid of
all material attributes such as motion, size and mutability.
As spiritual reality, puru~a, is set over ag~~st the
principle of material reality.
3.2. THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY
The principle of causality is of central importance to the
samkhya system, as on it rests its entire argument concern-
ing material nature. The Karika says that an effect is
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non-different from its cause, since what is non-existent
cannot be brought into existence by the operation of any set
of causal factors. 13 The emphasis here is not on the fact
that effects exist, for this is patent to our perception,
. t t' 1 t' 14but on their existence prlor 0 ne causa opera lon.
The doctrine maintains that a cause is that which already
carries its effect potentially within it; that a cause is
specific to a particular effect. The Karika itself says:
"the potent cause effects only that of which it is capable."
Thus it is milk that turns into curds and not plain water.
Causal efficiency is a specific power, otherwise anything
will be capable of producing anything, and there will be no
necessary relation subsisting between cause and effect.
Vacaspati shows that the effect cannot be a mere property of
a pre-existing cause. A jar is non-existent (as an effect)
before its transformation from the original clay (as the
cause). If the jar were a property of the cause, it would
be non-existent, and a non-existent entity cannot be brought
into eXistence. 15
A cause is therefore the prior condition of an effect, while
the effect is the unfolding of the cause in which it lay in
a latent condition. Because non-existence cannot be
produced from exi.atence and vice-versa, the system does not
countenance creation ex nihilo nor any true destruction.
Creation is in fact production or manifestation, evolution
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or development, while annihilation is disappearance of the
effect into the cause, a resolution into its own prior state.
For the effect is non-different from its cause, as the cloth
from its threads. Yet cause and effect are not confused
with each other16 because they are different states of the
same substance. Although one in essence, they serve
different practical purposes. 17 The saIDk~y~ principle of
causality is known as satkaryavada, the doctrine that the
effect (karya) is a pre-existent entity (sat) made manifest
in a different state. 18
PRAKRTI.
The ~amkhya divides all existence, all reality whatsoever,
into two fundamentally opposed categories of puru~a or
spiritual reality, and prak~ti or material reality. Apart
from the pure spiritual consciousness of puru9a, all that
exists in the entire universe is traced to prakrti and its
evolutes. Besides puru9a and prakrti, nothing else exists.
Both these concepts arise out of human experience and both
formulations are designed to satisfy the demands of
experience, in metaphysical terms. Says Hiriyanna:
"Both Prak~ti andPuru::;>a alike are thus
deduced from an investigation of the nature
of common things; the only difference is
that while the one is the result of arguing
from those things to their source or first
cause, the other is the result of arguing
from them to their aim or final cause. 1I
19
The samkhya argues to the existence of prak~ti from our
- - ---
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perception of the real world, on the basis of the principle
of causality. The world of flux and change together with
the multiform entities that are patent to our vision,
represents a multitude of effects, each one specific to its
own cause in a prior lli~manifested condition. Yet the more
antecedent causes participate in higher generalisations of
nature until all specificity of casual conditions is
resolved into a single ultimate entity that bears within it·
l · t f 1 . f 20 P k t' . ththe potentia ~ y or evo v~ng new orms. ra_~ ~ ~s e
great matrix of the world, the seed and womb of all creation,
the final merger of all phys i cal entities. The cognate
118 tin term mater Drocrea.trix brings out the meaning of
prak~ti as the creative womb and mother of all things.
Prakrti is the very root of all existence, the one antecedent
ultimate cause of all things. But .it is also the rootless
root, the causeless cause. 21 It would be illogical to
conceive of a cause beyond prak~ti, as that would lead to an
infinite regress. The samkhya conceives prak~ti as that
entity which possesses the necessary characteristics that
would be attaching to the highest and most general possible
conception of an unmanifested or unevolved entity, the
avyakta, which yet bears within itself the infinite potenti-
ality for change and evolution. 22
There is no such thing as creation of nr-akr-ta , Since all. .
material existences that have evolved from prakr.ti are
indestructible and uncreated, only their causal states being
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referred to antecedent conditions, prakrti, the most
anterior of all antecedents, is itself uncaused and
eternal. 23 It is the reverse of the limitations attaching
to all created things. 24 Thus it is one and infinite,
unmoving and imperceptible. In tracing the ,wor l d of
disparate forms of evolved t hings to an ultimate source
which is totally material yet pot ent i a l ; in tracing the
heterogeneity of fragile and partible substances of common "
experience to a most anterior principle that is indestruc-
tible and partless t the saIDkhya is demonstrating its
sustained concern for a rational metaphysic. 25 The system
takes care not to confuse the material with the spiritual,26
while ensuring t hat the world pf changing forms is not"
reduced to an illogical absurdity.
THE THEORY OF THE Gul~AS.
The primary substance of creation, prakrti, though one, is
not homogeneous. If it were, the manifold heterogeneity of
the world of created things would be a patent absurdity, for
that which is non-existent cannot be brought into existence.
The very word "prakrti" means intense activity, and we get
a true picture of it by inverting the first term and saying
a ct i v i t y 'in tension t • It would be metaphysically
inaccurate to hol d that a plurality of reals proceeds forth
from homogeneous unity. In its concern for precision
samkhya thought asserts that, even in the condition of
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non~~anife8tation, avyakta, the unified basis of the world
of becoming is in fact "the symbol of the never-resting,
active world stress".27
Prak~ti in fact is a unified composite of three substances
28called ~~as. We cannot say that these g~as are
qualities, though often translated as such; they are the
very substance and constitutive stuff of primal nature. 29
In all its creative aspects prak~ti is known by and
evidenced through the action of the g~as, for these
constituents, though contrary in their natures, do cooperate
in the actual process. They are said to be of the nature of
pleasure, pain and indifference, and they serve to illumine,
actuate and restrain the activities and objects of man and
the world. 30 They are known as sattva, which is buoyant and
illuminating, rajas, which is stimulating and mobile, and
tamas, which is heavy and enveloping. 31 It is clear that
their nature is mutually opposed, yet the text indicates
their cooperation by the analogy of a lamp in which the
flame, wick and oil cooperate towards a common goal. 32
Again, sattva is goodness, happiness, pleasure, while rajas
is activity, excitement, movement, and tamas is darkness,
sluggishness, slothfulness. 33 Sattva, being illumination,
leads to knowledge, truth and freedom, while tamas, being
darkness, leads to ignorance, delusion and bondage. These
constituents always operate in close relationship, so that
112
prak~ti and its evolutes are always seen as simple wholes.
Since the J~1JQa._!?. are nothing but prakrtl, all things are
traced to the gUQas and their operations. By action and
reaction on each other, by their relative preponderance
and different combinations, the infinite variety of the
world is explained, both psychological phenomena as well
as the grosser manifestations of things.
).5. EVOLUTION OF PRAKRTI
The process of world becoming is directly de~endent upon
prak~ti, which is to say, upon the gugas. In the condition
of relative quiescence or non-manifestation, the avyakta
condition, the activity of the gUQas is extremely fine and
held in tension. Vacaspati says :
"Modified condition forms a part of the nature of
the gU1)aSj and as such they can never, for a
moment remain inert." 34
At the time of dissolution the constituents are in a
condition of relative quiescence, whereas in the actual
mode of becoming they burst out into creative differentiating
activity when different properties latent within prak~ti
begin to become manifest due to the action of the gunas.. .
The process of world manifestation is also dependent upon
pur~~a or the spiritual principle of consciousness, but
only indirectly, for purusa is not the substance out of
~-=."=..~=-~_..!':.., .~.,..,,,,=
which the world proceeds. While in the state of non-
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manifestation the three constituents are in a state of
perfect equilibrium or balance, this equilibrium is some-
how disturbed by its association, samyoga, with the puruf?a.
As a reslllt of this association lI a process of unequal
t · 011 of the gun.aS1,35 takes place determining andaggrega 1 _
differentiating into the manifold world.
Neither Isvarakr?~a nor Vacaspati, nor even later SaIDkhya
writers, could explain this association between prakrti
and puru9a with any logical precision. On the basis of
the very premises of the system it leaves a huge metaphysical
gap in the rationale of the system. "How or rather why
prakr-t i should be .di s t ur bed is the most knotty point in
- . 36Samkhya."
The system proposes a teleological association on the part
of prakr,ti, such that the ~UDas begin to operate for the
sake of innumeTable puru9as who go through pleasllres and
.- - - --- ---- - "-
pains and finally attain release. 3? Since pmk:rti is totally
unconscious, the association is compared to that between a
lame man who climbs llpon the shoulders of one who is blind,
and in which the former gives intelligent direction and
the latter provides the means of transport. 38
Whatever the demerits of this scheme, the conjuction of
puru:;:>a and prak:r:ti His the necessary presupposition of all
experience n • 39 It is an attempt to secure the independence
of puru~a and prakrti, and thus to preserve the integrity
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of the basic presuppositions of the Samkhya metaphysics.
If puru?a were to be dependent upon prakrt i through a real
w . .. --.- - - - - --- "" .- - .-
1 " t· ··t 1 40 ~fconnection it would ose ~ s sp1r1 ua supremacy; ~
prakrt i were dependent on purusa the plurality of purusas
would evaporate and a theistic relation would become
apparent; the majestic sway and dominance of the ~uoa~ in
the natural and mechanical arrangement of the world would
suffer diminution. 41
Prakrtic evolution has a clear psychological orientation,
though non-psychological reality is also sought to be
covered. The first category to evolve is the buddhi or
intelligence-stuff, which is characterised by a preponderence
of the sattva g~a. This is also known as ~ahat or great
one, a term which suggests its cosmic significance as well
as its fundamental importance as the ground and substance
of the empirical individual. Thus it is also buddhitattva,
a state which "comprehends within it the buddhis of all
individuals ll • 42 A general differentiation of the constitu-
ents leads to the rise of the individuation principle, ego
or ahamkara. From this a parallel development takes place.
From the sattvika ahamkara proceeds the development of mind,
the five organs of perception (jnanedriyas) and the five
organs of action (karmendriyas), while from the tamasika
ahamkara develop the five fine elements or tanmatras, which
in turn give rise to the five gross elements or bhutas. 43
The five organs of knowledge are hearing, touching, seeing,
tasting and smelling, while the organs of action are speech,
hands, feet, reproductive organ and excretory organ. Thus,
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from prakr.ti downwards, are counted 23 evolutes, which
together with prak~ti and purusa make up the 25 categories
of samkhya metaphysics.
3.6 THE ]m~IRICAL INDIVIDUAL AND LIBERATION
The saIDkhya metaphysics formally declare the utterly
transcendent nature of puru~a and the fundamentally
material character of the human personality. Seen this
way the empirical individual can really have no connection
with spiritual reality. Yet the system disallows the
concept of the individual apart from some so~t of contact
or influence) however vaguely defined, of purusa upon
.
prak~ti. It is only through association with puru~a that
prakr.ti transforms itself into buddhi, self-sense, and
mind. The basis ~f these three which together are known as
the anta~kara~a or inner organ, is the influence of purusa,
wi thout which they are nothing but prakr;ti; with it they are
something vitally more. 44 The system appears to have anti-
cipated the problem in some measure. Dasgupta says:
"•••• one class of the g~as called sattva is
such that it resembles the purity and intelli-
gence of the puru~a to a very high degree, so
much so that it can reflect the intelligence of
the puru~a, and thus render its non~intelligent
transformations to appear as if they were
intelligent." 45
The sattva constituents are in great preponderance in the
buddhi or intellect,
they reflect puruxa,
as an empirical ego,
and being of nature light and buoyant ,
who then attributes to himself selfhood
and the notion of agency.46 The idea
of reflection strongly indicates the otherness of purU$a
116
from prak~ti, and yet confers a limited form of conscousness
on the individual; and it is just this limited nature of
his consciousness that defines the chief feature of the
empirical individual. Radhakrishnan says on this point:
"The ego is the seeming unity of buddhi and
puruf?a • • • • • The relation between purUf?a
and prak~ti associated with it is such
that whatever mental phenomena happen in
the mind are interpreted as the experiences
of the puru~a." 47
The conception of the reflection of spiritual reality in
the buddhi endows the empirical individual with a true
reflective consciousness and genuine will. Within the
parameters of the samkhya it is the buddhi alone, operating
as the soul of man, that can itself see through the variety
and spiritually voided character of the world by discrimina-
ting the subtle difference between itself and the true
puruf?a. 48
So long as, even through the aid of the buddhi, the puru$a
fails to make a clear distinction between itself as the
transcendent s pirit and the buddhi as a material vehicle
it will remain entrapped in prak~ti• . Lack of discrimination
is itself a mode of operation of bUddhi, a continuation of
the confusion between spirit and matter, which is avidya
and "the root of all experience and misery,,~9 When the
individual overcomes the confusion between spirit and matter
through right knowledge and discrimination, he wi ns final
liberation from the meshes of matter. 50 The system maintains
a metaphysical consistency in its doctrine by holding that,
since confusion and incorrect knowledge lead to bondage,
only correct knowledge of t he distinction between spirit
and matter can confer emancipation.
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Chapter Four: The Metaphysics of Advaita
This chapter outlines the fundamental doctrines of the
advaita system of thought. It is shown that, in terms
of the metaphysical structure of the . system, it tends to
undervalue the world, and consequently the status of the
individual. Yet the system institutes certain checks
against this tendency, through which it strives to give
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It is the contention among scholars that the tradition of
advaita is to be traced to the Upanil;3ads while those who
belong to the tradition insist that advaita is the central
teaching of those texts.
The first systematic statement of the advaita metaphysics
is given by Gau4apada in his commentary on the Ma~dUkya
Upani 9ad.
1 In this work he establishes not only that the
supreme reality is of a non-dual character (advaita), but
also the doctrine of ajativada, that "nothing is ever born, 'T~,
nor is it possible for anything to come into birth,) and
that those who think that the mind or the objects perceived
by it are ever born are under a severe delusion. 4 Gau4apada
asserts that the world of plurality is an illusion because
it lands us in the muddle of causality.5§affikara, however,
who laid out the groundwork and the details of the general
advaitic position is not always as austere as Gau~apada
though he is much influenced by him. 6 The term advaita
signifies that the plurality of the world may be explained
in terms of the single concept of Brahman.? As non-dualism,
it asserts the transcendence of all numerical quantification
altogether, rejecting also lTany position that views reality
as a single order of objective being. 1T 8 Although other
schools such as those of Ramanuja and Vallabha are also
considered varieties of advaita, the term has a special
/ ,.
affinity to Samkara's system .and should be seen as germane
to it.
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4.1. AUTHORITY AND REASONING
Safukara firmly held that the authority for all things super-
sensuous and man's spiritual destiny lay in the dual realm
of scripture and mystic experience, while the authority for
an analysis of the physical world and the relations obtain-
ing among objects lay in the realm of logical thought and
human reasoning. 9 If scripture were required to provide a
knowledge of matters pertaining to ordinary perception,
human thought would become redundant and scripture reduced
to a mundane level. Scripture or sruti, which for Samkara
denoted mainly the Upani~ads and secondarily the Bhagavad
GIt'a, gives us knowledge of transempirical reality, which
is not available to ordinary modes of perception.
The sruti represents the anubhava or direct experiences of
/ ,
perfect sages. Samkara accepts the traditional account
that the Vedas areapauru~eya, without authorship, and
which do not need to stand on an.y authority apart from
itself. 10 But this authority is not so far removed from
man that he merely has to obey it as a servant obeys his
master. The scripture is a traditional guide and inspiration
that should lead each one to the realization of its teaching
in personal mystic experience~ Dasgupta says:
It /' •
From his own position Samkara was not thus
bound to vindicate the position of the Vedanta
as a thoroughly rational system of metaphysics.
For its truth did,not depend on its rationality
but on the author~ty of the Upanil?ads." 11
Scripture teaches the transcendental truth of the true self
of man, to which empirical modes of investigation are
irrelevent. 12 Yet Samkara himself engaged in protracted
122
dialectics against all opponents, for he held that by reason-
ing and logical demonstration the truth of scripture can be
appreciated and faith deepened. 13 While scripture taught
a single lesson, the existence of diverse interpretations
presented a dilemma to any student, and he must resort to
philosophy in order to choose from among them. 14 It is true
that for Saffikara philosophy carried no ultimate value.
Radhakrishnan says:
~
"Samkara's philosophical undertaking is intended
to disillusion us with systematic philosophy
and make out that logic by itself leads to
scepticism·"15
Samkara's very practical religious interest is deeply under-
scored when he says: "Disease is not cured by saying
'medicine', but by actually taking it.,,16 still, it can be .
safely said that, apart from and above all considerations of
purely exegetical interest, the advaitic tradition justifies
itself as a technical philosophy invoking metaphysical
subtlety of a higher order. 17
4.2. THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION
Advaita dialectics advanced the cause of an unrelenting
idealist metaphysics by founding itself firmly upon the
doctrine of causation, the relation between cause and effect.
The realist schools of the nyaya and the saIDkhya had based
themselves on commonsense views of the world of things,
whereas Samkara was heavily influenced by the mystical
teachings of the Upani~ads and the views of Gau~apada. The
basis of his philosophical theories is the intuitive
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conviction that logical thought falls short of reality
because it is forced to set up a relational connection
between the known and the unknown. 18 The mind operates
within the confines of a dualistic framework, and it is not
proper to let the natural constitution of things affect our
perception of the truth. " .Samkara says that the highest
truth is "the negation of all differences - the conclusion
arrived at by reasoning and supported by the scriptures.,,1~
'" .Samkara's metaphysics takes the world of experience as
operating within parameters that are specific to it.
Experience is bound by a sense of time, space and causation,
whereas reality is transcendent to these conditions. 20 As .
the world of objects is taken to be precisely interconnected
through cause and effect relationships that is the very
" .ground and assumption of metaphysics, SamRara argues against
the concept of causality on logical grounds. 21
The satkaryavada view of causal relationship is accepted in
advaita. Thi s view maintains that the effect pre-exists in
t he cause, on t he £r ounds that an entity cannot be produced
out of non- en t i t y . If t he effect were not already present
in some way , it could not logically manifest, just as oil
t . 't ~ d 22canno · oe pressea ou , 0 1 mere san.
The t heory_in its realist framework is also known as
pariQamavada or transformation, and this designation
clarifies the naturalistic motive of an evolutionary
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cont i nuance of the pr i or condi t i on . The state of an -e ntity
a s cause change s i t self i n t o an effect conditi on by a
natural rearrangement of i ts substance, and without
'1' . t I n t . .... ' t t 23V10 a t l ng 1 s I n egrlvy as an eX1 S en •
Samkara hol ds tha t an essential identity obtains between t he
ef fect and it s cause, since nothing new can be fre shly
produced. He holds that a thing which does not exist in
identity with something, does not even originate from that
ent ity.24 Outward appearances thus do not affect the inner
essence t hat pers ists. The same phenomenon t hat we call
effect is earlier known as cause. Such an explanation
a ppea r s to hold wel l at the level of physical reality, where
a series of prior causes as an indefinate series may be
tolerated. When a metaphysical presupposition such as a
first cause is pos i t ed , Samkara holds that the causal
relationship must be found i na dequa t e . The samkhya view
that the manifested universe of forms is to be traced to
prakrti o~ avyakta as its first cause is illogical, since
there is no reasonable ground for terminating the series of
causes at the level of avyakta which, on the t heory, must be
continuous with the later effects. And logic demands that
we ask for a'further prior cause. But this would lead to an
infinite regression, pecause there is no reason to. suppose




Samkara takes his stand on scripture and declares that cause
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and effect are non-different; the world is an effect of
Brahman which is the changeless reality. Since this change-
less reality cannot be logically conceived to actually
. transform itself into the world, empirical existence is said
26 " .to be "conjured up by nescience." Samkara asserts the
logical validity of Brahman as the first cause of things by
pointine out the scriptural declarations of changelessness
with regard to Brahman, thus reconstructing the notion of
the world-effect on a lower ontological plane as a mere
appearance. 27 The advaitic theory is known as vivarta-vada,
~world-effect is an apparent transformation of Brahman as
distinguished from the idea of a real or factual
transformation or pari~ama-vada.
4.3. ULTIMATE REALITY
Creation is characterised in advaita as mere name and form,
nama-rupa, while Br-ahman is different from it. 28 Empirical
usage is a characteristic of all language, which imposes
marks on things. Differentiation and linguistic functions
go together, says the advaitin. The manifold cannot reveal
the tr~th of Brahman, which is yet the basis of it. Thoug4
Brahman is entirely different from the existence of ' the
world, yet it remains as the basis of the negation of the
world. Salllkara says: "The statement that Brahman is beyond
speech and mind is not meant to i mply that Br ahman i s non-
existent". 29 The utter transcendence of Br-ahman .is a
necessary corol~ to the finitude of man, for if Brahman
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were cognizable then it would be rendered finite.
30
The notion of ultimate reality as nirg~a or attributeless
is seen as a necessary corollary of the empirical character
of language. Therefore, the negation of all distinctions in
the text that says "neti neti" (not this not this),31 is
taken to represent the truth of ultimate reality accurately.
Sarnkara asserts: "Words denotethine;s•••• but Brahman has no
distinguishing marks".32 Samkara, however, does not adopt
a totally austere position in this matter on the showing of
s cripture which uses positive descriptions, such as "satyam
jnanam anantam brahma" ( Brahman is truth, knowl edge and
infini ty),33 lI pr a j nanam br-ahma" ( Brahman is supreme conscious-
ness);4 etc. All positive descriptions, however, insofar as
they apply to Brahman, are to be taken as negating their
opposite characteristics. Since t he absolute Brahman is the
indeterminate beyond every characterisation;. since, · tri)~y
speaking, there cannot be a symbol of Brahman, neither in
the world of objects, nor in the world of thought, all
pr edi ca t i on must necessarily refer to a negation of its
opposite. The concept of the nirg~a Brahman denotes t hat
ultimate reality is transcendent to all objects and thoughts;
it canno t be understood as any form of personality as this
is always connected with a binding ego. Nirg~a Bra~man is
therefore trans-empirical. 35
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4. 4. SA GUFA BRAm{~N OR I SVARA
Samkara is loathe to make the i mpersonal nirg~na Br ahman t he
di r ec t cause of t he wor ld ; it is i mportan t for the premises
of hi s me ta~hys i c s t hat no vestiee of changeful phenomena is
se en t o a t t ach t o the ca tegor y of t he trans- empi r ical , t he
ca te gory of pur-e be i.ng , Hi s di ct um "brahma satyam jagan-
mi t hJra., " (Br ahman is the truth,the world is f al se) makes
ultimate reality totally transcendent to the world.
Ye t the world is very much a pa r t of experience and cannot
be wi shed away i nt o no t hingne ss. I t ha s a t l eas t the
sembl ance of bei ng , even as an app earance . And s ince
nobh i ng exi s t s apart f r om Brahman , and since even s cr i pt ur e
spe~ks of the wo r l d- ef f ec t and our ac t i vities i n i t, i n
a dvai ta met aphys i cs the concept of sagUQ.a Braliman or Isvara
i s pos i t ed a s t he r e conciling pr i n ci pl e between" the "change-
l e s s absolute i mper s onal Brahman and the world-effect.
Ra clhakr i shnan says that the concept of Isvara "is not a
self-evident axi om, is not a logical truth, but an empi r i ca l
pos t ulat e which is pr a ct i ca l ly useful. ,;36 San1ka r a asserts
t hat we canno t s ay t ha t the world is related to Br ahman as
one ob ject to another, for Brahman is trans-empirical
reality; yet the origin of the world must somehow be related
to "a cause t hat is by nature et.ernal, pure and free, and
intrinsically omnicient.,,37 Isvara is the concept of
Brahman modi f i ed to suit our needs of apprehending this
world in a logical fashion. As objects in this world always
exist in some relation to each other, the world is seen 8S
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related to Isvara as effect is to cause. Isvara is the
creator, sustainer and dissolver of the world. It is the
concept that stands for the God of religion, the object of
devotion and worship. It is that concept of the absolute
as modified to stand over against the world as the great
Ruler and Controller, controlling all things from within
as the antaryami, the Inner Ruler. 38
The nirg~a Brahman is seen as the sole ultimate reality in
- ;
advaita. So Isvara is said to be Brahman in association
with maya, the medium of world appearance. As Brahman is
the ontological principle of unity pertaining to the world
and to man, it is proper to speak of Isvara only in terms
l:l~
of the world~empirical reality. Yet we cannot say that
the advaitic concept of Isvara isirr~ev&nt. Within the
advaitic premises, it answers to all the practical religious
requirements until identity experience is achieved. 39 Its
reality is said to be the smile as the reality of nirgllQa
Brahman conceived in terms of the world. The question of
the objective reality of Isvara cannot arise, because it
would raise the very question of the reality of the world. 40
The concept is an integral part of advaita metaphysics which
must be taken as a whole.
4.5. WlAYA AND AVIDYA
As pure being free of all qualities, the absolute is indes-
cribable. Known in this way it is said to be svarupa-
lak?ana, characterised by its own essence. Since it is
asserted that the absolute alone exists, and nothing else
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besides it, the manifold world is also a certain view of
the absolute, but a view that depends upon accidental
characteristics, ta~astha-lak~~a.
The reality of Brahman, for the advaitin, is translogical}
as it is trans-empirical. As such, it can only be ascertain-
ed through mystic experience. The paradox of the changeless
undifferentiated consciousness which is the absolute, and .
the simultaneous existence of the manifold world rests upon
a mystical intuition. 41 Since sruti declares that non-
duality is the highest reality1 2 the ~q~~~tin feels that
the perception of multiplicity must be due to the operation
of some error. Samkara posits the metaphysical construct
of maya or avidya or ajnana, to account for this error of
judgement. 43 Because it covers the entire existence of name
and form, that is, all material reality, he also designates
it as prak~ti, so that maya is not only the power of
illwsion, but also the illusion itself. Just as Brahman
is not different from Brahman-experience, the world is non-
different from the experience of it; the world is what is
experienced as such (phavarupa).
Brahman, which is changeless spiritual essence, cannot
properly be characterised as operating through m~y~. There-
fore advaita adopts the stand that maya is that power of
.. I
creation through which Isvara puts forth the entire world
of phenomena. Since the act of creation is in a sense a
lapse from the pure changelessness of Brahman, maya is
stated to be an upadhi, limited adjunct, a condition
that arises inexplicably. Again to maintain the conceptual
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purity of Brahman, maya, and therefore the world, including
all individual selves, are assigned the status of sadasad-
vilak~ara, neither real nor unreal. 44
The concept of maya seems to work on the basis of an
epistemic - phenomenological circularity. The world is the
product of maya because Brahman is in essence changeless
being. Yet we as individuals are unable to perceive that
Brahman is the sole reality and that the world is only an
appearance because of the operation of maya as avidya or
ignorance. Radhakrishnan says:
I1Avidya. is the fall from intuition, the mental
deformity of the finite self that disintegrates
the divine into a thousand different fragments ••••
(it is) the twist of the mind which makes it
impossible for it to see things except through
the texture of the space-time cause." 45
The advaitin maintains, however, that avidya is only
another aspect of _maya seen from the level of individual
perception, and the world-effect is coeval with the
production of selves. The two standpoints do not constitute
argumentative hedging, but are complementary versions of
the same argument. 46 The problem is at the same ontological
level for the world and for man; therefore what is maya for
the former is avidya for the latter. From the perspective
of the t ranscendent Brahman, there is no creation and no
problem f - - !J.7O T'l~VP "~.
4.6 . STATUS OF THE WORLD
The fundamental position of advaita with regard to the
status of the world is that Brahman is its basis, ground
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and sup,ort. In advaita metaphysics it could not be other-
wise, since Brahman alone exists, and nothing else besides
't 481 • Since the world is perceived to exist, there are
only two alternatives: it is either a tra..Ylsformation
(pari.t}ama) of Brahman or. a misapprehension of its reality.
The former view, adopted by the samkhya is rejected by the ·
advai tj.n on account of its violation of the immutability of
Brahman, "Brahman that is beyond all phenomenal processes".49
We are then left with the second alternative, that the
world as we experience it is a misapprehension of its
underlying reality which is the changeless Brahman. In the
,/ ,
introduction to his commentary on the Brahma Sutra, Samkara
urges the view that "there is nothing impossible in super-
imposing the non-self on the self that is opposed to it. ,,50
Advaitin~ argue that the world is an apparent trans-
formation, a vivarta of Brahman, and that therefore the
world is not a baseless appearance. All misapprehensions,
even within human experience, are made on some factual
basis. Sarnkara asserts that "even phenomena like mirages
are not without their ground.,,51 The world is neither
totally unreal nor pure illusion, like the "son of a barren
woman." It is the superimposition (adhyasa) of a false
view upon the only true reality which is Brahman. Such a
view renders the universe false or mithya but not totally
unreal. 52 While Brahman is transcendent being, the world
of appearances belongs to the empirical category. As such
there can be no causal relation between the two, as necess-
arily exists between two empirical Objects. 53
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Samkara maintains that the world is dependent upon God (as
Isvara), or indirectly upon Br ahman , even as the snake
54illusion depends upon the rope. . In this sense of being
dependent on a real gr ound , a genuine relati on is affirmed
between Brahman and the world, though this relation is
declared to Hbe inexplicable, anirvacaniya.
In metaphysical terms, the advaitin does not say that the
world is real, but it stands between the real and the unreal.
It is not real because reality belongs to Brahman alone; it
is not unreal because it is gr ounded in Brahman. 55
In Samkara's view, the precise relation of the world with '
Brahman is, in the nature of the case, an insoluble riddle. 56
The world has phenomenal reality, because it is experienced
as real. Whi l e only Brahman can be accorded the highest
reali ty or paramarthika sat ta , the wor Ld is accorded
vyavaharika satta, empirical reality. Thus advaita meta-
physics extends a practical and pragmatic validity to the
world of common experience. To the purely illusory category
of pratibhasika satta belong events such as dreams and
hallucinati ons, s kyflowers and sons of barren women.
4.7. STATUS OF THE I NDIVIDUAL
The status of t he individual is an area of some miscon -
ceptions, partly due to terminology and partly due to the
nature of advaita metaphysics. TakinG into consideration
. ...-
the second half of Samkara's dictum "jIvo brahmaiva na para~.,'!
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the j1!~ is non-different Brahman, does not help to clarify
the issue, unless we take jlva to mean "essence of the jiva l ' ,
as in the Upanil?adic statement regarding the world. "sarvam
khalvidam brahma", all this (world) is indeed Brahman. 57
Obviously here what is meant is not the world as perceived
through the senses, but the essential reality or essence of
it, which is Brahman.
./ ,
Advaita teachers from Samkara downwards have always under-
stood, in spite of the terminological difficulties, that
58"the individual soul is essentially an agent". The entire
advaita met aphysics, as concerning the individual, hinges
upon the doership or agency characteristic of the soul. The
Atman-Brahman equation is the very ground of the advaita
system, and "ayamatma brahma,,59 is accepted as a great
saying maha-vakya. The empirical individual is therefore
- 60not Atman.
Man is an agent who consciously directs his activities and
enjoys the fruits of his actions. 61 As in the saIDkhya
system, in advaita also, consciousness belongs to the pure
spirit alone, while activity belongs to the non-self. The
buddhi as a part of the material psychic apparatus is not
itself endowed with consciousness,62 yet it appears to be
conscious as a result of the reflection of the Atman in it. 63
Samkara holds that the relation of the individual self to
the pure spirit cannot be logically demonstrated. The
reflection theory (bimbapratibimbavada) is one way of
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looking at it. Another way of appreciating the connection
is suggested by considering individQals as jars whose
delimited space within is compared to the delimitation
superimposed on the pure s pirit by the upadhis. This is the
" ad 64limitation theory or avaccheuava a.
In any case, the Atman comes to conceive itself as an active
agent through misapprehension. 65 Through the operation of
aVidya or nescience the . qualities of the material
psychic apparatus (the upadhis or limiting adjQncts) become
- 66superimposed upon the pure Atma. Advaita thus posits the
empirical individual as the jIva, which is the individQated
pure s pi r i t . Operating with a limited conscioQsness, the
jIva is an empirically real seLf'<conecdous individual,
capable of sQbject-object .r el a t i ons . Deutsch says:
tiThe individual human person, t he jI va , is
a combination of reality and appearance.
It is "reali tylt so far s s the T!tma is its
.e;r ounr1 ; it is "appearance" s o f'a r a s it is
i dentified as finit e, conditioned, relative"'67
In association with and conditioned by the buddhi (intellect),
ahafuk~ra (ego-sense), mana s (mind) and i ndri v 8 s (senses),
the nure s Virit operates a s a doer and enjoyer in the world.
Advaita emphasises that agency always belongs to the limiting
conditions of mind, intellect, etc., and never to the spirit.
Advaita demons t r a t es an obsessional attaclwent to the
- 68pr i n ci pl e of changelessness of Atman or Brahman, an
obsession that runs through its entire metaphysics, an
obsession that is never compromised. The status of the
individual, therefore, as a jIva, as an actively operating
agent in the world of relationships, the individual as we
understand him in interpersonal relationships, is that of a
passing phase. The jlva is in reality none other than
60Brahman. -'
In relation to the jiva, the Atman is spoken of as the
sak~in or the unchanging witness self. Though based on
Upani~ad~creferenceB it is a metaphysical construct set up
in later advaita tradition, and, though it is variously
described in the literature,70 it appears to function
chiefly as a reinforcer of the immutability of the true
spiritual consciousness, as against the changing conscious-
ness of the individual jIva.
4.8. LIB"SRATION
As the individual is thrown into a mode of ignorance, the
process of liberation in advaita is a highly individual
metaphysic of self-awareness. The lost estate of Brahman-
hood has to be recovered throughthe practice of
introspection and discrimination. The goal of advaita is
the re-establishment of ontological unity or identity
between the individual soul and the nirg~a Brahman.
The highest value in advaita, therefore, is the nirguna
Brahman. No liberation is true until the nirg~a Brahman is
realised.
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Although mok~a or freedom is the attainment
of Brahman, it is not a process along which the aspirant
travels. Strictly speaking, it is not even any attain-
. . t If 71ment; it is the Brahman-exper~ence ~ se •
It has been seen that the individual soul exists as a
unified, organised, personality-principle at the empirical
level. Through the operation of avidya the sense of
personality is superimposed upon it. In reality, the jlva
is the At man or Brahman in empirical dress. And its
defining feature as a jiva is the buddh i or intellect, which
stands, so far a s the individual is concerned, for the
individualisation of pure s pirit specific to that individual.
Since through some pervasive error the pure spirit has
misapprehended the finite personality-apparatus as itself,
advaita specifies a corrective on the cognitive-spiritual
level to effect mokya.
The buddhi-mind apparatus as the connE:ction between pure
spirit and t h!2' empiric being of man is important for
advaita,72 as it identifie$ the malady for which a specific
cure can be diagnosed. The buddhi, by harbouring a
semblance of pure spirit, even in the form of a pratibimba
(reflection) or avaccheda (limitation), keeps open the
ga t eway for its own salvation.
/ .
Samkara says:
" •••• we say that it is not possible for the
soul to have natural agentship, for that
would lead to a negation of liberation. If
agentshipbe the very nature of the Self,
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there can be no freedom from it, as fire
can have no freedom from heat. mor eover ,
for one who has not got rid of agentship,
there can be no achievement of the highest
h~1an goal (liberation). For agentship is
a sort of miserY".73
Si nce it is a kind of cognitive error that identifies the
Atman with the upadhis, simultaneously bringing about the
lapse from the transcendental l evel to the empirical plane
of consciousness, it must require a cognitive shift in
reverse order to effect liberation. Advaita metaphysics
teach that, since the reality of Bramnan is non-different
from the experience of it,74 and since Brahman pervades the
individual, mok~a is always near at hand. All that is
required is t he appropriate type ~f cognitive shift or
realization of it as such. 75
The buddhi-manas personality complex is bound to samsara or
the transmigratory rounds of births and deaths in accordance
with its karmas. These rnetaphysical principles of k~r~~ and
rebirth, the advaitic system holds in common with all other
Indian systems except the materialistic ones. The jIva
continues under the bondage of karma until final liberation.
/
Samkara holds that all karmas, both righteous and unright-
eous, create bondage, and that knowledge alone is a
prerequisite for liberation. 76
In the state of liberation the individual self becomes
Brahman, (Brahmaiva bhavati).77 The advaitin accepts this
literally, yet maintains that the powers of cosmic creation
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and destruction are denied to the liberated. In the
condition of liberation, which is a trans-conceptual state
of mystical intuition, aparokyanubhutior non-mediated
experience, the entire world of plurality disappears for
that individual. 78 When limiting adjuncts, intellect, mind,
etc. are transcended in Brahman-experience which is
liberation, the jlva is totally merged into Brahman as in
an identity-relationship.79
The advaitic view of liberation differs from other systems
in that it is maintained that liberation is possible of
attainment during life, Cj"lvanmukti). In this state of
TTembodied f'r-eedom" t he liberated soul, wi t h its consciousness
merged into pure spirit, is said to be above the sense of
limitation and egoity. Though free i n spirit, the physical
body continue s ~nt i l dea t h under the i mpetuq of pas t
k 80ar mas • .
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Chapter Five: Metaphysics of Visi§xadvaita
In this chapter the chief doctrines of the Visi~~advaita
are presented and shown to operate in terms of a uni-
dimensional view of reality. The system is seen to be
stroIlg in its realism, in which the individual finds
meaning through aspiring to achieve a specific type of
relationship with God.
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The visi~tadvaita school of thought is recognised as the
leading school of theism, "the earliest and most outstanding
form of theistic absolutism,,1 to have arisen on the soil of
India. Although the systematization of this brand of meta-
physics, religion and philosophy was effected by Ramanuja
at the turn of the 11th century A.D., its roots go back
much earlier. On the metaphysical side we can easily trace
it to the Upani~ads, whose saprap~nca or cosmic view of
creation is made explicit by Ranlanuja. 2 On the religious
side there is the undoubted influence of the ancient
Pancaratra sect. 3 But the most important direct influence
on Ramanuja's theology has been the devotional poetry of
the Afvars, a group of twelve mystic visionaries who gave
out their deepest feelings for God in song. Dasgupta says
of them:
. "The works of the A+var-s are full of intense
and devoted love for Visnu. This love is
the foundation for the later systematic
doctrine .of prapatti."4
Among the many antecedents that go into the making of the
-visis1advaita religion and philosophy must be counted, apart
from the Prasthana Traya and the hymns of the Afvars, the
Maha bhar a t a , Bhagavata PUI'~a, Vi~~u Pur~a and the
Vai~~avaAgamas.5
Ramanuja's chief aim was "to proclaim the doctrine of
salvation through bhakti, and make it out to be the central
teaching of the UpanifElads, the Glta and the Brahma Sutra.,,6
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Since bhakti or devotional love necessarily requires a
unitive view of God as the Beloved, Ramanuja was under an
obligation to work out a sound metaphysical basis for a
monotheistic faith. His attempt in this regard, says
A.B. Keith, "in substantial merit and completeness far out-
did any previous effort to find in the Brahma Sutra a basis
for monotheism."?
From the above it becomes clear that the system of visist-
°adva i t a has complex antecedents, and in a sense, is not a
single system. As SrIvai~~avism, which is its alternate
name, the tradition itself recognises the equal authority
of the Tamil devotional hymns of the Alvars, an authority. .
that stands side by side with the Sanskrit sources.
Therefore the system is also known as Ubhaya Vedanta, the
Vedanta based on a double source~
5.2. THEISTIC-MONISTIC REALISM
An outstanding feature of Ramanuja's system is that it is
a realistic metaphysics that is both theistic and monistic.
The term vi$i~tadvaita emphasises the advaita or non-dualist
or monistic orientation, while the adjectival tenn visista,
meaning special peculiarity, qualifies it in a secondary
sense. 9 The usual idea of monism is that of an absolutism
'" °of the SaIDkara-advaita type, which brooks no qualification
"'whatever. Visi~tadvaita, on the other hand, is essentially
theistic, without compromising its own type of absolutism.
And we have seen that it is referred to as a theistic
absolutism, which is another term for theistic monism. At
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the same time it is to be noted that as the terms of the
system are realist in every way, we may say that the reality
of all things is absolute. 10
All the -three major elements of theism, monism and realism
may be seen in Ramanuja's doctrine of tattva-traya, which is
the inseparable ontological unity of three factors, cit,
acit and Isvara (soul, matter and God). 11 God is the
independent reality, while souls and matter are dependent
upon Him. Yet souls and matter are as real as God, and they
are subordinate in the sense that He is the Controller.
Even as real ontological unity, this doctrine should not be
/' " - --viewed as a weak version of Samkara's advaita, for Ramanuja
sees its philosophical basis in the Prasthana Traya as a
whole, and the spiritual experiences of the Tamil Atvar
mystics. 12 The relations between God and soul, and God and
matter are not dissolvable or changeful, but are inherent
and unchangeable. The substance, visefiya and its _quality
vise~aQa, are connected by an internal relation of insepara-
bility known as apr.thaksiddhi. 13 Souls and all prak~tic
evolutes are linked to God in terms of this ultimately
indefinable principle, which is the foundation of Ramanuja's
ontological metaphysical realism. It can be appreciated
that it is this principle of inseparability of the substance
from its attribute that underscores the 'advaitic arnon-dual
character of Ramanuja's metaphysics. We have to note,
however, that
tlRamanuja's concept of unity is not unity but
union; for from a logical point of view it is
only union and not unity that can be thought
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of as being constituted of ultimately
distinct and separate parts."14
In the opinion of Hiriyanna apr.thaksiddhi is neither identity
nor difference , but a "logically unsatisfactory" modifi-
cation of Upani~adic metaphysics to suit the requirements of
th ' 15e.i sm,
5.3. THS GENESIS OF KNOWLEDGE
The visi$tadvaita system accepts three main sources of
knowledge as valid - perception, inference and scripture.
Scripture is incontrovertible because it gives us knowledge
of transcendental reality as revelation from God. 16 The
authority for a knowledge of Brahman is scripture and
scripture alone. 17
So far as objects of the world are concerned, there is no
such thing as their apprehension in a purely undifferentiated
form. Knowledge is always qualified by some specific
quali t~r. Rarrianuja says that "experience is only of objects
qualified by some characteristic difference".18 The very
nature of the soul's consciousness is such that it must
discriminate objects in terms of special features pertaining
to it. Our knowledge of the world is a knowledge of
distinct reals.
For Ramanuja, knowledge without distinctions is a psycho-
logical myth. The nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception
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that is the first stage of the perceptual process is not
totally indistinct, but gives us an apprehension of a class
character, such as a "cow" as distinct from another class of
animals. As the apprehension of distinctions is the very
nature of the mind, almost along with such an indeterminate
perception there immediately follows the savikalpaka or
determinate perception, which, in our example of the cow,
establishes the particular cow that is perceived as distinot
from others of its own class. 19
In explicating his ontological and epistemological position,
Ramanuja shows a passionate concern for the preservation of
the concept of person, both in terms of God as well as man.
In all the Indian schools, ontological metaphysics and
epistemological formulation are closely related, and we are
justified in assertirlg that epistemology is an extension of
the metaphysics of a system. 20
Knowledge always implies a subject and an object. The
knowing subject is the soul, and while it is constituted of
knowledge, it operates in the world through its attributive
knowledge, dharma-bhGta-jnana. It is a unique adjunct of
the soul, in that it has the characteristics of material
objects as well as spirit. It is characterised by inertness
(ja~atva) as well as consciousness (caitanya). Due to this
dual characteristic it operates as the lir~ between the soul
and the objects of the world. Through its operation the
revealing knowledge of the soul goes out through the various
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senses and manifests the reality of objects. Thus it has
the characteristic of expansion and contraction, but it
becomes all-pervasive only when the soul attains salvation. 21
In its commerce with the objects of the world, the dharma-
bhuta-jnana operates as attributive knowledge of the Self;
however, it expresses its substantive aspect when it reveals
the Self. 22
Ramanuja does not precisely define the soul as being totally
of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge itself is self-
luminous, svayamprakasa, yet it is stated as if distinct
from the Self upon which it is dependent. The soul is Ita
knower both in the state of bondage and freedom ll • 23
Hiriyanna suggests that Ramanuja may be here expressing a
desire to bring the concept of soul into harmony with the
idea of Changelessness. 24 It would be truer to say that
Ramanuja leaves the concept ultimately in the region of
mystery, just as he does the concept of God, though both are
endowed with the essence of personality.
Ramanuja places himself under obligation, in terms of his
metaphysical theory of a plurality of reals, to develop a
theory of knowledge to correspond with it ~ And we see the
logi'cal extension of his metaphysical trends in his theory
of error. 25 Error, says Ramanuja, is not due to any kind
of illusion, but occurs because of the exa gger a t ed
perception of a true element, such that the psychological
perception is disproportionate to the actual empirical
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context. Through his doctrine of pancikar~a or quintupli-
cation, Ramanuja maintains that, since a certain proportion
of the five elements is always present in every real object,
an erroneous perception simply magnifies one element at the
expense of others. On this view, the mirage is not truly
illusory, for particles of water are present in the air and
in the desert sand, which are magnified into a pool. Thus
it is a case of apprehension of the true, yathartha-khyati '
or sat-khyati,26 but it is abnormal and serves no useful
purpose.
5.4. GOD AS SUPREME REALI TY
Radhakrishnan makes the telling remark that, in Ramanuja's
,,-
eyes, SaIDkara's conception of the nirg~a Brahman would be
like "the famous mare of Orlando, which had every perfection
except the one small defect of being dead".27 And true to
such projection, Ramanuja displays an uncommon passion for
a conception of God to whom human beings could relate in a
real fellowship of spirit. This is not to say that Ramanuja
constructs his concept of God in order to match it with
man's psychological and human needs, but he develops the
theist ic elements of the Upani~ads, in relation to ideas of
the Vi9~u and Bha gava t a pur~as.28 As Dasgupta points out,
Ranianuja firmly believed that "the nature and existence of
God can be known only through the testimony of scriptures
and not through inference. 29 "The scriptures· alone are the
authori ty with respect to Brahman," says R8.nlanuja. 30
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In visi~~advaita, God is the Supreme Reality other than
which nothing exists, in the sense that all individual
existents are contained within Him as a whole. 3' All
individual souls and material entities are parts of God
who is the all-comprehensive reality. Yet God is the inner
soul of all things. Ramanuja says:
"Brahman has for its body the world of
senti~nt and insentient beings and
Brahman is its Self."32
'"God is the Saririn, the soul and Inner Ruler (Antaryamin)
of all things, while all other existents make up His body
or sarlra. Thus ~n every way God is unit~ but not adis-
tinctionless unity.
class such as the difference between one cow and another
cow from within the common class of cows. Svagata-bheda is
an internal distinction between the ' par t s of the self-same
individual, as between the horns and tail of a bull. 33
These categories clarify the idea that Brahman in visist-..
1idva~ta is a synthetic whole with no external distinctions
Whatever, but bearing within itself only the svagata-bheda
category of distinctions, in that individual souls and
entities are integral parts of His Being. 34 AlthOUgh the
whole universe of sentient and insentient beings are parts
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of His nature, God is free of all dosas or imperfections. 35
Brahman in the visi~tadvaita theology is called variously
as Vi9~U (the all-pervader), Naray~a(the dweller in man)
and Bhagavan (the Great), though Isvara, Supreme Lord, is
most favoured. It is obvious that Brahman is not nirguqa
(qualityless) as affirmed in the advaita of SaIDkara. 36
Ramanuja aaya that Brahman cannot be pure undifferentiated
consciousness because consciousness always involves the
cognition of difference".3? Hence Swara's distinction
between nirSUQa and saguna aspects of Brahman are rejected
by Ramanuja on the grounds that such distinctions are con-
trary to experience and logic, and are unsupported by
scripture. 38
The crucial point of Ramanuja's theism is two-fold. One is
the affirmation of the personality of God, as "unconditioned
personality,,~9 which also suggests the trans-logical or
eccentric nature of the concept. The other point is the
ananyatva or "otherness" of the soul from God, so that the
two are neither identified nor completely separated. 40
AlthOUgh God is connected with all the forms of the world,
as he is the Supreme Personality endowed with an infinity
of benign attributes,41 He may yet be considered to be
Uby itself altogether formless",42 showing that the notion
of God's personality is really a trans-empirical concept.
The relationship of souls and matter to God is also stated
to be like that of the mode (prakara) to its bearer (prakarI),
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part (se~a) to the.whole (seein), and the controlled (niyamya)
to the controller (niyanta).43 In every way Ramanuja
relegates all entities to a subsidiary position and shows
the supremacy of God. Metaphysically, he establishes that
souls and matter are not discontinuous with the highest
spiritual reality. All existence is a harmonitrs interaction
of reals, where matter, souls and God exist on a single
plane of reality.44
5.5. STATUS OF THE WORLD
Ramanuja skillfully weaves his fundamental concept of God
as adhara into his theory of causation of the world, to
illustrate that "God is the ontic ground of finite being, as
well as the cause (both material and efficient) of its
periodic transformations of state". 45 . Ramanuja adopts the
sat-karya-vada theory of creation in which both matter and
souh evolve into the world as modes (prakaras) of God. In
the causal condition (karanavastha), matter and souls remain
latent within Brahman, and, as an expression of God's will
they undergo a transformation (paririama) and manifest as the
effect condition (karyavastha).46 Since souls and matter in
their essence are considered unchanged, Ramanuja considers
the effect to be non-different from the cause. 47 Logically,
this is a difficult position to uphold, since finite
attributes are also made a necessary part of the infinite in
this system. 48
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The physical universe evolves out of prakr.ti, which in the
causal condition remains latent within God in a subtle
(sUk~ma) state. Through God's will this subtle matter
becomes differentiated into three subtle elements of fire,
water and earth, which manifest the three qualities of
sattva, rajas and tamas. By a continuous process of further
differentiation, the perceptible universe of objects arises.
Ramanuja holds that the world of becoming is a real trans- .
formation of real substances. 49
The advaitic concept of the phenomenality of the world is
therefore totally re jected by Ramanuja. The scriptures are
to be taken literally in the matter of creation. Just
because an entity changes does not make it unreal. The
advaita theory of identity between God and the world, making
the world out to be false is illogical, for identity can
only be stated of two distinctly existing things. 50
Ramanuja and later followers of his school, Vedanta Desika
,
in particular, direct a sustained polemic against SaIDkara's
theory of maya and avidya. Maya is considered a purely
fictitious idea because it cannot be shown to have a locus.
If Brahman is its seat, then His perfection is compromised.
It cannot be said to exist in the jIva because, on advaita
theory, jlvas are themselves the products of avidya. It
cannot conceal Brahman because it would detract from
Brahman's self-luminosity. It cannot be stated to be
something apart from and next to Brahman, as that would
place a limitation on His infinity. To say that it is
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anirvacanIya, indescribable, is to be absurd and illogical. 51
5.6. STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
The soul or jIva in the visis~advaita is described as a
spiritual essence, with knowledge and bliss its eternal
qualities. It is characterised by both change and change-
lessness. As constitutive knowledge the jIva is an
unchanging spiritual principle, but it also possesses
knowledge as an attribute, and this is the element of change
. . t 52
1.n 1. •
The soul is the permanent knower behind the changing states
of knowledge, which inhere in it. 53 It is atomic in size
but due to its attributive consciousness which is capable of
contraction and expansion it can become aware of distant
objects just as the tiny flame of a lamp can illumine many
objects. 54
The soul is di f f er en t from the mind, the senses and the
buddhi. It is the agent (karta) and the enjoyer (bhokta)
that operates in this wor ld through these psychological
instruments. 55 The soul is bound to the world of birth and
rebirth in terms of its karmas. In the s tate of release
from samsara the soul attains to infinite knowledge and
happiness. Even in the state of release the soul maintai~s
its status as an amsa (part) or mode (prakara) of God in a




In terms of this principle of ap~thaksiddhi, souls are
considered eternal and inseparable attributes of Brahman or
Isvara who is their substance. 57 Ramanuja tries to avoid
the problem of change by asserting that Isvara in Himself
does not change so much as the ~ntities which are His
-/
inseparable parts. In a sense therefore, Isvara retains
something of the Upani~adic changeless absolute, the vise~ya
element of the totality, whereas, as participating in the·
changeful vise~a~as as their antaryamin (indweller), Isvara
must be considered to be suffering some sort of change inas-




The soul is bo"und to the cycle of samsara (recurring births
and ~eaths) as long as it has not worked out its pastkarmas.
Its embodied state is thus due to the sum total of its past
actions. Karma is a form of ignorance or aVidya,59 because
it leads the soul away from the full realisation of its
co~~ection with God. 60
Though God as adhara is the ruler and support of the soul,
the soul as a real agent (karta) enjoys and exercises its
own free will. As souls in samsara are under the bondage
of their past selfish actions, they have to operate their
wills in accordance with God's design in order to free
themselves from .this bondage. The soul continues to be
weighed down under the burden of sin, until it realises its
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total dependence on God who is its only support. Liberation
then becomes possible for the soul.
61
Liberation from samsara is achieved through bhakti
(devotional love towards God) in combination with prapatti,
total surrender to Him. Meditation is a devotional attitude
of constant remembrance of God, which is pleasing to God and
which helps to overcome the sinful results of action. 62
Jnana and karma by themselves cannot lead to release except
as aids to the development of devotion and the attitude of
total surrende r. Bhakti in the visi9~advaita system has a
wide range of meanings concerning the devotional attitude,
for it is that process through which the soul becomes "more
and more vividly conscious of its relation to God, until at
las t it surrenders itself to God.,,63
In spite of t~e great importance of the concept of prapatti,
Ramanuja accepts social divisions based on caste, as these
pertain to the embodied state. Only the three higher orders
may prosecute jnana and karma, as these involve study of the
Vedas and sacrificial duties prescribed therein. 64 But
bhakti and nrapatti as the final means of liberation, are
open to all irrespective of social distinctions. 65
In the state of release, the soul necessarily transcends
selfish attacmnents or egoity, but retains its sense of
individuality. Ramanuja preserves his metaphysical stand
by saying that rnok~a is dependent upon "the intuition of
Brahman as the inner Self different from souls and matter.,,66
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In the state of release the soul attains only to a likeness
of God (brahmaQo bhavati) but not total identity with Him
( - .) 67. na tu svaru~a1kyam •
The concept of jlvanmukti .proposed by Sarnkara is denied by
Ramanuja. Since embodied existence is the consequence and
badge of karmic bondage, final liberation is secured only
after the body is shaken off, since bodily existence
symbolises at least the vestige of unfulfilled karmas. 68
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Chapter Six: Ethical Ideas in Indian Thought
This chapter gives an account of the basic ethical
doctrines in their most general features, and as they
are acceptable to the classical systems.
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6.1. ~mTAPHYSICS, ETHICS AND SOTERIOLOGY
Our study so far of the three systems of the samkhya,
advaita and visistadvaita has shown clearly that the chief
concern of the schools has been the realization of a trans-
cendental or spiritual aim. In prosecuting such a
soteriological aim it sometimes appears that Indian thought
is quite indifferent to the ethical concerns of the indivi-
dual and to the problems of morality. 1 In point of fact,
most of the problems that concern man, as pertaining to
his individual self as a whole, have received the attention
of Indian thinkers from the classical period at least. We
may even say further that, during the classical period,
when the metaphysical systems under review were formulated,
large and wide-ranging ethical notions appear to be presumed
by the philosophers. On the basis of the Manava Dharma
/'
Sastra we Ere obliged to accept that well-formed ethical
rules were in operation. However, the evidence before us
suggests that gains in the direction of the formation of a
systematic theory of ethics were accretionary and cumulative,
born more out of a growing tradition than any form of fixed
and systematic preservation. Indian ideas coneerning ethics
are therefore largely evolutionary.2
Early Indian thought does not provide a specific or clear
enunciation of a moral philosophy, except in the most
general terms pertaining to a soteriological aim in life.
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As we have seen, in the period of the systems, a general
heightening of moral tone is inescapable. The brimming
thought about moral and ethical issues does not get fixed
as a system in its own right, but trails behind in the wake
of metaphysical debating that is the central concern of the
philosophers. 3
The Dharma Sastras contain a great deal of material regard-
ing moral conduct and ethical principles and are in fact
codifications of social law which goes down to great depth
and detail. The philosophers take these codes for granted
and a few speak in terms of them in their discussions.
Ethical concerns therefore form the background of all
discussions of objective morality,4 and we have to give
due consideration to them in the context of the metaphysical
systems.
The Upani~ads, which provide the main inspiration of the
later systems, and which, as we have already seen, are
mystically orientated, are so heavily inundated with meta-
physical speculations, that they leave ample scope for
reading variant ethical views into them. 5
Considering the ethical implications of the monistic inter-
pretation of the Upani~ads, Thakur" observes that while
Deussen "finds in this philosophy a compLet e explanation
of the ethics of lov·e,,~aIl'ICKenZie comes to the very opposite
conclusion that the advaitic allied systems t11eaveno room
for ethics.,,6b
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By way of explanation for his point of view McKenzie
supplies the example of a Hindu holy man who discounted an
Englishman's humanitarian services to fellow men as being
"the very bottom-most stell of the ladder" in the scale of
spiritual values, declaring that "meditation" and "contem-
plation" constituted the highest rungs.? We cannot, of
course, say with McKenzie that the Indian systems as
represented by the Hindu holy man do not constitute ethics '
of a sort, and may even be considered worthwhile for men of
a certain persuasion, but we shall leave the proper dis-
cussion of such ethical anomalies for later discussion.
Indian metaphysics and ontological doctrines have invariably
developed differential epistemologies that serve to
stabilise and support peculiar and varying metaphysical
positions. Indian metaphysics have also developed along an
axiological dimension, only the axiological considerations,
which we may say constitutes the pure ethics or moral
philosophy proper, have tended to remain in metaphysical
dress. We have to agree with Raju when he says:
"Social ethics and political thought were not
regarded as important by the classical
philosophers. This indeed has to be admitted
and may be traced to the classical philosophers'
deep interest in the inward reality than in the
outward." 8
This means that an ethical philosophy as such has not
developed in Indian thought, except as referring back
and getting fused with the metaphysical concepts. The
writer is not saying that this is a failing in Indian
thought, though Indian thought has not escaped this
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criticism either, as we have already seen in the case of
Ii1cKenzie.
Axiological considerations have tended to place values in
a scale of grad ati on as in a simple way we noticed in
McKenzi e ' s example of the Hindu holy man. Indian philosophy
which is committed to an axiological dimension, is generally
regarded as a philosophy of values, in which "the idea of
gradati on is basic to the conception lt • 9 What men desire,
or ought to desire, is placed in a scale of values. And
the most pervasive term for value is "puru~artha", what is
worthy of attainment by man, or what ought to be desired
by him in fulfilment of the moral life. 10 Metaphysical
speculation from ~gvedic times through to the Upani~ads
and the Bhagavad Gita has undergone significant changes.
As values are not far removed from their metaphysical
base, "the conception of value also has undergone
important changes in the course of time".11
The classical systems state in their own ways what they
consider to be the essential features of thought of the
canonical texts, and develop them further. They suggest
and emphasise specific aspects of ethical behaviour such
as are thought to comport with the peculiarities of their
several doctrines. From the metaphysical point of view
we may say that in the classical systems, we have Indian
metaphysical and ethical ideas in a relatively arrested
state, in the sense that they have been recognised as
standard interpretations whose influence has had a
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continuous history well into the modern period.
Not only is this true for the post-classical, medieval and
modern periods, but the implications are also reflected
backward in time, inasmuch as the classical systems are
adamant that it is their interpretation-· and theirs alone,
as against every rival view, that has been in fact promul-
gated in the ancient texts. This backward reflection
implicit in the systems brings within the field of relevance
all the post-Upani~adic literature, the law-books, epics,
and mythologies, whose ethical doctrines are taken up ·and
given emphasis in special ways to bring out the metaphysical
pe culiaritie s of the schools. 12
Though ethical considerations are tied down to metaphysical
doctrines, the flexibility of interpretation along the
axiological dimension has been a feature of Indian thought
and this is not the less so as a result of the peculiarities
and differences of the metaphysical constructs. It cannot
be denied that the "hi ghes t good' is to be seen in terms of
the teaching regarding Brahman. Mahalievan·~ays:
"The metaphysical basis for the Indian theory
of values is to be found in the Upani~adic
conception Brahman". 13
This conception is regarded in itself as both the good and
the real, since it fulfils all those things that man ought
to strive for. It is the emphasis on Brahman as the goal
to be striven for that confers on it immense ethical value.
In terms of samkhya formulations mok§a is purely individual
salvation as pure consciousness. In advaita metaphysics
mok~a is the goal of human striving as transcendental
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bliss. Brahman is itself the state of mok~a or total
..~
freedom from becoming, according to Safukara. For Ramanuja,
however, Brahman is that Ultimate Reality which includes
within itself all finite forms in a very real sense. It
is the supremely Real, the repository of every form of
blessedness, that is the goal of all human endeavour. 14
Regarding the ethical value of these two general approaches,
one characterised by the samkhya and advaita type of
impersonal mok~a on the one hand, and the other characterised
by the -visietadvaita concept of inclusion within a personal
God, on the other, Balbir Singh says:
" ••••• every Indian system strives, directly or
indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, to
transcend the sphere of the intellect, in its
search for an Ultimate, believed either to be
the all-inclusive Spirit, or a supreme state -
that of moksa." 15
The Indian systems accept on faith that the correlation
between ethical value and spiritual value as understood
and as represented in the concepts of Brahman or mok~a,
and God, is an intrinsic one, that it is already set in the
ideal as a practically realizable one. Regarding the inter-
weaving of the ideas of the good and the spiritual in these
two approaches, Balbir Singh says further:
" •••• in both these cases it is tacitly assumed
that, unless the good is an intrinsic part of
the real, the real cannot provide a basis for
both ethics and religion."16
We cannot have a clearer statement than this of the
spiritual basis of ethical actions as it covers Indian
thought in its generality. The emphasis on the good as
being but another and vital aspect of the real, even as
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being a definition of the real, is an important feature of
both advaita and visi~tadvaita, and in a somewhat negative
way it is certainly applicable to the saIDkhya as well_
The importance of striving for a transcendent goal which
represents the higr.est value is reflected with great_force
in the inspirational text:
"Lead me from the unreal to the Real,
Lead me from darkness unto Light,
Lead me from death unto ImmortalitY"-17
The general Indian approach to the problem of ethics is
that it points to a transcendental realm, conceived either
in personal or impersonal terms. At the same time, it must
be noted that ethical ideas are not merely the sUbjective
responses of different individuals to the pressures of the
world. If ethics were confined to an individual's inner
world, it would either lead to nihilism or place the
spiritual ideal (Brahman or mok~a) totally out of reach of
living individuals_ Such an attitude is precluded in the
Indian approach. All three systems of the samkhya, advaita
and visi~~advaita labour in important ways to demonstrate
the vital connection between the metaphysical conception
of Brahman or mok~a on the one hand, and the individual
jiva on the other, in and through the world of things.
It is thus that Brahman or mok~a becomes the ,highest
ethical value. The world of plurality is not totally
discontinuous with ultimate reality. Such a metaphysic
is seen to impart significance to moral striving. In this
connection Y.K. Menon says:
" ••••• there is no hope of arr~v~ng at moral
principles that are not downright absurd _
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unless one starts from som~ metaphysical
conception of the world - some assumption
as to what the world is and what each one
of us as an individual is in it for" 18
Thus the Indian view of ethics sets for itself a trans-
cendent or absolute standard, variously conceived. It is
not subjective because the goal of ethical striving is
really attainable, and attainable through the world; and
its attainment is the summum bonum of human life. Indian
ethics is intuitionist in a spiritual sense because it is
referred to the inner meaning of life and not to outward
marks. The value of an ethical act "resides ultimately
in its effect on the doer,,19 in the sense of revealing
to him the standard in terms of which he ought to act.
Since ethical actions in the Indian view must refer to the
inner meaning of life, they cannot have as their standard
any item in the external world. Any external standard is
invariably tied up with a scientific or analytic view of
contingent reality, and this is irrelevent to a spiritual
view of life. 20
For the same reasons, hedonism and utilarian ethics have
been rejected. The carvaka or lokayata school is well-
known in Indian tradition as a heterodox school that simply
rejects all transcendental values, and confines the good
life within the bounds of ordinary perceptual modes. This
view is rejected "both on grounds of spiritual authority,
and on grounds of inherent absurdity".21 It is accepted
as an axiomatic truth that a value that is not abiding,
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but which changes with changing external circumstances or
the psychological dispositions of individuals, cannot give
true or lasting happiness. 22 A sruti text expresses the
idea succinctly in the words of the spiritual aspirant
Naciketas, who rejects the sensual temptations arrayed
before him:
"Transient and ephemeral are all these;
they wear out the happiness of such sense
powers as a mortal has ••••••• Keep for
yourself the chariots, and the song, and
thedance·"23
All that we have said so far underlines the deep soterio-
logical view prominent in Indian philosophy. As a
philosophy of values, Indian thought tries to express,
through its metaphysical construction~, not only that
Brahman or mok~a is the highest reality, but it is also the
goal that all men should strive towards. Indian thought
is persistent that "the final fruit of philosophy is the
. 24
experience of value."
The Chandogya Upani~ad portrays the learned sage Narada as
approaching his preceptor and ruefully declaring that he
had mastered the long list of arts and sciences, but had
remained only at the level of a mantravit, knower of the
sacred verses, not an atmavit, knower of the spiritual Self.
Narada says that he was in a state of grief, for he was
aware that "a knower of the atman goes beyond grief".25
This episode in the sruti is a forceful declaration ·of the
need on the part of man to attain a direct realization of
spiritual reality, whereby alone salvation is won.
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Every Indllm system, except the materialistic ones, designate
a state beyond grief as the highest and most desirable value.
"The attainment of sorrowlessness is the common goal of
Indian philOSOPhy".26
~hile this way of stating the goal of Indian thought might
not be amenable to the devotional schools of Vedanta, it may
be accepted in the general sense of stating the soterio-
logical aim of all Indian thought. A more personalistic
ethic is emphasised in the following affirmation 'of
spiritual attainment:
"I have known that Great Being, bright as
the sun and beyond all darkness; by knowing
Him alone can man overcome death; there is
no other waY."27
6.2. THE PRI~~RY ETHICAL INSTITUTIONS
Ethical activity seeks to prise the individual out of the
physical environment and mundane setting in which he finds
himself fixed by nature. As man in Indian thought is seen
to be continuous with subhuman species, removed only by
virtue of the blessings of karmic spiritual development,
hedonistic values associated with hunger, thirst, sex and
material attachments are a constant threat to his spiritual
development. In. this regard a vitally important ethical
idea developed in Indian thought is that of sreyas, the
good~ This concept is contrasted with its opposite, preyas,
or the pleasant • . The .Ka~ha Upani~ad says:
"That which is good is one thing, that which
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is pleasant is quite another. Both of them
bind the Self, but to different objects.
Of these, well-be~ng comes to him who
chooses the good; he who chooses the
pleasant fails to attain the goal."28
In the depths of his nature man transcends his outer animal
self, although he might confuse himself at times with that
which is less than his true self. 29 By virtue of reason or
discrimination or faith, man is capable of aspiring to a
long-range goal for which sreyas stands, by abjuring the
c~ll of base appetites. The Indian systems are in general
agreement that ethical striVing means restraint of passion.
This means operating the rational faculty as part of moral
activities. Since the goal of philosophy is the transcendent
reality, it is necessary to discriminate keenly with regard
to what activi ties one may undertake. Only by being rational
can those moral qualities develop that provide the fOillldation
for attaining the spiritual goal. 30
6.2.1. ETHICAL DISCIPLINE
The central concept of Indian thought, with regard to
ethical discipline and morality, is dharma. Radhakrishnan
calls it "a word of protean significance".31 Crawford says
of dharma in regard to the whole development of Indian
culture, that "in the depths of this single word lies an
entire civilization".32 Derived from the sanskrit root dhr.,
the word dharma connotes that which sustains, nourishes,
integrates or holds together. "It is the norm which
sustains the universe, the principle of a thing in virtue of
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which it is.,,33 These definitions, which are based on
grammatical meaning and consistency of usage, show up the
hieh importwlce of the concept in the ethical sense, and
brings it very close in meaning to the idea of the highest
value. It gives a strong indication of the dominant soterio-
logical dimension in Indian ethical thought. As bearing an
ontological commonness with the concepts of Brahman and
mok~a, dharma is, in this sense, in the highest axiological
category, and it "occupies a pivotal position in any scale
of value".34 On the basis of its meaning of "that which
holds toge:ther" it has a broad dimension of meaning and
application, and covers all types of moral activity that is
intended to harmonise the individual with the central
spiritual purpose of life.
-'-
The Manu S~ti or Manava Dharma Sastra gives the detailed
applications of the rules of dharma pertaining to different
life-situations. It states that the sources of our know-
ledge of ~~arma are the sruti (Vedas), the smrti (secondary
tradition), the conduct of virtuous men, and the light of
individual conscience. 35 Manu goes to great lengths in
describing moral rules down to the minutae of duties
affecting man at different levels of social organisation and
in different stages of life. The clear impression is given
that these rules for the most part are fixed and irreversibl~
and therefore, for the development of ethical ideas, the last
two sources of dharma, the conduct of virtuous men and
individual conscience, appears to assume great importance in
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matters of social change. 36
6.2.1.1. VARNA DHARMA.
The ethical organisation of society goes back to a remote
antiquity, and refers to the division of ancient Aryan
society into four divisions or varQas. Varna dharma refers.
to the duties pertaining to each of the four classes, which
were conceived to be appropriate to their natural endowment,
character and functions. 37
The four classes are first referred to in the Puru~a-SUkta
hymn of the ~g Veda, which states t~at the brahmaQa (teacher),
the k~atr~ya (soldier), the vaisya (trader) and the sudra
(serf) issued respectively from the head, arm~ thighs and
feet of the primordial Divine Being,38 from whom issued also
all things else in the world. The division of society into
the four var~as or classes is then made out to be a funct-
ional division based on occupational types. 39
Though in a later day these classes degenerated into rigid,
endogamous castes, thus stratifying society in a rather
fixed pattern, the original idea almost certainly appear~ to
have been pragmatically inspired as a result of the develop-
ing complexity of society. Radhakrishnan says:
"The original Aryans all belonged to one
class, everyone being priest and soldier,
trader and tiller of the soil. There was
no privileged order of priests. The
complexity of life led to a division of
classes among the Aryans e"40
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Basing their ideas on the accounts as generally given in
Manu and other sm~ti literature, Safukara and Ramanuja take
the varQa system for granted as a system of hereditary
castes with no significant vertical or inter-caste mobility.
The differentiation of individuals into caste divisions
based on birth is understood as due to the individuals· past
karmas, and as dependent upon g~as, natural tendencies,
innate dispositions and character.
-/
6.2.1.2. ASRAMA-DHARMA
The term asrama denotes effort or endeavour and refers to
the four stages of life during each of which an individual
is expected to perform the duties pertaining to his station
in life. Asrama-dharma is the collective set of ethical
activities that are obligatory upon the individual at each
stage of his development. 41
In this conception, ,t he assumed life span of one hundred
years is conveniently divided into four periods of twenty-
five years each. The four stages are those of brahmacarya
(studenthood), grhastha (householder), vanaprastha (forest-
dweller or retirement) and sannyasa (renunciation or
monastic stage).
The aim and end of the four stages are stated to be the
progressive spiritual development of the individual. In the
last stage of sannyasa the individual is not bound to the
ordinances pertaining to caste. 42
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6.2.1.3. THE SAMSY~RAS
These are the Hindu religious sacrament~many of which have
their origin in the safuhitas. The early simplicity of these
ceremonials grow in complexity in sm~ti literature, which
also places many caste restrictions on their performance. 43
Panday shows that a large number of the sacraments are
reflected in the more ancient texts, but that in the
classical period, a process of selectivity reduced their
number to a standard sixteen. 44 The spiritual and soterio-
logical character of the sacraments is quite prominent, and
they are interwoven with the four stages of life. The
sacraments are seen as nodal points along a social-spiritual
dimension of development, marking out important points in
the individual's history. The most important samskaras are
those connected with birth, initiation, marriage, and death
ceremonies.
6.2.1.4. THE PURUSARTHAS.
This term refers to the four ends or aims of life, both in
the sense of what is actually desired by man, as well as in
the sense of what ought to be desired. 45 They comprise
dharma or duties, artha or economic activities, kama or
hedonistic values, and mok§a or liberation. As a value,
dharma is higher than and holds sway over artha and kama•
. -
Dharma has a controlling function while the other two can
become dissipatory. However, all three belong to the
empirical level, while only mok~a truly represents the
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transcendent or ultimate soteriological value! Manu there-
fore refers to dharma, arth~ and kama as belonging togethe~
as the trivarga, the triune group of values. 46 We cannot
say that this is strictly true, though it may be accepted on
pragmatic grounds. As said earlier, dharma is a comprehen-
sive term, and includes in its meaning the idea of
transcendence as much as mok~a does. 47
As one of the puru~arthas~dharmarefers to every shade of
moral obligation attaching to man as a contingent being.
These include his duty as an individual, as a member of a
family, clan and caste, and as operating at anyone of the
asrama stages. Manu lays great stress on it as moral
behaviour befitting one's caste and stage of life, through
which alone life's goal could be achieved. 48
Artha and kama do not refer to unchecked indulgence in
wealth and pleasure, but are in the scheme designed to be
turned into the service of the supreme transcendent goal
of moksa, which, from the religious side, is also seen as a
service to God. 49 In a philosophical sense, we are not told
exactly how dharma in its primary meaning is related to the
other 'Ouru~arthas, and its controlling position may be taken
on faith. Nevertheless, it stands for the correlation of
the temporal and spiritual aspects of life,50 by insisting
upon moral training. The Ka~ha Upanisad says:
"Those who have not refrained from wickedness,
nor those who are unrestrained and unmedita-
tive, nor yet those whose minds are not
tranquil - they cannot attain this (atman)
even through knowledge".51
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Moksa states the supreme end of all life, and underlines, in.
- t erms of the purusartha scheme, the basic soteriological
direction of all ethical endeavour.
6.2.1.5. YOGA
Yoga means union with God, or yoking the mind and holding it
in check. From a religious perspective it refers to the
entire range of disciplines that enhance man's relationship
to spiritual reality. It has a distinct theistic connotation
in its application to the Vedantic systems, while it also
refers to the specifically mental and psychological disci-
plines by which the mind is .stilled. 52
Yoga takes into account the many-sided nature of the
individual and imposes on him an aim that transcends his
empirical significance. It encompasses the sub-disciplines
of jnana (knowledge), karma (action), dhyana (meditation)
and bhakti (devotion), which are all taken up in the service
of the soteriological. aim of freedom from earthly trammels.
The different schools of Indian thought press it into the
service of their specific metaphysical and ontological
framework. 53
Looked at from any point of view, yoga explicates an
interiorised discipline that yet enhances man's significance
and action on the empirical plane. While in itself the term
does not deny the significance of the world of becoming, it
emphasises the attitude of inwardness that is important for
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an integrated spiritual life. It is an inwardness that does
not deny or negate the outward. In this connection, P. T.
Raju says:
"The contribution of Indian religious thought,
then, is , the recognition and the explication
of the inwardness of man, of its freedom,
dignity, sacredness, and importance. 1I 54
From our account of the ethical presuppositions as they
operate in Indian thought, we have seen that they are an
extension along the axiological dimension of the metaphysi-
cal constructions pertaining to the different systems. The
soteriological aim of Indian philosophy is itself a meta-
physical construct in the sense that it purports to show a
continuity between empirical reality and the transcendental
truth. To a significant extent some features of the ethical
formulations refuse to blend harmoniously, but there is no
denying the fact that, the conscious design and notion of
ultimate value represents a notable attempt at presenting a
holistic view of life. 55
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Chapter Seven: Dharma: Theory of Moral Obligations
This chapter presents the concept of dharma as a
peculiarly Indian concept that operates at two levels of
meaning. In its relation to the advaita and visietadvaita
systems, it is shown that this concept has engendered
some fb~S .of tensions and ambivalent attitudes, which
have been a recurring feature of Indian life.
7.1.
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Chapter 7 · DHARMA: THEORY OF MORAL OBLIGATIONS
With the exception of the radical dualism of samkhya
thought, the metaphysics of the advaita and visi~tadvaita
schools show, each in their own "way, a certain passion for
a holistic view of the world. In the advaita, the world
(jagat) is false (mithya), that is to say, ultimately
and transcendentally negated, leaving Brahman as the only
reality. The world that exists at least phenomenally, which
is both the product and the process of nfaya, though negated
ultimately, is not admitted to be other than Brahman. There
is between the two an ineluctable harmony, since the
world is based on Brahman and resolves itself back into
Brahman, as the mirage into the desert and the snake into
the rope.
In the case of Ramanuja's theory, also, although both
Brahman and the world are posit ea. to exist not on different
levels of reality, but on a single plane, the infinite
variety of the world is not admitted as divorced from the
wholeness of God, but i s a neces sar y part of God's divine
unity. The dialectics of this school, thus, would not
admit to a discontinuity between the actuality of this
world and the ultimate reality.
The changing face of Indian conceptions of ethics from
ancient times has been asserted by many researchers in
the field. We may take it that, in keeping with the
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evolutionary principle, notions of ethics which were
obviously objective and customary, slowly developed more
subjective and reflective forms that took into account the
soteriological pattern of the metaphysical theories. Thus
the lower ideas of objective morality became in the course
of time integrated into higher level ethical thought,
"marked by the emergence of the most highly developed
consciousness of the ethico-spiritual ideal of ~~ or any
one of it's equava.Lentis , attended with the most earnest
feeling of the need for it's realization". 1 We can say
with confidence, therefore, that .the ontological unity
conceived between the individual as an entity in the ~
objective world and it's spiritual source, passes over
from objective metaphysical speculation about it to sub-
jective psychological "realization" conceived as the fruit
of ethical striving. In this view, a continuity and a
harmony is established between pure being (regarded as the
source of the world and of the indiVidual) and the processes
of becoming (regarded as the world of actuality and the
empirical reality of the world).
When we thus consider ideas relating to the concept of
dharma, that is, ideas of the good in thought and deed,
both individual and social, and see it in terms of it's
origin and growth, we in fact harken back to the ~g Vedic
2concept of;rta. This- conception originally referred to
the sense of orderliness, pattern and consistency that is
the mark of the cosmos, which was somehow felt to be good
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and right because it demonstrated the harmony of recurrent
activity without jarring aberrations. The harmony of the
objective natural world was assumed to be continuous with
subjective moral conduct in the individual and society.
What is orderly is also true simply because it is orderly,
both for the world and for man. In this connection Gupta .
says:
"The metaphysical bond between the ontological
and axiological characterizations of ~ lies
in truth (satyam) which is not only a sYnomym
of ~, but also significant in the cosmic as
well as moral spheres. The concept of dharma
preserves the two implications of ;ta in ~et
another unique manner, characteristic of Indian
thought, in which it is used not only as an
ontological reality, such as in Buddhism, but
also in legal, social, political and moral
senses in Hinduism". 3
This precisely states the dual function of the concept of
dharma, which, in the understanding in which it was taken,
has in a sense, bedevilled the course of Indian social life
for long centuries and has produced the confusions and
tensions that have characterised it along the ethico-
religious dimension. Whi l e these conceptions of rta and
-'-
dharma had their origins in the samhitas, the later
Upani~ads did l i t t l e to reduce the identification of the
two concepts, for the clear reason that they were themselves
bent upon the Atma-Brahman identification, which in a sense,
supported and enhanced the idea of the i~erent relationship
between r,ta and dharma. Hence we see this theme as well-
developed and attaining rigid levels all through classical
Indian thOUght to modern times. While a conceptual harmony
is established between the natural and the moral spheres,
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this harmony, as we shall see, was bought at a heavy price.
We may discern that the idea of dharma is split up into two
distinct streams of the higher and the lower dharmas. 4 The
higher conception stands for the universal dharma akin to
the older concept of the cosmic ~ while the lower
conception of it accomodates the vagrant and vicissitudinal
nature of the individual to the requirements of the higher
as consisting of order, harmony and perfection. Between
the tw.o there is presumed to exist a genuine connection
and continuity, for the two are at bottom one, the lower
being am~ifestation of the higher. The connection is
mysterious, imperceptible, "subtle" and very difficult to
know; . Zaehner aays- of it:
"Indeed it is the very ambivalence of this key
concept that both gives Hinduism its distinctive
flavor and sets up within it a tension that is
never wholly resolved. II
S
The perceived patterns of order, harmony and perfection of
the higher dharma were passed over into, and somehow expected
to be reflected in, the lower dharma of moral life and
ethical behaviour. The cosmic ~ta, standing for the most
ultimate value of mokea through an ontological identification
is the subtle truth that must be embodied in man's life of
moral action. Mok~a is parama puru~artha, the supreme end
of life, and the means to it is dharma, 6 Radhakrishnan
further says:
"The principles which we have to observe in our
daily life and social relations are constituted
by what is called dharma. It is truth's embodi-
ment in life, and power to refashion our nature."7
The overpowering and most pervasive idea of dharma-&~~g1v.§n
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in the dharma-sastras has been the insistence on it as a
supreme regulating principle, which, though necessarIly
working from within, is yet seen in every detail of human
action and social relationship. It's prototype is not only
the order perceived in the actual world, but also the
mechanical rigour of the yajna (sacrifice) and the
agnihotra (ceremony of the fire priest). Human life, both
at the inner psychological levels of p;3.ssion; desire and
motivation, as well as the outer levels of individual
behaviour and social inter-relationships, is the inheritor
of the form, the pattern, and the necessity inherent and
visible in all nature. If nature is the macrocosm, man is
the microgosm, and the two must be seen to be harmonious.
So far as the inner idea and motivation in this view of
man and nature is concerned at it's profoundest level, it
is to be observed that it is a noble attempt at maintaining
the integrity of Indian ontological ideas. But the formulators
of the >dharma- sastras, the codifi.ers of Hindu law, failed to
see that dharma, so interpreted, is yet only an interpret-
ation that tries to accomodate the realities of life to the
ontological metaphysical premises. They could not see that
while external nature is rigid, fixed and repetitive, life
itself, if it is to reflect a spiritual reality, must be
free, spontaneous and outgoing. It cannot wear the habit
of external nature or be supjected to the rigidity of
mechanical law.
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The problems- inherent in the Indian system of ethics, as
it applies to social life and moral behaviour, are thus
seen at three levels. The first is the problem of defining
the inner .dharma , which is subtle and "difficult to know",
but which is nevertheless largely accomplished in the
metaphysics of the several systems, The second is
establishing a complete set of behaviours in terms of which
the lower dharma or duties may be promulgated. And the
third is the relationship between the two, which is, in
fact, established in an illogical and arbitrary way, and is
the weakest link in the ethical system. Regarding these
problems, McKenzie says:
"There are in a way two standards, and their
bearing on practical life presents problems
that are full of difficulties. The duties
of social life cannot be deduced from the
ultimate goal of attainment as the orthodox
understand it,nor can they be shown to stand
in any vital relation to it. Dharma is imposed
by authority, and that is the end of it."8
In the manner in which tradition has been handed down in
Indian culture, it is fairly accurate to say that "~arma
is imposed by authority." The basic reasoning behind it
has already been indicated above. But authority that is
arbitrary and not based on a sound and acceptable inter-
pretation of metaphysical premises is always tension-
producing. Ostensibly, all morality is based on the Veda.
The Manu Smrti itself says:
"The sources of dharma are the Veda, the tradition
and practice of those that know it, the conduct of
virtuous men, and the individual conscience."g
From this important reference we get the clear idea that
dharma is highly pertinent to morality. The direct
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reference to matters of conscience and virtuous conduct,
and to practical matters, give the clear impression that
dharma has to do with individual and social morality. And,
in persuance of this idea, the sm;ti and dharma-sastra
literature generally elaborate a complicated web of social
rules and regulations to an amazing level of detail' and
complexity.
What is to be noted is that, having stated at the outset
that conscience and virtuous conduct are the guiding
principles of the rules of dharma, except for allowing
token and merely verbal consideration to these requirements,
the treatLsea on morality go on to elaborate social rules
and regulations in an arbitrary fashion without reference
even to the Veda: Indeed, there is a problem to be encount-
ered here, and that is the fact that the Vedas, including
the Upani~ads, barely touch upon the rules of morality.
Regarding the sketchy manner in which they are dealt'with
in the Veda, Radhakrishnan says:
uThe Vedas do not contain a systematic account of
dharma. They indicate the ideals and mention
certain practices. Rules and commands, as
distinct from instances of conduct, are found
in the Smrtis and the dharma-sastras.",o
We can already see here the vicious circle in which the
whole matter is caught up, and the tensions that must
invariably develop even at the fonnal level of inquiry. Any
rational enquiry into the sources Qf dharma is directed,
by the ~mtti itself, to the Veda, which, because of the
indefinite account it contains, leads back to the self-
same smI;'ti. Radhakrishnan quotes a classical commentator
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who points out the doubtful character of the smrti
literature and the ambivalent attitude towards it, and
says:
"In as much as these sm::rtis have emanated from
human authors, and are not eternal like the
Veda~ir authority cannot be self-sufficient.
The smrtis of Manu and others are dependent upon
the memory of the authors, and memory depends for
its authority on the truthfulness of its source;
consequently the authority of not a single sm:r:ti
can be held to be self-sufficient like that of
the Veda, and yet, in as much as we find them
accepted as authoritive by an unbroken line of
respectable persons learned in the Veda, we
cannot reject them as absolutely untrustworthy.
Hence it is that there arises a feeling of
uncertainty regarding their character."11
The rule that the ancient Veda has to be the source and
final authority in all matters of social law cannot be
gainsaid. It is recognised as the final arbiter in any
dispute. "If sruti and smrti conflict, the former is -to-- - _ .--'--~
be accepted.,,12
Radhakrishnan1casting himself in the role of a modern
commentator and reformer, is firm in his contention that
the need for change is part of the ancient tradition.
Emphasising the mutability and evolutionary character of
social rules, he says:
"The Hindu dharma gives us a programme of rules
and regulations and permits their constant
change. The rules of dharma are the mortal
flesh of immortal ideas, and so are mutable.!t. , 3
This is a clear statement of rational demand that reflects a
tension between what ought to be and what actually is, in
the realm of ethical theory and behaviour. The fact is, the
sm~tis and dharma-sastras have been with us for nearly two
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thousand years, and not a word has been expunged nor a line
erased, nor any new edition has been dared to be published
by any ecclesiastical authority: Their moral rules have
acquired a permanent, inviolable and rigid character. In
the field of moral and ethical conduct the sm~tis construct-
ively enjoy the status of Veda, and their influence has
succeeded in befuddling the minds of otherwise rational and
virtuous men. Schweitzer mentions that Rammohan Roy, who
engaged himself in much social reform and who "spoke openly
against caste," yet "took precautions that, at the meetings
for divine service (which he organised), the Vedic texts
should not be recited in the presence of members of the
lower castes,,:14
The dharma-sastras, as the recognised authority on all
matters. of conventional morality, deal with a wide range of
social activity. They "mix up topics of law, religion and
ethics and claim to deal with the whole conduct of life by
man. n 15 They are the ,sanctifying authority for moral
behaviour pertaining to the individual as well as to society.
Society is understood not only as comprising individual
members for whose good it stands as a pragmatic concept, but
as something over and above the totality of individuals, as
a sort of metaphysical entity in itself. Dharma is the
comprehensive term that upholds the value of this extra-
social idea of society and at the same time regulates the
activity of individual members comprising it. Dharma
includes rules regarding ceremonial conduct (acara), legal
procedures (vyavahara), expiatory rites (prayascitta),
188
personal impurity (asauca), and a variety of other topics
such as moral criteria in different life situations, virtue
and vice, rights and duties, etc. 16
It must be noted that all these conceptions are not even
presumed to be founded on any rational thought, but on the
fiction of Vedic authority. Any moral precept "for which a
Vedic source can be found becomes invested with the authority
of the Veda".17 There need not be a direct link between the
rules of dharma and the sruti; a bare mention or even a
stretched interpretation suffices. In the absence of these
circumstances, entirely original constructions are made to
serve as dharma, on the presumption of accord with the
spirit and injunction of the sruti.
The mechanical sacerdotalism of the brahmana texts were,
taken up and extended into the domain of law and morality by
the school of the mimamsa. In Indian ethico-religious
tradition, the mImamsaka is the theologian par exellence.
The principles and maxims of interpretations adopted in the
mImamsa school, on the basis of its peculiar metaphysical
presuppositions, have greatly influenced the concept of
dharma as social morality, and rendered its dictates immune
to rational correction. 18
The presumed immutability of the rules of dharma allowed
the dharma-sastras, on the presumed basis of the Veda, to
sweep aside its own stated concepts of "individual con-
science", and the "conduct of virtuous men". The dharma-
sastras thus asserted their sole authority · on the fictitious
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basis of having Vedic sanction, when in fact the Veda knows
nothing ;of its detailed complexities and extensions of
simple moral ideals. It is thus clear, on antecedent
historical grounds, tI ••• why there have been no systematic
treatises on the theory of ethics in Sanskrit literature,
and why ethical discussions stop short with the texts of the
Dharma SS:stras.,,19
Since both the advaita and visi~~advaita systems lay great
emphasis on both the Vedic and the sm;ti traditions, and
since both seriously attempt to maintain, each in its own
way, a holistic view of total reality, which includes the
ultimate reality of Brahman and the empirical reality of the
world, certain conflicts are inevitable as flOWing from the
presumptions underlying the larger concept of ,dharma . Our
presentation thus far has shown that, quite apart from
personal and subjective assessments, there are fundamental
tensions inherent in the type of. interpretation the dharma-
sastras have taken for granted concerning the primary term
dharma. We have said that the concept of dharma as inter-
preted by the dharma-sastras and generally accepted by the
philosophical schools is only one type of interpretation.
However, it is an interpretation that is made on the
presumption of a metaphysical continuity between the
ultimate goal of mokea or Brahman and the contingent reality
of the world. It is mostly on this basis that the philo.
sophical schools accept the scheme proposed in the tradi-
tional accounts of ethico-religious rules. For it is quite
clear that even Manu works on the concept of dharma from an
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axiological perspective in the fashion of consistency with
Indian metaphysics, and "there is no doubt regarding the
1 1 t th ult ' t 1 of human 1~fen.20relation of mora va ues 0 e ~ma e goa ~
When we say that the sm~ti tradition provides only one type
of interpretation, the implication is that other inter.
pretations could have flowed from the sruti texts. This in
turn implies that the sruti texts should be general enough
and non-committal on important points of conduct. Radha-
krishnan holds that the Veda is simple in its moral precepts
and does not elaborate the rules of dharma. 21 However, we
cannot say for sure that the notions of the later dharma-
sastras were no t in some ways operating presumptions in the
social life of the early Vedic Aryans. 22
Keith held the view that although there is no proof that in
the ~gVedic period castes were hereditary, there is also no
proof that they were not hereditary. He feels that there is
some slight evidence of caste divisions as operating
structures of society.23
It must be stated thatwB do know, on textual evidence, that
something very much akin to the later dharma system was
already developed and in operation at least during the
Upani~adic period.
It is important to understand, however, that in a significant
way, the Indian ethico-religious consciousness accepted the
world-view of the dharma-sastras and its elaborations of the
nature and duties of man and society as sufficiently
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sacrosanct, and as not to require further inquiry into its
validity. Therefore it can be said that " ••• the Hindu is
satisfied with tracing the origin of rules to some text of
scripture or some authoritative tradition and does not press
home the question as to the rational basis of the rUle.,,24
- ~
7.1. VARijASRAMA DHAml~
Having considered the principle of dharma in its most general
form of an ethico-religious system, and its relation to the
ontological metaphysics of the Indian schools, we now have
to see this concept in terms of its most obvious manifes-
tation in the life of the individual and society. This is
the varnasrama dharma, that is, the duties relating to
castes and stages of life. 25
The ontological nrinciple involved in the concept of dharma,
that is, the most general idea of ~ta as cosmic harmony, is
manifested conceptually in the term sadhar~a-dharma or
general, universal righteousness. This has a bearing upon
all men and, in the sense of rights as distinct from duties,
even extend to animals. 26 As applying to all men equally,
Manu gives a list of ten cardinal virtues, as perseverence,
forgiveness, self-control, abstention from theft, cleanli-
ness, wisdom, knowledge, non-indulgence, truthfulness and
control over anger. 27 These constitute Universal moral
obligations to be practised by all men, and are regarded as
the true essence of dharma because they are marks of the
inner spiritual disposition of man. 28
192
The moral rules governing man are further divided into those
that pertain to social and individual aspects of life. The
former comprise the system of va~na, which, according to
Manu Sm~ti, is the four-fold division of human society
based on birth. 29 The four castes are the brahmin (teacher
or priest), k~atriya (ruler or warrior), vaisya (trader or
agriculturalist), and sudra (serf or menial worker).
The asrama-~~arma refers to the four-fold stages of life,
those of studenthood (brahmacarya), householder. (garhasthya),
retirement (vanaprastha), and renunciation (samnyasa), and /
the duties pertaining to these stages. These two aspects of
dharma roughly correspond to the social and individual
aspects of life, and are together known as var~asrama-dharma.
Indeed, they very much go together insofar as the rights,
priviledges and duties pertaining to the different castes
are concerned. These rules and regulations are highly
detailed, precise and systematic, and impose, no doubt, a
certain grandeur and nobility upon the life-styles of the
individuals belonging to the different orders, except
perhaps the poor sudra, who has nothing much to look foward
to in life. The asrama-dharma scheme, considering the
antiquity of its formulation, certainly has great merit with
respect to its graded discipline. It called forth the
admiration of Deussen, who remarked that "the entire history
of mankind does not produce much that approaches it in
grandeur". 30
Of the va~a-dharma, Hiriyanna avers that "social solidarity
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is their essential aim," while of the asrama-dharma he
points to thesoteriological aim,that it "serves as a
spiritual ladder to enable man to gradually reach the final
goal of life.,,31
In the Indian view in general, the ethical consciousness is
'di vi ded along two dimensions. Morality is seen in terms of
the classification of sadhara~a-dharma on the one hand,
which constitutes the unconditional or univereaDyapplicable
principles of morality, and varpisrama-dharma on the other
hand, which constitutes the conditional or specific duties,
that is; conditional upon one's caste and stage of life f and
specific to that individual. 32 And in terms of this
classification, we may be able to appreciate the position
of SaMkara and Ramanuja and their general ideas regarding
ethico-religious morality.
The notion of the sadharaqa-dharma seems to indicate a type
of universal ethics of humanity, which may conceivably be
promoted without any emphasis upon the var~asrama-dharmas•
./ .
Contrary to this expectation, Samkara appears to have greatly
s'tressed i[arna.s·ram~-dharmas or specific duties, as the
necessary bridge leading to a system of self-CUlture, which
in time alone ...:can lead to salvation. In this regard
" .Banerjee says of Samkara:
"According to him, the observance of the varnasrama
dharmas constitutes the external discipline which
is the necessary preliminary step towards the
attainment of the ideal of human life, consisting
in the realization of the identity of the
individual self with the absolute self that is
Brahman. n 33
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Such a view of Samkara's position must not be misunderstood.
Safukara was indeed not any kind of caste chauvinist.
It is rather his philosophical position that governs where
the emphasis has to be placed in terms of the classification
of moral duties. The specific duties of caste and stage
of life are considered by him consistent with the
disciplin~of restraint and abjuration. Even with regard
to asrama-dharma, Samkara's natural emphasis lay more upon
samn¥a~ or renunciation. The var~asrama-dharmas appeared
to him to comport more with ethics of individual self-
cUlture , while any type of exclusive emphasis on the
universal ethics of humanity was seen to be inconsistent
with his metaphysics.
safukara himself emphasised the ethics of individual
self-culture in terms of viveka, discrimination of the
real as distinct from the false sensory modes, vairagya,
the pr~ctice of dispassion towards worldly goods and
relationships, ~ (tranquility), dama (restraint),
titik~a (forbearance), uparati (renunciation), samadhi (in-
ward concentration), sraddha (faith in the real as being
totally different from the actual) and mumuk~utvam (intense
desire for liberation). These requirements constitute the
sadhana-catuyt,aya or four-fold discipline and are the pivot
of ~dvaita ethics.
~
We cannot say that Samkara is opposed to an ethics of
humanity. On the contrary, if he were to have been approached
on the matter, he would have willingly concurred with such
a positio~. In point of fact, there is a legend related
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of him that once, on his travels, he found a c~gala
(outcaste) coming towards him. Following the customary
/ .
prejudice born of var~a-dharma, Samkara requested the man
to move away from his path, whereupon the poor man
surprisingly requested to be directed as to who should
move away, the Atman or the body? Realizing his error in
" .terms of his own metaphysics, Samkara acknowledged the
the validity of the man's question and the irrationality
of his own erroneous attitude based on conventional
morality. 34
It is unlikely that the legend is true, though there is
much truth in the matter of it. In spite of the fact
that Safukara grants the validity of -empirical experience,
empirical relations are not ends in themselves. No matter
how emphatically an advaitin may argue about the reality
of the empirical world, he ultimately has to admit that
such reality must be transcended in order to attain
salvation in the advaitic sense. The truth of ultimate
reality is removed from empirical experience by an entire
order of reality. Can we say that our general thesis of
holistic harmony is thus violated in advaita? The advaitin
would maintain that the continuity between the vyavaharika
(empirical) and paramarthika (transcendent) levels of
reality is secured by maya or avidya.
Advaita ethics, under the pressure of its metaphysical
constructs, concernsitffilf almost exclusively with the
nullification of avidya• . We have to repeat that it is not
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directJ.y opposed to a universal ethics of humanity; rather
it is constrained to be largely indifferent.to it. The
concerned critic may have his own sUbjective judgement
about indifference being equivalent to opposition, but that
would be inaccurate. Advaita ethics is mainly concerned
with the ethics of transcendence. It is not necessarily
inimical to an ethics of humanity.
When it is claimed that advaitins themselves, especially
/'
SaIDkara, vigorously promoted reforms and took some
interest in the affairs of the world, it does not affect
the position of advaita. ethics in any formal or logical
sense; it only shows that the demands of the worlq are too
imposing and affect even advaitins. The real position is
that advaita, not being directly opposed to an ethics of
humani ty, can quite legitimately allow such"~an~:ethics a
secondary interest. Advaita is precluded from allowing
it a primary interest without seriously denying the
integrity of its own metaphysical formulations. The
"classical formulation of advaita by Satikara and supported
by a large tradition of post-Samkara dialectics, clearly
demonstrates the overwhelming concern for establishing
the validity of the concepts of maya and aVidya, ef the
nirgwta Brahman against the saguna Brahman, of jnana
against karma. Banerjee is quite justified when he says:
"So as SaIDkara may be said to have held, there
can be no such thing as the universal ethics
of humanity; there is only a religion instead -
not the religion of God, but the religion of
salvation" 35
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This projection on the part of Banerjee, while it might be
considered by counter-critics to have discounted the
"ecumenical comprehensiveness with which SaIDkara was also
concerned at the social level, underlines on the contrary
the major thesis of modern criticism that a universal
ethics, even on a thesis of advaita-style comprehensiveness,
does not necessarily breach the "religion of God" from "the
religion of salvation." Banerjee's thought on this point in
fact supports the dialectic of the interpretational bias
running right through Indian thought, combined with an
anxiety to maintain metaphysical priority with regard to
social structures. Substantially the same point is made by
Hindery in a trenchant criticism of the inherent arbitrari-
ness of the advaita in extrapolating from metaphysics to
ethical formulations, when he says:
"SaInkara's split level ontology of ultimate
and relative truth proposed non-egalitarian
and double standards of ethics which were
~Qt thought to be discriminating for
arbitrary reasons. In fact his commentary
beckons the reader to the apparently
incontestable fact that some individuals
simply lack the capabilities of others."36
", .
The commentary referred to is Samkara's Bhasya on the Brahma
Sutra and the underscoring in the above passage is ours,
inserted in order to lay· emphasis on the consideration,
important in the present context, that an ethical derivative
can be .t he result of personal, historical and social
influences, as much as of purely metaphysical ones. Ethics
may be seen, therefore, as the product of shaping factors
generated by social evolution, as well as thrOUgh a
consideration of the logic of metaphysical postulates. Some
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attention has already been drawn to this perspective in
relation to ethical ideas in the dharma-sastras and in the
earlier tradition.
To continue the development of this argument, we may cite
Deutsch's effective conclusion, arrived at upon the appli-
cation of the pram~as or traditional methodology of
knowledge, that the concept of ~~~I!la in advaita is "a
convenient fiction." Deutsch has applied the traditional
proofs in a highly formal and restrictive fashion, but our
- "
interest lies in his conclusion.
"Karma, therefore, cannot be a content of
spiritual experience. K13.r ma is undemon-
strated, and for .,A dyaita_~Y~d@ta it is
undemonstrateable; hence, logically, it
has the status of a 'fiction'."3?
This conclusion must appear harsh in the Indian context, but
it should be borne in mind that it is arrived at as a
negative implication, for karma is not "a content of
spiritual experience." From an advaitic viewpoint, the only
admissible category of spiritual experience, again in a
highly formal and restrictive sense, is the pure and absolute
Brahm~ which is qualityless and changeless. On an . a priori
basis, every other category would be discounted as it would
fall within the purview of empirical expe~ience. Deutsch
himself asserts:
"For Advai ta, then, which insists on the sole
reality of a distinctionless Oneness, there
cannot be any absolute moral laws, principles
or duties."38a
Deutsch appears to contend that advaitic teachers from the
Upani?adic period onwards (and including SaIDkara) utilized
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the "fiction" of karma in relation to the traditional
morality in a self-conscious though purposive way, in order
to achieve advaita-orientated metaphysical goals,38b but
this lies ouside the writer's field of consideration.
As a practical explication of its axiological imperative,
advaita was led to justify moral acts on the basis of the
simple criterion that the good consisted in promoting the
attainment of Brahman-experience, and that which prevented
such attainment was necessarily evil. 39 On this somewhat
natural (if not logical) presumption the moral rules as ;
traditionally enunciated under the conception of dharma are
in fact not incumbent upon the advai1iin, for the simple
reason that "Brahman is incommensurable with the empirical
world ll • 40 Relations pertaining to actions and sequences of
the nature of past, present and future are irrelevent to the
spiritual "life" and ultimacy of Brahman. In a true
advaitic perspective, therefore, alternative modes of social
structuring, would, on the face of it, be totally acceptable,
as it has been in Buddhism, whose metaphysics, at least with
regard to empirical concerns, is quite comparable to
advaita's. Against such options, and the example of Buddhism,
however, Safukara himself held that the traditional morality
in terms of var~asrama-dharmawas a necessary discipline
leading to mok~a.41 In so opting for the traditional social
order with its obvious restrictive measures against possibly
half the population of the land, Safukara was yet not, in one
sense at least, violating the supremacy of the value of
~~~an, but rather demonstrating it (paradoxically:). For,
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as Deutsch says of advaita's acceptance of the traditional
hierarchial co~plex of moral rules:
"Advaita does not proffer any W1ique or special
justification for it, and qualifies its
acceptance of it with the understanding that
it has only a possible instrumental value for
one who is seeking freedom (mok$a) and that it
has no meaning at all for one~who has attained
this freedom."42
This observation is not a mere assuagement of the violation
of our ethical sense, but is distinctly consistent with the ·
view that sees the overwhelming importance, even urgency, of
Brahman-experience in itself, as unrelated to empirical
social concerns, and is therefore constrained to see
morality as a mere means to the spiritual ideal.
However the a~vaitic position with regard to .dhar ma may be
sought to be justified, on any objective standard it must at
least become clear that, by according such priority to meta-
physics against social ethics, the advaita becomes a
"religion of salvation" more truly than even Buddhism, so
far as the matter of dharma is concerned. An objective
critic f however sympathetic, cannot fail to be impressed
by the clear social and moral implications of theadvaita
tradition in this regard, and with the great personality of
Safukara at the head of it. In his commentary on the Brahma
- .-' ,
Sutra, Samkara himself, after supporting the immoral
prohibitions and unjust penalties heaped upon the disenfran-
chised sUdras, affirms:
"But the conclusion stands that the slidra has
no right to knowledge through the Veda."43
Radhakrishnan quotes Ramanuja as holding that according to
the advaita theory of Brahman as indeterminate pure
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consciousness, "restrictions imposed upon the _~udras cannot
be justified".44 Yet in his own commentary on the same
sutra Ramanuja blandly states the traditional prohibition
that "sudras are debarred from hearing and studying the
Vedas", and repeats the observation of the .sutrakara,
appearing non-committal in the matter. 45 But ~n his
commentary on the previous ~u~~a concerning the competence
of Satyakama Jaoala for Vedic study, Ramanuja, declaring
that Satyakama was in fact a brahmin (by birth) and therefore
could be considered competent, says in conclusion: "Hence
sudras do not have the necessary qualification for Brahma-
vidya and are not entitled to it".46 Both Saihkara and
Ramanuja cite two prohibitions from the Manu Smrti against
sudras being qualified for Vedic learning. 47 It should be
noted that in their commentaries on the four sutras pertain-
ing to prohibitions against the ~udras, neither Saffikara nor
Ramanuja avails himself of the opportunity to vindicate
the sUdra's rights and declare any type of ethics of
humanity.
Radhakrishnan's citation of Ramanuja, though given in the
original Sanskrit, does not give the textual source. Radha-
krishnan himself, as an able commentator and an acarya of
considerable repute, says in support of a universal code :
of ethics:
"The restrictions with regard to Vedic study
cannot be defended. Whatever be their caste
or class, race or religion, sex or occupation
the methods for gaining release should be ope~
to all." 48
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Commenting on the sutra concerning Satyakama Jabala, Radha-
krishnan rightly points out that the sutrakara is non-
committal. Referring to the original ChBndogya text (which
itself does not show discrimination against the .sudra»)
Radhakrishnan clearly confirms its view:
"It is obvious from the ChSndogya episode that
character and not birth was the test of
Brahminhood. Jabala was given initiation
because he did not deviate from truth."49
It would be unduly naive to presume that the weight of
tradition was too heavy and impossible to ignore. In point
of fact, the tradition of both Sruti and sm~ti (barring the
dharma-aastras), support a somewhat fluid social system.
The tensions between castes, together with a clear teaching
of at least the principle of equality of opportunity, is
firmly embedded in the tradition at two levels. One is
at the level of caste as such, as demonstrated in the
legend of Vi~vamitra (a kf;?atriya) ,engaged in protracted
feud with Vasif;?~ha (a brahmin} and rising to the level of
a brahmarsi through an arduous process of self-discipline
and devotion. 50 Tradition has it that Visvamitra, with
generosity of heart and not without a sense of moral
indignation, took under his personal protection a king who
-
had been turned into a c~dala (outcaste), for desiring to
enter heaven bodily. Visvamitra attempted to send him up
bodily to the highest heaven, thus expending a large part
of his spiritual merit, which he had acquired through austeri-
ties for the sake of becoming a brahmat~i. It is difficult
to ignore this clear lesson of the sacrifice of comforts
and endangering one's own highest ambitions in order to give
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help to fellow-man, and virtually an outcaste at that. 51
The tradition further states that, in the process of help-
ing the stricken man, Visvamitra began creating a new cosmic
order, with new gods and new heavens, and we may discern
in this episode the enactment, in legendary form, of the
desire for an entirely new social and moral order.
The episode in the Chandogya concerning the status of
Satyakama Jabala provides a clear lesson of equality of
/ .
opportunity, and it is surprising that both Samkara and
Rantanuja chose to place a 'stretched interpretation upon it
just to uphold caste prejudices involved in traditional
conceptions of dharma.
At a second significant level, the principle of equality of
opportunity is patently enunciated in the legend of Indra
(representative of the gods) and Virocana (representative
of the demons), being equally instructed by the teacher
Prajapati (God himself).52 Another parable places gods,
men and demons in a situation of receiving equal instruction,
again from God. The instruction is interpreted according
to their individual requirements and propensities, but the
significance of equal teaching for all cannot be missed. 53
Yet another significant legend shows both gods and demons
cooperating actively in a venture to procure the elixir
of immortality, though each party wishes to secure it
exclusively. 54 It is impossible to conceive that Samkara
and Ramanuja could not see the analogical references to
human types in these legends. That they chose to ignore
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the more humane (and really logical) interpretation helped
to perpetuate the biassed views and unjust discrimination
against the sUdras inherent in the traditional views of
dharma. The dharma-sastras discriminated against 6udras to
the point of considering them slaves. 55
The samkhya system, like Buddhism, repudiated caste, though
it generally accepted the asrama-dharma for practical
reasons. "It does not ,excl ude the ~udras from higher
studies", and lithe teacher is not necessarily a bramnin.,,56
The samkhya's ,opposition to ' t he debilitating effects of the
caste system is attested to by Crawford, who is otherwise
" -so favourably disposed towards advaita and visistadvaita:
itA good teacher is one who is himself free; and
it is not important whether he is a brahmin or
not. Finding such a guru is contingent on
virtuous conduct in the past. And as another
strike against caste, sudras are not barred from
receiving instruction in the highest knowledge."57
In the saIDkhya itself its own theory of the three ~~as is
interpreted as applying equally to all men, irrespective of
caste and past karmas. 58 Whi l e in the Hindu tradition this
originally sanumya theory of g~as is applied with
precision in the dharma scheme of differentiation among the
castes, to the advantage of the brahmin and the derogation
of the sudra59
The tensions and stresses generated by the traditional
interpretations of dharma, have continued throughout the
""' .
centuries from Samkara onwards, and have manifested at the
intellectual level as well as at the level of practi,cal
ethical endeavours. A host of saints and reformers have
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repudiated the system as refle.cted in their lives and
-" .
works. The Alvars who preceded Samkara by several centuries
and who have attained canonical recognition as God-realized
/- th . b 60 Isaints, feature several 6udras among e~r num er. n
the lives and works of many later poet~saints also, such
as Caitanya, Ramananda , Vallabha:, Tukaram and Mirabal.,
varnasrama-dharma becomes irrelevant.
I
In fairness, it must be emphasised that Ramanuja's doctrine
of prapatti potentially gives the edge to visi~]advaita
against advaita doctrines. Hiriyanna says of this:
"The inclusion by Ramanuja in his doctrine of
a means of salvation which is accesible to all,
explains the wide popularity it has always
commanded; and the social uplift of the lower
classes to which it has led is of great value
in the history of India"61
!he enthuaia sm dn the above lines appears a little forced,
especially in connection with "social uplift of the lower
classes", while it is probably justified with regard to
Ramanuja's conception of salvation as extending to all
persons. But the definition of bhakti shows a tradition-
bound ambivalence in Ramanuja. On the one hand, "Ramanuja
preaches equality in worship and proclaims that bhakti
transcends all caste distinctions,,,62 and follows up his
convictions by allowing ~outcastes into the temple. On the
other hand, as Radhakrishnan says further:
"But it is by no means clear that he was pre'Cared
for a wholesale defiance of the accepted order.
Out of deference to tradition he concedes that
freedom is open only to the three upper classes,
and others will have to work their way up and
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wait for the next birth."63
The metaphysical tentacles of the traditional dharma reach
down and appear to place heavy constraints on genuine
tendencies to actualise the ethics of the "religion of God",
otherwise so promising in Ramanuja's system. In the matter
of var~srama-dharma and the morality flowing but of this
conception we have to say with Radhakrd.ahnanrtha't Ramanuja
was not "in full sympathy with the logical implications of
his (own) teachings".64
A modern academic and follower of the yisi~tadvaita finds
Radhakrishnan's remarks "strange", on the strength that
Radhakrishnan recognises that Ramanuja admitted outcastes
into the Melkote temple. After affirming that "phakti as a
feeling of love is accepted to be present in all," the same
respondent defends the discriminatory attitude with:
"But bhakti as a practical discipline involves
certafn restrictions governed by one's station
in life, which cannot be violated."65
This type of justification precisely presents the case of
the traditional concept of dharma, and reveals clearly the
metaphysical link between bhakti (or jnana or karma for that
matter), and its application in terms of social ethics. It
is therefore the mere interpretation that is the "obstacle
to genuine morality." It is to be noted that the reformer
Rammohan Roy insisted that "moral doctrines be kept beyond
the reach of 'metaphysical perversion' and within the reach
of the understandi~g of all people.,,66
Perhaps the alleged metaphysical constraints imposed upon
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the actualisation of a wider ethics of humanity is, in the
perception of Indian thinkers, dependent significantly upon
the central role assigned to the notion of karma, a
partiality towards which is understandable. To this dilemma
the closely allied ethics of Buddhism cannot fail to provide
the necessary corrective. A satisfactory metaphysical re-
formulation, in a philosophical sense, has not come forth
from Indian thinkers even of modern times, as a studied
alternative to the traditional interpretation of dharma and
its relation to karma. Yet, almost to a man, Indian leaders
of the modern period have rejected the validity of its
social implications in the traditional sense, including
Dayananda, Vivekananda, Tagore and Aurobindo. The peculiar
exception is GandhI, who seriously and persistently upheld
that vocations fixed by birth is a principle of spiritual
life because it is the foundation of a non-competitive
society.67 Perhaps in his over-concern for his programme of
universal welfare, sarvodaya, GandhI failed to appreciate
that if an altruistic attitude to life is to be truly
spiritual, and therefore meaningful, it must issue from each
individual as a self-willing unit of society; that the
individual can only reflect the will of God if he is an
artist (like Tagore?) creating out of his inner spontaneity;
that when he splashes the colours of his dedication onto
society he must necessarily see himself reflected as the
divine aesthete and not as one bereft of will and
individuality. This would have been more befitting to
GandhI's own declared acceptance of a general advaitic
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position unspoilt by traditional interpretations.
GandhI's peculiar personal-traditional stand on the dharma
issue provoked the criticism that, in fact, "Gandhi was
enslaving human conscience to duty as Gandhi saw it -
disciplined blind obedience_,,68
Gandhl's own personality and fervour for a social-ethical
life-style chosen voluntarily (since he was himself born in -
a trader family) notwithstanding, Hindery concludes that
Hindu mysticism in its "Sailkarite and neo-Vedantic versions
(both indigenous and Wes t er n ) necessarily slow down active
empathy toward a social ethic of commit~d decisions and
humanistic interaction.,,69
In concluding this section it is perhaps necessary to remind
ourselves of the global design of spiritual harmony into
whose service the entire co~cept of dharma in all its
ramifications was sought to be pressed. While the samkhya
avoided the larger propriety and declined to accept the
\
traditional interpretation (though ultimately it was bodily
drawn into the larger metaphysics of Vedanta), the advaita
and the visi~~advaita systems, each in their own way, helped
to extend the official doctrine into the ethical field of
their influence. Neither system could fully realise that,
in spite of some excellences of the ethico-metaphysical
scheme of social morality that they promoted, it amounted to
a splintered social conscience which showed itself in many
phases of social and literary development down to modern
times. We have also shown that the many confusions and
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perversions manifested in social stratification as a result
of metaphysical hegemony over the individual, ~ in fact a
misapplication of the true, inner and most original meaning
of dharma. In the case of the advaita this misapplication,
in the sense of advaita's conformity to the official
doctrine, is due to its anxiety to rationalise in social
terms its clearly negative metaphysical interests. In the
case of the visi?tadvaita, this misapplication, again in ths
sense of upholding the official doctrine, is due to a
failure to fulfil the promise of its own positive meta-
physics.
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Chapter Eight: Moral Effort: Ethical Dimensi.ons
of Karma
212
This chapter discusses the concept of karma as continu-
ous with the holistic metaphysics of Indian thought, and
emphasises its positive role in all moral striving, and
its relation to the idea of freedom.
It is shown that the force of the positive aspect of karma
is somewhat reduced in the advaita system with its rather
severe emphasis on the path of knowledge. The ethical
implications of this view are considered.
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mORAL EFFORT: ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF KARMA
The idea of striving for that which is considered good,
the idea of moral effort, takes its root in Indian
tradition in the ancient conception of ~ta, "a conception
that has far more importance than any other," says
McKenzi e , so far as the most ancient Indian views of
morality are concerned. 1 As we have already seen in the
previous chapter, the term ~ta stands for the most general
and pervasive idea of the good or moral life, even in its
most ancient application, though, because of the evolution-
ary character of Indian and Hindu ideas of ethics,2 a fully-
fledged system of ethics.has not come down to us from anti-
quity. Early ideas therefore, have to be taken to be of
"a very rUdimentary·sort.,,3 Regarding the early importance
of this concept in the moral sphere, McKenzie says:
"It is clear enough that :r;ita stands for moral
order and is opposed to sin and unrighteousness,
but we search in vain for clear indications as
to forms that conduct in accordance with tita
takes as against conduct that is sinful •••••.
The conception of ~ita is so wide in its
application that it loses correspondingly in
depth."
4
For our purposes, in relation to Indian conceptions of
morality, we have to see that "it is this very fact of wide
application that is so important for the evolutionary
character of Indian ethics. McKenzi e is quite right, at
least from one point of view; when he says:
"••••• in the history of Indian ethical thought
it has not been upon the idea of an overruling
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God, righteous in Himself, seeking righteousness
of His people, and helping them in the attainment
of it, that the moral life has been grounded."
5
And that point of view is the bifurcation of all reality
into the being of God, as one realm of it, and all that
which is not God, as the other realm of it. Apart from
samkhya ideas, there is about Indian ideas of morality
a persistent sense of wholeness between God and man, bet-
ween God and the universe. All existence is a single
whole composed of individually functioning parts. "Gods,
men, animals and insentient objects belong together in a
universal cosmic order (~~ta), and so the relationships
involved are organic.,,6 To take up McKenzie's thought,
since moral life has to be grounded ,i n that which is trans-
cendent, great and overruling, it had to be grounded in
the principle of ;ta, in the Indian context, which answers
to the requirements of moral striving and imparts signi-
ficance to it.
Hopkins is opposed to this view, in holding that the ancient
Veda does in fact give us a true conception of a trans-
cendent God to whom the supreme power of r.ta actually
belongs.? Yet he acknowledges the peculiar and character-
istic interpretation of law in and through the various gods,
which mark out a "'divine harmony". 8 Karma as moral effort
that is expressive of the divine law, as moral striving that
maintains a "harmony with the higher spiritual environment,
which encompasses and controls the world," though far from
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becoming fully formulated in the early Veda, is nevertheless
rudimentarily conceived. 9
That the concept of ~ stood for cosmic or~and harmony,
which was at the same time also the supreme principle of
moral conduct, is admitted on all sides. It stood for the
principle of physical orderliness as well as moral right-
eousness. 10
It was conceived at the same time as the ontological
principle on whic h all things rest, and on which they
depend for their continued existence. 11 It is only logical
that such a principle, elevated to such a high plane, should
not really be distinguished from the highly ethical notion
of truth. 12 In the ethical consciousness of the early
Indian, both the eternal cosmic order or ~ta and themorally
true are together responsible for the creation of the
world. 13 As characterising the inner life of man it
should be remembered that sat means not only that which
is true, but also that which is good. 14
In so far as man was thus considered an integral part of
the moral order of the world, it was incumbent upon him to
perpetuate the same order through the institution of yajna
or sacrifice. The concepts of ~ta and yajna came to be
closely bound together. Wha t was generally considered as
a universal pattern found in nature, came to be expressed
in terms of human action that had to adapt itself, through
the yajna, to the characteristics of objective nature, and
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imposed upon it a mechanistic interpretation. 15 The
mechanical ordering of the constituent parts of nature are
to be seen in the works of man. Indeed, it is to be
broQght to fulfilment in man's karmic actions, for such
are the ancient ordinances and the dharma that all men are
required to follow. 16 As we had seen earlie~ the concept
of dharma is fundamental to the idea of action or karma.
It is both metaphysical as well as ethical in its impli-
cations. In both senses it is ontologically unitedtb the
concept of ~ta17 We are in a position to say that, to the
development of the concept of yajna, we may trace the
objective mechanistic notions in the concept of k~rma,
while through its connection with the conception of dharma,
karma has i~herited its flavour of freedom. Karma is ,thus
that which binds as well as that which frees. Seen in this
way, the concept of karma exemplifies the overall holistic
design at the level of ethical actions. Man is a partici-
pant in the natural order of the universe and is not entire~
ly.distinct from it, while at the same time he is a free
agent for he manifests dharma as his inner spirit. 18 Dharma
is the expression of the eternal order of rta at the onto-
~
logical level within man, whi l e karma is its manifestation
at the level of overt action. 19
We cannot deny that such was the metaphysical formulation
of the idea of the law of karma in the Upani~adic period
with its pronounced holistic world view, and taken over
into the various schools of Indian philosophy, with
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specific adjustments. It should be noted that the view
of the Vedic origin of the concept of dharma has been
disputed; it is sometimes held that "Vedic Aryanism and
the Upanisads are different genera altogether and the
doctrine of karma as seen in t he Upani~ads, does not seem
to have taken its origin in the Samhitas, but on the other
hand it has grown independently in the Upani~ads.,,20
However this may be, the classical view of karma has been
fixed along the dimension of ontological unity with basic
elements in man and the universe, and in the peculiar
relations this created with regard to the individual and
social nature of Indian ethics, it also generated tensions
and ambivalences that have been perpetuated down to modern
times. It is therefore important to understand the notion
of karma in the fashion in which it has been understood
in the classical period.
8.1. SAI~A
An exception must be made in this understanding of the idea
of karma in regard to the sacikhya system. For, as noted
earlier, it is a system of dualistic realism, in which
bifurcation between the world of spiritual reality or
purusa, on the one hand, and ·t he world of material reality
or prakrti on the other hand, is total and irreconcilable.
It is not relevant to our purposes to undertake a criticism
of this position except as it affects the ethics of the
system.
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The metaphysics of the saIDkbya has many features in common
with the Vedantic system, but from an ethical point of
view, it bears stronger resemblances to a Buddhistic
outlook. Banerjee says in this regard:
"In the scheme of life thus conceived, there
is, according to the Samkhya, no room for the
performance of duties, whether conditional
(kamya), or unconditional (akamya), secular
or religious (enjoined by the scriptures)." 21
As the classical saIDkhya is plainly atheistic, it does not
countenance devotional practices or religious austerities
designed to appease any deity. Its chief ethical interest
lies in overcoming the three types of pains, intrinsic,
extrinsic and supernatural. It. blandly admits that the
world is full of misery and sorrows due to the everchanging
forms of matter. Both joys and pains are alike products
of ignorance and bind the soul (puru§a), to mundane exis-
tence (samsara), and the most meaningful ethic to be under-
taken is that which counteracts directly the effects of
avidya. or ignorance which is the "root of all experience
and all misery,,,22 So far as the classical formulation of
the saIDkhya is concerned, in spite of the fact that it
accords to the world the full status of reality, and
although it accepts in a general fashion the whole system
of samsara including the traditional ideas of gods and
heavens, it is constrained to confine moral effort to the
way of knowledge only, which must lead to a total trans-
cendance of the three ~as or material constituents of
prak:rti.23
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8.2. CAUSALITY AND KAFm~
Since Indian thought sees the world somehow in terms of
unity, man is considered an integral part of the world,
both at the physical and spiritual levels. Both physical
reality and spiritual reality are seen as part of a single
movement whose centre is man 'hi ms el f . Many important
texts in Indian tradition assert the central value ascribed
to man in the scheme of life. 24
The principle of causality that is the most pervasive and
characteristic feature of the physical world is extended
to cover the life of man as well. Man is as much a part
of the physical world as he is of the spiritual. The
cosmic principle of rta imposes its rule of orderliness
. ..-L-
and rhythm in the life of man at the moral level, which
is seen as the operation of his inner dharma. In this
connection Crawford says:
"The doctrine is very ancient and is to be
seminally found in the Vedic concept of Rta.
It postulates a universe governed by law:---
The same immutable law which charts the
course of the sun and the moon across the
sky operates in the rational and ethical
realms with equal exactitude. 1l 25
Physical causality is precise in its antecendents and
unerring in its effects. Indian thought attempts to
maintain the holistic model by extending the external
material principle of a cause and effect relationship to
the spiritual aspects of life. From this point of view
the essential feature of karma is an invariable connection
with the past and an undeniable one with the future. 26 The
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precision of the natural world is thus brought over into
man's psychological life and made a feature of his -
spiritual dimension.
The necessary connection with the past and the future refers,
quite naturally in the context of Indian thought, to the
theory of rebirth or samsara. The empirical ego or the
jlva, trapped in this world as a result of its lapse from
its pristine perfection (in the view of saIDkhya and the
advaita) or as a result of its lapse from correct relation-
ship of love and utter dependence upon God (as in
vigi$~advaita), is born repeatedly in accordance with its
own karmas. Sometimes the soul advances towards its
soteriological goal of mok~a through the performance of
good deeds, at other times it may regress through the
performance of evil deeds. All the systems follow the
Upani~adic conception of the dynamic interrelationship
between karma and the samsaricvicissitudes that befall
the soul. Says the B~hadar~yaka in this regard:
"As is his desire, so is his will; as is his will,
so is the deed he does; and whatever deed he does,
that he attains."27
The operative principle in the -causal i t y of ~arma is thus
conceived to be desire or motive. This is itself to be
taken in the form of a principle, and does not refer to
stray wishes and unconnected fancies that overtake the
mind in casual moments. As a principle the rule of desire
is affected through the change that is wrough't in the
221
entire character of the individual through the overlaying
of samskaras (deep-rooted tendencies). Through a generalised
accumulation or building up of samskaras, which take
possession of the soul and impel it into appropriate birth
circumstances such as may be said to give expression to
28 d d .those desires, further karmas are sown, an reape l.n
turn.
Causality thus imposes its own constraints, both in a
retrospective and in a prospective sense. If the past is
fixed and unalterable, the future must at least have a
definite shape. Othe~vise the principle of causality must
fall away. A strict inference of the causal principle may
mean that man is not free to create his own future. Hiri-
yanna says: "As every event in the physical world is
determined by its antecendents, so everything that happens
in the moral realm is preordained ••••• it may be asked
whether the doctrine does not become fatalistic and there-
fore leave no room for exercise of freedom. 1l 29
Another problem is raised at the level of the g¥Qas, which
constitute not only man's physical body, but also his
mental make-up. In saIDkhya and the Vedantic systems the
buddhi (intellect) itself is basically constituted of the
~as which are material prak~tic elements, and the
principle of causation must issue in a rigid determinism
in respect of human behaviour. The constraints, and
limitations, insofar as they can only operate through the
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g~as of pr akr t i , must appear to seriously curtail any
notion of true freedom. 30
The overpowering influence of the constituents of nature and
man's inherited tendencies have to be accounted for, and
related to the possibility of genuine ethical action. The
heavy weight that nature places on the struggling soul is
. . th G~t- 31clearly p01nted out 1n e 1 a.
It is clear that, whether karma is seen as the operation of
generalized desire, or the operation of the g~as (which in
any case is another way of speaking about psychological
functions), karma does seem to operate in a deterministic
way. The constraints and limitations of the past appear to
forge a causal chain that cannot logically be broken, for
karmas performed in the present life are really dictated by.
past karmas. And the causality will likewise be carried
into future lives. Even the performance of good acts, by
the same token as the. performance of bad acts, binds the
soul to mundane existence. In its formal aspects karma
appears to be a self-perpetuating principle of bondage
rather than of liberation. The classical mlmamsakas, as the
karmists par excellence had this idea in mind, when they
denied the possibility of any type of final l iberat ion.
8.3. THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM
The notion of freedom is a peculiarly elusive one. It is
important to understand that it is primarily a metaphysical
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concept. From a purely formal and logical point of view,
the notion of absolute freedom is as impossible as it is
inconceivable. The very idea of freedom presupposes a
background of constraints against which freedom becomes
possible and significant. Freedom without some type of
constraints would be chaotic lawlessness. At the physical
level, even, we cannot conceive of a world without the
operation of law in some sense.
If we try to take our minds back to a most primeval
condition of matter, then too, utter chaos cannot be
rationally conceived. The concept of mUla prak~ti (original
or roat matter) ' i s "i t s el f not without constraining
conditions. There must be some imposition of form upon
material particles through the operation of a principle of
law. 32
When the idea of absolute freedom is sought to be trans-
ferred to man's psychological life, it becomes impossible of
conception. We may say in fact that such an attempt results
in a non-concept; for even the bearing of a concept in the
mind entails some sort of discipline. If the idea of
absolute freedo~ is pressed further w~th regard to human
individuality and mental life, the result is necessarily the
total annihilation of the psychological ego. Therefore, any
consideration of freedom can never be a consideration of
absolute freedom. Freedom of the individual has to be
conceived with necessary constraints; it has to be viewed
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within those circumstances that set up the constraints. It
is only within such a frame of reference that we can speak
meaningfully of freedom of the soul or freedom of the
individual self. In its idea of karma Indian thought
assumes as much.
In its moral application in the Indian systems karma refers
to free acts performed by a freely willing self. It is
self-determination in the sense that the self does not feel
itself bound to act in any pre-determined way as a result of
either external or internal constraints. Freedom is mainly
the sense of being free, the feeling of not being determined
by factors that violate the integrity of the self. Hiriyanna
says :
"Freedom should be regarded as consisting
not in unrestricted licence, but in being
determined by oneself. When therefore we
ask whether belief in karma does not
result in fatalism all that we mean is
whether it does or does not preclude self-
determination_"33
Some scholars have succumbed to the heavy mechanistic
element in the causal explanation of .~~rma , and have
declared it to be a doctrine of fatalism. 34 We cannot say
that some thinkers in the Indian tradition even have been
immune from this line of thinking. 35 The tensions
associated with the ka~a doctrine have been sought to be
overcome in various ways within the tradition itself.
Fatalism in its undiluted sense would certainly be inimical
to any type of moral effort on the part of the individual.
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As society is a collection of individuals it would tend to
make relations among men more mechanical and reduce the urge
to create new social institutions to meet challenging
situations. Insofar as karma means the inheritance of
psychic patterns at the individual level and institutional
patterns (to which individuals are born) at the social level,
the tensions arising from this difficulty inherent in the
concept itself will always remain.
A major dire~tion for the interpretation of karma is given
in the etymology of the word itself. Coming from the root
~q:, which means "to do" or "to make", the term karma really
stands for positive action that is creative or forward-
looking at both the individual and the social levels. At a
simple level ,karma is a corollary of human freedom. 36 Each
individual has the power to regulate his present actions and
so mould for himself a suitable future. He can either rise
morally and materially or fall, depending largely upon his
exertions. 37
No individual and no physical object, can completely break
with the past. Causality is implicit in all things. Karma
is to be seen more as a process that comprehends the whole
life of man, than as isolated events of life. Individual
events are also ,kar ma , but they are not to be regarded as
isolated events discontinuous with each other. The shaping
influence of past action asserts itself in the present and
fixes the parameters within which the individual has to
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operate. We can no more jump out of our own skins than
break with the past. What is history for the nation is
karma for the individual. It provides the framework within
which the present has to be worked out. Freedom lies in -
the fact that man can initiate new action from the depths
of his being and alter the circumstances of the present.
It is the ontological unity wit~ the divine principle
within man that confers on the individual this freedom to
operate in an autonomous way.
Whether the karma doctrine is necessarily related to the
Atman doctrine from which is derived its spiritual autonomy,
has been called into question. 38 Yet it cannot be denied
th~it~ not necessarily a species of determinism) in that
the conditions that bind the individual to samsara as well
as those that liberate him are both generated within his
own being. Banerjee says that the karma doctrine, as has
been formulated in the Indian tradition) is neither fatalism
nor a doctrine of pre-destination. He says of it that:
"••••••• it is a form of self-determinism instead
of necessitarianism in so far as it holds that
the determining factors are not extraneous to man,
but are only the potencies left behind by his own
t ' 11ac ~ons. 39
The karmic potencies are what make for continuity with the
past and provide the conditions within which the human
spiri t is to be .moulded by the exercise of mind. If st'rict.
inviolable determinism prevailed in nature, we would not
even have the phenomenon of the rise of mind and the values
it entails. Indian thought holds that a materialistic
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interpretation of causality is not tru~ to the facts of
life. The human spirit as represented by the mind shows
us the possibilities of value and removes it from a rigid
involvement with matter. 40 Ultimate values cannot be
demonstrat~d by a reference to the external world, but
. f" be i 41 N tonly an terms 0 man s arine r ea.ng. 0 man as an
isolated product of nature, however advanced he may be,
but in terms of his ontological unity with some Divine
Source that is higher than all the parts of the world put
together. 42 The disciplines of asceticism, the strivings
of religion ~ as well as the labours of the scholar, all
The Indian systems accept the freedom of the will as a
given datum proceeding from the reality of the divine
spirit. Physical causality is linked to morality as an
available form of explanation by analogy. Yet we cannot
say that this line of reasoning has not been a carrier of
some form of intellectual tensions. A causal explanation
that looks to antecendent causes does not explain the root
of the problem, which requires an explanation of the
conditions that initiated the causal series. Since the
soul in its true nature is ever-free, the question of how
it came ' i nt o bondage is at least a perplexing one, and
brings the theory of karma into question. For purporting
to explain a present situation by reference to a past one
leads to infinite regress only, without providing a s~utkn.
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This problem must loom especially large for the samkhya
thinker and the advaitin, for it directly affects the
integrity of their notion of puru!?a or Atman, which is
the source of individual freedom. Bowes remarks of the
regress hypothesis (taken as a sufficient explanation)
"This answer seems unsatisfactory to me for it
is not entirely clear who or what is reborn
and where jn this account of being born again
the concept of an eternal soul fits in". 44
The endless regression of lives and karmic deeds has inherent
in it a deep sense of the depravity and wickedness of man.
And reflection upon the doctrine in this way must cause
a great deal of anxiety to sensitive souls. However,
Indian theism like visi~~advaita has a built-in salve for
this problem because the created world is considered as
IlIa or divine sport. God has put forth souls into the
world so that they might experience the supreme bliss of
seeking Him amidst the te'mptations of the world. To a
great extent the tensions of heart and mind are assuaged
by actually acknowledging the immense loading of guilt and
evil in the discipline of demeanment before the might and
glory of God. The bhakta or devotee considers himself
unworthy of the presence of God, and in his lowly and
fallen condition he is thankful for the blessedness of
being able to even remember the Lord, which is itself a
saving mercy.
229
"'-8. 4 . ,JNANA AND THE WAY OF KARlVIA
The mlmamsa school of thought represents the ritualistic
path of works in the Indian tradition. A significant legend
is related of SaIDkara, of how he, as a renunciant monk and
follower of the way of knowledge (jnana marga) in an
exclusive sense, engages in debate M~~ana Misra, a renowned
follower of the ritualistic doctrine. The debate, said to
,-
have lasted seventeen days, ends in victory for Safukara,
--- ,
whereupon the defeated M~4ana converts himself to Safukara's
lifestyle and dons the robes of a sannyasl. 45 The legend is
celebrated in advaita tradition not only as a clear demon-
,.
stration of the superior dialectics of the Sarnkara school,
but also of the ethical primacy of the way of knowledge.
Firstly, we have to note that, since mlmamsa represents
" .Vedic authority at its highest point of orthodoxy, Samkara's
victory for the way of knowledge is to be seen as firmly
based on the ~ruti or revealed texts, and therefore binding
upon all followers of the general Hindu tradition. Secondly,
/' .
it needs to be emphasised that Samkara's victory is taken
not in the narrow sense of a victory against the soulless
mechanical ritualism of the mlmamsa (Which any general logic
of reform could achieve anyway), but a victory against the
principle of the spiritual significance and efficacy of all
karmas, all works, performed in the mundane empirical world
for the purpose of achieving spiritual freedom. Mor al
effort is significant only if it is accompanied by a spirit
of renunciation, if it eschews the world and has a desire to
transcend it.
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IvIi tt.al is substantially correct when he says :
"It is not unnatural, therefore, if it seems,
at least in some of its interpretations,
that the Vedanta has a thoroughly negative
attitude towards matter and the material
world·"46
Our interest in the matter is to clearly show that the
Indian systems embody ambivalent and differential approaches
in matters pertaining to ethics and morality. It is not
possible to ignore or explain away this ambivalence as it
has high relevance to practical matters. Within the same
general tradition we can see the operation of differential
ethical approaches, each one claiming primacy for the
attainment of the self-same goal. Although mlmamsa is not
interested in .moksa as such, the advaitin's interest is also
not so much the refutation of mere ceremonialism, but the
refutation of the entire basis of the performance of karma.
Thus, Deutsch also quite rightly urges with regard to the
advaitic view:
"The advaitic concept of freedom (mok~a or
mukti) likewise is cast initially in
negative terms, as freedom from karma, from
actions that bind one to the world, and from
the ceaseless round of births and deaths in
the world (saIhsara)."47
The system, in one sense at least, takes up every form of
human activity, be it of the individualistic ethical variety,
or of the type of outgoing love that places high value on
service to fellow-men, and tends to relegate all these forms
to the category of bondage-producing karmas. Apart from any
consideration of the merit or demerit of such an ethic, it
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cannot be denied that it thus urges an approach that is
quite opposed to man's natural inclinations, and must there-
fore set up tremendous tensions in the soul of man.
The tradition of the differentiation between the attitude of
knowledge and the attitude of works is mentioned in the GIta,
wherein Krsna says :
~ . .
"Of old did I proclaim the twofold law in
this world, - for men of theory the
spiritual exercise of wisdom, for men of
action the spiritual exercise through
works·"48
The term for "wisdom" used in the text is "sainkhya", but it
refers generally to the way of knowledge, and, as Zaehner
quite right13f shows, it means "detachment from all that
is transient and attachment of the immortal self to God," an
attitude that does not negate all activity in the world but
. only negates attachment to the world as against attachment
to God. 49 In his commentary on the same passage Safukara
says that "devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are
mutually opposed_,,50 Again, Sarilkara says that Arjuna
reacted against "action which caused bondage,,51 whereas
Arjuna, certainly not afraid of death, showed a deepcand
natural concern for the fate of friend and foe alike in the
general conflagration that was to follow. He was not
concerned about any type of "bondage" based on an indi-
vidualistic ethic. SaIDkara's primary interest lies with
relinquishing all karmic bondage· by a disengagement from
action. According to him, those only are true yogins who,
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ftnaving renounced all action, are eversteady in their know-
ledge of the identity of the self with Brahman.,,52
Moral effort, then, in one part of the Indian tradition, is
characterised by the negative approach to life as represented
by samkhya and advaita ethics, in that all actions, good or
bad, create bondage to ~~~~§r~ and must therefore be trans-
cended. But we have to concede that advaita makes some
allowances to accomodate the common understanding which
feels itself bound to the performance of various types of
duties. This is merely a concession and is not a necessary
condition for the attainment of spiritual freedom. Banerjee
sums it up well when he says
"Thus, according to SaIDkara, action in the
form of performance of duties, though
useful in some cases, is not a necessary
condition of the realization of the ideal
life •••••• On the contrary, he is of the
view that morality is not the inescapable
gateway through which one must have to
pass in order to be initiated into
liberated life, and that some may have the
prerogative to live this life without ever
having to bear the burden of moralitY."53
This touches the crux of the problem with regard to the
advaita tradition. Advaita has structured within itself a
valuational approach that militates against the natural
tendencies of man. This is in contradistinction to sam~ya
of the classical variety. Banerjee says that SaIDkara
"differs from the Samkhya in not excluding action altogether
from the planning of the ideal life and holding, on the
contrary, that the performance of the various kinds of
duties contributes to the purification of the mind
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(cittasuddhi) which is essential to successful practice of
contemplation".54
Now, we are not concerned here with the merits or demerits
of advaita, saIDkhya or visistadvaita conceptions of ultimate
reality in terms of their philosophical truth-value, but
more importantly in terms of their ethical implications and
the kinds of demands they make upon the heart and mind of .
the individual. The difficulties that stand in the way of
satisfying these demands are dependent not so much upon the
fact that the tradition envisages multiple ends of human
life, but mor e especially upon the fact that in important
ways these ends, and the demands that they make, tend to
split up the unity of the individual as a psychologically
operating unit. As a relatively dominant tradition the
advaita's attraction is undeniably in terms of its value of
Brahman and the way of knowledge appropriate to it. Insofar
as it tries to accomodate the demands of society involving
strenuous moral effort (though still individualistic in
nature), it does so as a condescension to "lesser faiths"
and to "the frailties of human nature.,,55
The doubts and suspicions that govern the outlook of
individual schools with regard to other views56 are
precisely the factors that have contributed to the dialec-
tical confrontations that in turn lead to further fixing of
the distinctions among the varying schools. On the other
hand, it is a peculiarity of the general Indian philosophy
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of religion, that, despite the existence of irreconcilable
differences at the level of epistemological and metaphysical
thought, there operates a hazy and blurred sense of ethico-
religious unity in the tradition. It is important to under-
stand that even metaphysical niceties impart to ethics a
peculiarity of interpretation that reveals itself at least
at the level of psychological attitudes, if not at the level
of overt practice. A tradition that insists upon splitting
metaphysical speculation into tight compartments on the
basis of precision of thought and subtlety of logic, as
profoundly and seriously as does Indian tradition, and yet
appears to foster a general and unified system of ethico-
religious behaviours, cannot stave off the development of
some types of tensions. Disunity at the metaphysical level
cannot give rise to unity at the ethical level. Moral
effort in Indian tradition therefore, in spite of a certain
commonness of interpretation of the concept of karma as an
ethical principle, is characterised by some unavoidable
tensions.
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Chapter Nine: Mok~a: Freedom and Ethical StriEing
In this chapter the general soteriological dimension of
moral striving is considered with special reference to
the systems of samkhya, advaita and visietadvaita. in
terms of their distinctive metaphysics. It is shown that
advaita has close affinities to both samkhya and visist-
advaita, but along differential dimensions, which invari-
ably give rise to some types of tensions.
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Chapter 9. MOK§A: Freedom and ethical striving
We may take it as a truism of the Indian tradition that the
fundamental postulate in any spiritual attitude to life, in
any spiritual metaphysics, is the idea of freedom or ~ok~a.
While the concept of tlfreedom to act" (which was discussed
in the last chapter) pertains to the idea of karma at the
individual level, "freedom of the soul" pertains to the idea
of ultimate freedom in the soteriological sense. While
"freedom to act" supplies the metaphysical ground and basis
of moral striving, "freedom of the soul" furnishes the
reason and aim of all such striving. We aim to show that
such an aim in the Indian tradition is not a single aim, and
that ethical striving is distracted and split up along at
least three different conceptual dimensions. Ethical
conceptions are functions of metaphysical postulates and
presumptions. Metaphysical thought has built into it
certain precise modes of thought with regard to the attain-
ment of the ideal it proposes. An outstanding characteristic
of Indian thought lies in the "recognition of the all-
importance of the ethico-spiritual ideal of mukti, mok~a,
kaivalya~or nirvana in human life and the attempt to
determine the way to the realisation of this ideal". 1
Inasmuch as the Indian systems uphold the primacy of the
soteriological ideal, it is upon this ideal that the ethics
and rules of moral conduct are systematically built. To the
extent that this ideal is held to be important, to that
extent also, the specific moral determinations peculiar to
that ideal are set forth with emphatic forcefulness, in the
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case of each system.
9.1. SAMKHYA and the ethics of freedom
As noted earlier, the type of patterns of cosmic harmony
maintained at the individual, social and universal levels,
in the Vedantic systems, is conspicuously absent in the
s~hy~, which pursues the line of total and irreconcilable.
differentiatioribetween the spiritual and material
principles. Somehow, however, the spirit-principle (puru~a)
becomes entangled with the matter-principle (prak~ti), and
this entanglement of the self with a material body and
material objects, is what "plays a determining role in its
2degradation or bondage". While the sarilkhya shares -this
view of defilement of the spirit with other Indian views
generally, it is also seen to be unique in this respect on
account of its "uncompromising dualism of spirit and matter".3
A universal characteristic of Indian view is also that the
self 's association with the body and material objects, how-
ever brOUght about, is invariably characterised by pain
and suffering. 4 And this feature certainly enhances the
soteriological values inherent in the tradition as a whole.
In the case of the ~Bmkhya, however, it is just the very
bifurcation of all reality into two totally separate areas,
puru~~ on the one hand and ~rak~i on the other, that
appears to overcome the negative aspects of the teaching,
at least in one sense. The samkhya took it upon itself to
explain the details of the material world, both in its
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physical and psychological aspects t which it did with such
admirable precision t considering old-world limitations t
that it imparted to the world a positive and life-affirming t
almost 'scientific' appearance. These overtones t born out
of its metaphysical structure t are well attested in the
popular words of Garbe:
"In Kapila's doctrine t for the first time in the
history of the world, the complete independence
and freedom of the human mind, its full con-
fidence and its own powers t were exhibited."
5
The frank atheism of samkhya lends credibility to this
view. Even the name 'samkhya' has nothing of abstract
metaphysics in it; rather it is suggestive of a positive
world-affirming ethic.
The saIDkhya analysis of prak~ti into the three gunas
engages man in an active interplay with dynamic aspects of
his own being. The conception of prakrti suggests that
life t together with human individuals, must be a constantly
renewing activity.6 So far as life in the world is
concerned t samkhya metaphysics t in this sense, focusses
attention not on passivity but on activity. If we remember
that the entire evolutionary process has but a single aim t
that of serving the purposes of the enjoyment of puru~a,
and only through that enjoyment (even though it may be
viewed as bondage) the purpose of liberation t we cannot
fail to detect a "strong materia.listic proclivity" in the
teaching.? The Samkhya Karika itself uses similes and
metaphors that are sensually presented with direct reference
to the soul's involvement in matter t and together with the
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characteristic of enjoyer or bhokta, one cannot miss a
rather strong tendency towards a positive affirmation of
the world.
Whatever may be the reason for the samkhya's persistent
plea for an overriding soteriological yalue in life, and
it may be a desire to be counted as a 'spiritual' system
given its pronounced atheism, and so be seen to be con-
sistent within the framework of Indian thought, its
strong material leanings do possess the seeds of a
divided ethic and an ambivalent attitude to life. Apart
from any consideration of internal metaphysical inconsis-
tencies, the ethical problem inherent in the safukhya may
be simply expressed thus:
liThe evolution of the material world is meant
for the enjoyment as well as liberation for
the soul, though enjoyment of the -ma t er i al
world means bondage for the soul. IIS
It is a characteristic feature of the Indian systems,
whether S-amkhya, advaita or visistadvaita, or any other,
that its ethical leanings depend upon the way in which it
presents and resolves the embattled opposition between the
spiritual and the material. Although, as a philosophy of
realism, the samkhya is bound to acknowledge and accept
the value of the natural world without explaining it away
(a s trong tendency in advait~), in the interpretation of
most commentators the samkhya represents an extreme form of
life-denying philosophy.
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This interpretation is enforced by the nature of the spirit
principle of puru§a, which really holds the centre of the
stage in s~hya metaphysics and ethics. The puru~a is
absolutely "devoid of attributes and modifications" and "no
activity can be ascribed to it".9 The puru~a is '!freed from
all accidents of finite life and lifted above time and
change".10 It is "mere sentience" and "entirely passive, .
all activity being restricted to praktti".11
This strong insistence upon the total transcendence of
puru~a from any connection whatever with the material world
is reflected clearly in the saIDkhya conception of prak~ti
. 12and the three guQas. All variability and change, inclu-
ding psychological change, belong to the activities of the
gH£as and not_to puru§a, who, being inactive, cannot be
considered an agent (karta). Though paradoxically the
puru~a is stated to be an enjoyer (bhokta) it is in reality
"a merely neutral witness,11 13 "a solitary, indifferent and
passive spectator"1 4 In every way the spirit principle is
the reverse of prak~tic nature, exhibiting none of the
characteristics of the natural world. In its concern to
portray the pur~a as utterly other than the material
world in any of its modifications, the possibility of
bliss is denied of the Furu~a, for bliss, being a variety
of joy and happiness, can only be brought about by the
action of the g~as; and puru~~ is totally other than the
~~as. It is mere sentience, mere consciousness and is by
its nature free of any involvement in the world of matter.
Aside from any logical inconsistency here, we have to see
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that what is emphasised is the utter aloofness, the utter
otherness of the puru~a from all material modifications.
This is kaivalya or solitariness, and defines the conception
of moksa in the simkhya. The life-denying urge is manifest,
in this ideal, towards which all moral striving is directed.
Hiriyanna supports this contention with the words:
uThe ideal is kaivalya or aloofness from prak~ti
and all its transformations, which is quite in
consonance with the pessimistic attitude of
the doctrine"15
It is thus clear that while the samkhya does possess some
elements of a world-affirming, ethics, and its uncompromising
realism Is an asset itl this direction, the insistence on purely
philosophical precision in its concept of puru~a precluded
the development of a wholesome and positive outlook on
life. Puru~a being the ever-free, immobile and immutable
pure consciousness is conceived somehow, through a
mysterious and overpowering ignorance, to become entangled
in the web of material relationships and to think of itself
an agent ot karta. Since it is ignorance that is the root
of the soul's bondage and the cause of its pains and
, 6
sufferings,1 it is only knowledge" and knowledge of the
type appropriate to release, that can cancel the bondage
and sever the link with pain and suffering. Moral striving
in the samkhya, therefore, primarily takes the form of
discrimination (viveka) between the eternal, unchanging
puru~a, on the one hand, and the transient material objects
of the world on the other. The hig~est value of mok~a is
the realization of the total aloofness of the puru~afrom
all prak:r,:tic forms, 17. the realization that it "is not even the
, . . "-"
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bhokta, since both joy and suffering are the results of the
operation of the g~as and so belong to the changing world.
The world is a deceptive spell cast over the. . purusa as
pure consciousness, as the ever-free. SaIDkhya in its
classical form is clear about discrimination as the simple,
direct and only effective means of deliverence,18 which is
appropriate to ·t he burden of pain and suffering of all
contingent beings. 19 And although it incorporates the
full range of heavens and he lIs of popular mythology in its
metaphysical scheme, 19 which must raise expectations of
some form of world affirmation, these are not brought to
fruition because of the atheism of the system and because
of the overpowering negative influence of mok§a as kaivalya,
total isolation of the soul.
Apart fromvirtuou8 conduct· as part of the system of
social morality which it shares in common with other systems,
and which do not show up any differentiality of ethics with
regard to moksa, the samkhya does not elaborate any
specific method or discipline apart from that of discrim-
ination as already observed. But in the larger tradition
the samkhya is considered related to the system of yoga
which may be considered its sister system,20 and whose disci-
plinary elaborations may be bodily taken to apply to the
saIDkhya except in one particular. The yoga system introduces
the i dea of God and is known in the tradition as sesvara
sarilkhya (sa.riJkhya with God), while the original system is
regarded as nirIsvara samkhya (samkhya without GOd).21 In
this nomenclature we see the great importance of the role
245
of the classical .s8mkhya, whose metaphysics forms the back-
ground upon which the yoga develops its practical methods. 22
But the introduction of the idea of God is only nominal,
standing for a worthy symbol of concentration. This is
quite distinct from the wide and comprehensive meaning of
God in Vedanta. yoga is mostly a system of personal or
individualistic body and mind culture, consisting of eight -
separate steps and therefore known as ~~~~ga yoga (yoga of
eight limbs). These deal with yama (restraint), niyama
(regularity), asana (bodily posture), pr~ayama (control of
the life principle), pr~~I~ara (withdrawing the senses from
their objects), dh~E~a (holding the mind steadily on the
object of concefltration); dhyana (concentration) and ~amadhi
(mystic meditation). The first two deal with the moral
observations and prohibitions, the third and fourth with
physical and physiological well-being, and the rest with the
development of mental poise. The system is extremely
popular in the general ethico-religious tradition, and is
used as an auxiliary aid in the theistic and the idealistic
systems. But as can be seen, it does not set up a goal of
developing anything like a universal ethic of humanity
(though this may be implied), but limits itself to personal
self-culture. rz:»:Even its reference to God in Isvara pr~idhana
(surrender to God) ,23 . appeaz-s ·t o contradict the ,sut r a which
regards God as an aid for attaining saIDkhya type ~aivalya.
On the whole, then, so far as its relationship to samkhya is
concerned, the purpose of the ,~~~~ system is clearly "the
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isolation of puru~a from prak~ti, to be attained by the
discrimination between the two,,,24 for the reason that "the
round of rebirths, with its many pains, is that which is to
be escaped from". 25 The system teaches that "by withdrawing
thecitta (mind) from its natural functions, we overcome the
. - '126
pain of the world and escape from samsara. The second and
third verses of the ~Q~~ text say : "Yoga is stilling the
modifications of the mind,,27 and "then the seer (soul) rests
in its natural (pure spiritual) state",28 which in point of
motivation are not removed from the first verse of the
Samkhya Karika which urges the total removal of pains and
sufferings of a personal nature. We see, then, that yoga,
as a system of self-culture, lends significant support to
the ~~h~ concept of mok~a as ~aivalya, withdrawal and
isolation from all contingent reality.
9.2. ADVAITA and the ethics of freedom
Unlike the saIDkhya, in which all reality is bifurcated into
two opposing divisions, the spiritual and the material,
advaita maintains the larger and more general Indian tradi-
tion by insisting that the material world is not dis-
continuous with spiritual reality. Relying more heavily on
the Upani~adic texts, ad~~~~~ maintains with regard to the
world, that "all this is indeed Brahmantl,29 if once we
realise the spiritual reality which is the source and ground
of it. From a slightly different standpoint, advaita
insists that Brahman is the only true reality, as nirg~a or
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indeterminate, _while the world as commonly experienced is
"false", and the individual soul or jlva is the ~rahman
itself. 30 It is not to be supposed that the world is a
distinct reality separate from Brahman, for otherwise it
would make no sense to claim that Brahman alone is real,
which means that there cannot be two realities. Whi l e the
metaphysics of advaita has already been treated earlier, we
need only to look at the matter in terms of the bearing that
the advaita concept of freedom has on man's ethical life.
Since advaita presents the concept of Brahman as the sole
reality, man and the world must either be pure illusions, or
in some inscrutable sense identical with Brahman. Advaita
takes the latter course and says that the manifold universe
is not an illusion, but insofar as it is experienced as a
diversity, it conceals the unitive, unchanging reality of
Brahman. Mok~a is the realisation of the non-dual reality
of Brahman, which is the negation of all plurality. By the
inscrutable power of maya (that which is not) oravidya
(personal ignorance), the reality of Brahman is concealed
and the world and individual jIvas are projected forth. As
the centre of psychological activity, each jIva is capable
of experiencing ~ok$a which is the realisation of its ovm
true nature, which is becoming Brahman as it were, Brahmaiva
bhavati. 31
Thus it is to be seen that the holistic design that is so
deeply fixed in the general Indian tradition is carried by
advaita into the transcendental level, in which all subject-
object relationships melt away. For superimposition or
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adhyasa brings about only an apparent change, not a true
change of the original ground which i~ Brahman. Striving
for mok§a, therefore, is striving to re-establish the
ontological unity that is already there; it is not the
creation of a new situation.
Since ~affikarats highest standard is the nirg~a Brahman,
true liberation consists in realising it as such, and not
any qualified version of it. Nirguqa Brahman is that
conception of ultimate reality which is totally beyond
qualities and relationships. The empirical world in which
the i ndi vi dual jlva finds himself, on the other hand, is
characterised by a myriad attributes and relationships. It
is changeful and strife-bearing. Moral effort has to reckon
with the opposites of good and evil, and transcend both,
since it is the nirg~a Brahman that is the true aim of
realisation wherein complete freedom is attained. Moral
conflicts which are experienced in the empirical arena are
totally transcended in the highest Brahman-experience
(brahmabhava).
The i ndi vi dual jlva, the psycho-physical complex, holds the
centre of the stage in Safukarats ethical philosophy, so far
as the striving for mok~a is concerned. It is quite clear
-/
why this is so. Isvara, which is the God of +eligion, and
the creator, sustainer and dissolver of the world, is for
/ . _./
Safukara a concession to empirical reality. lsv~~a operates
in conjunction with m~ya which is his uEa_dhi or limiting
adjunct, though he is said to be in full control of it. As
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sag~~_~r~~, Isvara is a step lower then the nirg~a
Brahman who transcends every type of differentiation, maya
and all. The true goal of all ethical striving is therefore
the nir~aBrahman, the truly transcendent Godhead which is
beyond all categories of thought.
While mok§a in the saIDkhya was seen as total isolation from
matter and its modifications, the advaita position is that
moksa is a state that does not negate the world or the
,---.~.~--
individual, but takes up the empirical differences and
unites them into an identity at the transcendental level.
~oksa therefore, is only a denial of plurality and
difference; it is an affirmation of unity and identity which
is the culmination of all moral striving.
The radical life-denying ethics of the samkhya appears some-
what compromised inadvaita ethics. The emphasis on unity
and identity (both ostensibly positive concepts) appear to
suggest a non-denial of empirical values. Yet the true goal
-z:>of ethical striving is the gir~a~Bra~an and not Isvara.
Moral effort that has before it the goal of jsvara causes
the soul to oscillate between human birth and Q~~a loka,
the highest heaven, but mokFl8. as standing for the highest
Brahman value lies beyond the estate of Isvara.
It is not at all surprising, given the structure of its
metaphysics, that the ~dvaitic conception of Brahm~, and
therefore of liberation, has been sought to be advanced
along two distinct dimensions, which sometimes get confused
with each other. The one is the strictly philosophical
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conception of it which holds fast to the utter transcendence
of ~~k~a and to an uncompromising denial of empirically-
orientated values. Such a view is based on sruti passages
which indicate the total transcendence of Brahman. Iyer
expresses this view when he says:
"Strictly speaking there is no transition
from Nir~a Brahman to Sa~a Brahman.
Nirguna Brahman is immutable, it does not
undergo the least change. It does not get
transformed into Brahman with attributes."32
and again,
"From the transcendental standpoint Brahman
remains immutable, quite unaffected by
what we think about it. The descent of
spirit is only apparent and not real.
Thus both Isvara and jiva are the outcome
f . "o nesc~ence. 33
The. l ogi cal extension of this view is that liberating know-
ledge will lead- to a total transcendence of the categories
of this world which is regarded as a mere appearance, not a
reality. The empirical world of relations is completely
overcome in Brahman-experience because "the relation, as the
relation, has no place in the Abs ol ut e . 1l 34 It is quite clear
"that for Samkara the world of plurality disappears completely
in mok!?a~ Radhakrishnan cites ~aIDka~a as holding that "the
world experience with its distinctions of souls, things and
Isvara, disappears for him who recognises the oneness of
Brahman and the Atm~.,,35 Classical advaita as a whole also
adopted an austere interpretation of moksa, following
./ .
Samkara. Radhakrishnan quotes Suresvara, a direct disciple
.
of Samkara :
"When the infinite Light is instinctively
realised, all creatures from Brahma down
to the lowest plant melt into an illusion
like unto a dream."36
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Smara is quite convinced that "there is no metaphysical
warrant" for introducing "plurality and empirical distin-
ctions into the heart of the Absolute".3? Radhakrishnan
himself confesses that "it is Sa.ihkara's excessive attach-
ment to logiqal precision that leads him into somewhat
misleading statements, to the effect that the world is
nought." 38
Safukara views liberation as not being causally related
to any empirical category, such as time, place or action3~
It is therefore not a production out of anything nor is it
a modification of anything, for neither can be truly
eternal. 40 For Samkara, therefore, ~ok~a is not a state
of Brahman or t he Atman, but "it is the self itself that is
the absolute value, meaning that mok~a or the self is the
only value and that all other values are but partial
aspects, if not distortions of it". 41 To this basic
position, which is obviously austere and impersonal,
classical advaita doe s not fail to add the Upani~adic
terms sat, cit and ananda, which are held to be not attri-
butive but substantive of the self, and which may be
recognised as standing for "the highest theoretical and
practical goal of life". 42 Whi l e acknowledging the subtlety
of the advaita logic generally, Banerjee objects to this
inclusion of decidedly human values in a scheme of
liberation that obliterates the human personality
altogether:
t1But,.st:ict~y speaking, this, far from giving
any ~nd~cat~on of what human liberation is or
should be, amounts to a reiteration of SaIDkara's
c9nceptio~ of the Ultimate Reality as un-
d~fferent~ated and non-individual Brahman
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who usurps whatever is of fundamental value in the
world of nature and the world of human beings and
in whose abysmal depth both man and the world are
eternally and absolutely lost". 43
This is a truly trenchant criticism of the austerity of the
advaita value of freedom, made on behalf of the religious
interest. It rightly draws attention to the fact that
concepts of consciousness and bliss are really interpersonal
values,44 and questions their significance if "both man and
the world are eternally and absolutly lost".
our i nt er es t lies not so much in evaluating the logic and
validity of metaphysical postulations as in noting the
f
necessarily different ethical approaches that the meta-
physical systems give rise to. In this context it should
be noted that many writers prefer not to directly impugn
advaita metaphysics and ethics, but endeavour to
inject into the system the flavour of empirical values.
Apologising for Samkara Radhakrishnan says:
"In his anxiety to make out that the freed soul
has no possibility of relapsing into the
phenomenal world, Samkara frequently suggests
that freedom consists in an entire dissolution
of all empirical categories and subject-object
distinction. "45
But such dissolution of all distinctions in the state of
mok~a is necessary in Samkara's advaita, in as much as it
is a tautological affirmation of Brahman defined as being .
without distinctions either internally or externally.
Radhakrishna concedes that such a distinctionless state
appears to be an empty concept:
"Even as Brahman seems from our empirical point
of view a "mere nothing, so the state of mok~a
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seems to be a dead loss, a fading into
forgetful1ness, a putting out the light
and melting away into non-existence •••••• "46
Such a negative and life-denying ethic as flowing from a
formal consideration of Brahman as the highest freedom-
value is sought to be re4irected within the advaita
tradition itself by emphasising positive values, within the
limits of the metaphysical presuppositions, so as to be
more accomodating to the world and human aspirations.
Thus Radhakrishnan urges the view that "freedom is not the
abolition of the self, but the realization of its infinity
and absoluteness by the expansion and illumination of
consciousness,47 and "mok~a is not the dissolution of the
world, but the disappearance of a false outlook~48 Commenting
on Joad's view that if one's individual personality is to
be /lost in moki?a, striving for mokf?a becomes meaningless,
Iyer says with confidence:
"All of us want to be rid of our limitations
and live the larger life. To sink one's
individuality in Brahman is not a loss but
a great gain1l
49
This is hardly a satisfying answer from the purely religious
point of view. Although it is accepted by many that "mok~a
is a positive condition of bliss and not merely the negative
condition of the absence of misery, 11 50 the ordinary ·
religious person would yet hug his "limited" personality
if only to share its blessedness with the whole world. In
t erms of advaita metaphysics one may not go so far in lay-
ing caaim to the human personality, but at the same time
the metaphysically intrinsic logic enhancing the need to
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undervalue the world and man is not universally accepted
among advaitins "wishing to realise here and now the non-
dual Brahman experience of being, consciousness and bliss".51
We need not labour this point any longer but we need to
discern briefly the highly individualistic and soteriologic-
, al l y- di r ect ed nature of advaita ethics52 quite in consonance
with the unavoidably negative characterisation of Brahman-
experience or mok~a in this tradition. Although mokea
is in fact Brahman-experience at the highest level of
abstraction, for the individual jlva, looking at the
possibility of freedom from the empirical point of view, ~.
it is a question of the method to be adopted for establishing
his i dent i t y with Brahman. 53 The jlva's empirical plight
is that it has suffered a forgetfullness of its Brahman-
nature through the operation of nescience (avidya), and "the
only means necessary for liberation is the removal of aVidya
• ~~,~-=--==
by vidya ••••••••• Neither religion nor morality can serve
as direct aids to ~Ok?a".54 Like overcoming an illusion,
all that is required is a correct angle of vision, in
which the importance of karma or work is minimal, while
the operation of cognition is of the greatest significance55
Spiritual freedom in advaita means "the attaining of insight
into oneself; it means self-knowledge and joy of being.,,56
The ~adhana catu¥taya or four-fold spiritual discipline
/' .
prescribed by Samkara has deep affinities with the samkhya-
~oga tradition, combining within itself a clearly soterio-
logical ethics with a negative withdrawal from the world,
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"yet reflecting the essentially practical nature of Indian
thought lt • 57
The naturally passionate involvement in the objective world
has to be severely and radically redirected towards a
personal spiritual system of self-culture. 58 It has to be
noted that "involvement in the objective world" includes not
only anti-social undertakings, but good works as well, for
mok~a is a passive ideal and requires a quietist ethics.
Even the exhortation of K~~~ to Arjuna to engage in the
duty of battle does not qualify for the path of mok~a,
except as a preliminary act of mental purification leading
to the path of .jnana . Safukara insists upon the ascetic
order of sannyasa as a "necessary prelude to moksa" for this
• 1
order represents the total renunciation of works in the
world and exclusive devotion to the path of knowledge. 59
"". -9.3. VlSI9'tADVAITA "and the ethics of freedom
If the conception of liberation in safukhya was a total
isolation of the soul from all things material, and in
advaita a total immersion of the soul in Brahman, then in
Ramanuja's system we see it as one of total involvement of
the soul in the being of God. Whi l e in the advaita scheme
of things, the ontological unity between jIva and Brahman is
stated to be complete and unitary, the Vi-Si~i!advaita, though
it maintains ontological unity as the very essence of all
things, yet proposes a pluralistic modification of it in the
interests of its realist metaphysics. Since the
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definition of mok9a, except in the most general sense, must
depend upon the prior definition of the terms involved in
the liberation itself, this definition in Ramanuj a ' s system,
being a realist system, depends equally upon the nature of
God, matter and soul. In the advaita a simple equivalence
was seen to exist between Brahman-value and .mok9a-value, for
ontological continuity between Brahman and the world
(including jlvas) was seen in terms of the parsimonious
concept of' maya. But i n a Y~~i§~?:dvai ta.-type realist system
liberation has to be proposed in terms of an organic
continuity, that is, in t he fashion of correspondences
among the reals, with their relationships fixed in terms of
the metaphysical theory. Though being a realist system, the
saIDkhya dispensed with the notion of God, and ignored any
type of meaningful relationship between puru~a and prak~ti.
Since visi~tadvaita does neither, and being a truly theistic
system, the ethical disciplines for the attain~ent of moksa
proposed in this system are seen to carry over into the
spiritual realm in the fashion of an organic continuity.
This might appear too formal a statement, but its merit lies
in the fact that a realist· system must necessarily
repudiate the idea of transcending the moral standard in the
state of mok9a as obtains in the idealist system of
advaita. God is not only pure consciousness, but He is also
good. When the redeemed soul participates in God's nature
it participates in His goodness. Of the ethical implications
of the soul's relation to God, Crawford says, in relation·
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to the visistadvaita. "" .
"The nature of goodness is inextricably
bound up with the nature of godliness.
To discover the former we must delve
into the latter."60
Moral striving in a theistic realism auch as visi~~advaita
means that the goodness of the soul is seen as continuous
with God's goodness, whose realisation is the fruit of
liberation.
The truth of this statement is clearly to be seen in a basic
postulate of yi~~i§t~d:vaita, that the soul is an attribute of
God. It is not sufficient unto itself but is an eternal
portion of God and in an inseparable relation to Him. It is
this necessary unity that gives spiritual meaning to the·
soul. 61 The implications of mok~a in visistadvaita somewhat
reduce the anthropomorphic nature of ethics, otherwise so
prominent in Indian thought. The theistic concept of
liberation is in several important ways antithetical to the
advaita view. 62
While in the ~dvaita the individual may be said to dominate
the notion of liberation on account of the fact that the
A~man is considered equivalent to Brahman, in Ramanuja's
thought liberation has perforce to be considered in terms of
both the individual and Brahman. Because the individual is
a part of Brahman, this does not subdue or reduce the value
of the human personality, but rather adds immense value to
the individual in its every empirical act. Although the
g~as operating in nature provide the framework for
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the individual to act in the world, in the yisi~~advaita, it
is really the individual who as the agent acts through the
guqas. 63 The individual is not a mere variation of the
absolute Brahman, but a really existing finite self, a
centre of thought and action. 64 The self possesses its own
intrinsic value since its personality is eternal and is
never dissipated. Vedanta Desika, an early polemical
exponent of visi~~advaita, makes out that not only does the'
self retain its individuality in the state of release, but
it also enjoys the glory of God while yet maintaining i~s
specific status. 65 Mok~a is a state in which the spiritual
and ontological union of the soul with God is positively
demonstrated.
Since the reality of the soul is continuous with that of God,
moral striving in yisi~~advaita has a twin objective,
realising the soul's intrinsic nature as well as realising
the nature of God. "The real nature of the individual self
cannot be known apart from that of God, since the two are
inseparably united and. indissolubly related to each other. 1I 66
Liberation in vi§i91tadvaita, in common with other schools,
certainly implies freedom from the rounds of births and
deaths, but in addition also implies the full realisation of
the relationship of God to the soul as adhara and adheya
(supporter and supported), sarlrin and sarIra (soul and body),
/se~in ·and '8e~a (whole and part), etc., which indicate the
total and unmitigated dependence of the soul upon God. 67
Every aspect of moral effort therefore, is directed to the
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realisation of the supremacy of God wi t h the soul as an
eternal and intimate part of God's reality. Expounding the
.-
meaning of prapatti or surrender, Srlnivasacari says :
" ••••• the jI"va as the sarlra of Paramatman
has its triple function of knowing, willing·
and feeling-fulfilled organically in the
life of the saririn. Prapatti is the reli-
gious conclusion of the philosophy of the
sarfra-saririn relation and it affirms that
the sarlrin is Himself the upaya and the
upeya"·68
As upaya and upeya mean respectively 'means' and 'end', it
shows that the individual should unreservedly be consumed
with dedication to God both in the process of moral striving
as wel l as (quite naturally) the goal of it. Whi l e in
samkhy? and advaita the individual self holds pride of place
both in terms of means and end, in viSi~~advaita on the
other hand, though he is certainly the free and self-
determining agent, his individuality is sUbmerged in the
specific moral attitude of directing his entire soul force
towards appreciating, in so many ways, the incomparable
glory and supremacy of God.
Ramanuja accepts the traditional approaches leading to ·
liberation, such as jnana, karma, dh~ana and bhakti, but he
reinterprets them to the requirements of the doctrine of
love and surrender to God and· holds bhakti to be the primary
and necessary requisite. 69 Since the integrity of the self
as possessing intrinsic value is important to the system, an
"understandi ng of the true nature of the individuality of
the self" as a "primary requirement of the realization of
liberation,,70 must be accepted as important. But jnana-yoga
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as the direct link to liberation, as understood inadvaita,
and as violating the supremacy of bhakti, is rejected by
Ramanuja.
~nana is ingeniously defined as a form of bhakti, that is,
as knowledge that is not mere understanding, but that which
necessarily calls forth and becomes indistinguishable from
the deepest adoration and love of God. Devotion itself is
described as "a special kind of knowledge that fills the
heart of the mumuk§u with deep longing for Divine Communion
and Divine Grace".71
~arma-yoga is considered by Ramanuja to be important for the
purification of the mind, thus preparing it for a true know-
ledge of the nature of God and the soul, and of the true
relationship between them. Since for Ramanuja ",bhakti
stands for the steady contemplation of the mind of God," it
is in this sense equivalent to jna.na. 72 It is "loving medi-
tation of all his divine attributes and glories, so as to
qualify for his gracell~73 Liberation is the "integral
experience of Brahman that has infinite jnana and ananda and
other perfections.,,74 A knowledge of the soul's real nature
together with its connection with God, and blissful
participation in God's being is what constitute~ mok~a.75
For Ramanuja bhakti is "the most natural means for God-
realization".76 The visi~~advaita system incorporates the
nine modes of bhakti prescribed in the SrImad Bhagavatam,
viz., listening to the Lord's names (§rav~am)' singing His
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praises (k'irtanam), remembering Him always (smarartam),
worshipping His Holy feet (padasevanam), worshipping Him
(arcanam), bowing down to Him (vandanam), serving Him
(dasyam), treating Him as the closest friend (sakhyam) and
totally surrendering to Him (Atma-nivedanam). In spite of
this acceptance of a free type of p~~;, it is also held
that "the bhakta has to worship the Lord in the way ordained
by the scriptures".77 This stricture, due to Ramanuja's
acceptance of the karma-k84da portion of the veda,78 leads
to difficulties associated with social distinctions, as we
have already seen in a previous chapter.
As a path of unsurpassed ethical striving, over and above
the traditional approaches, Rarnlanuja proposed the path of
prapatti, which is "the unreserved, complete conscious
surrender of our entire self to the Lord in order to be
saved tt • 79 Prapatti implies taking refuge solely in God
(~araQagati) and relying upon Him to direct one's life.
Personal effort loses some significance in the face of God's
will, which directs the devotee as its instructor in the
world. The natural corollary of ~rapatti is the doctrine of
.kr pa or grace, which was developed in great depth in the
system. It was taken up and promulgated by the Tenkalai (or
southern) sect of Ramanuja's later followers, while the .
opposing doctrine of puru~artha or human effort was
championed by the Va~akalai (or northern) sect. The ~IE~
doctrine is exemplified in the literature as marjara-nyaya,
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reasoning according to the cat carrying its kitten, where
the kitten is required to put forth no efforts of its own,
except to merely surrender to its mother. Thepuru~artha
doctrine, on the other hand, is exemplified as JI!~rk~~_nya.y:a,
seen in the young of the monkey clinging to its mother by
its own strength and with no external help. The issue being
a highly metaphysical one, is difficult of resolution, and
the polemics continue into our day. It appears that
Ramanuja himself favoured the puru~artha doctrine, which is
closely allied to the doctrine of karma, and which he
considered highly important as a preparation for the fructi-
fication of phakti. Generally speaking, Ramanuja considered
bhakt~ as incorporating intellectualistic and meditative
dimensions, though he defined it as intense love for God.
Certainly phak~i.is not marked by undue emo.tional fervour or
excessively overt demonstrations in Ramanuja's thought, yet
the entire process of ethical striving leading up to m~,
as well as the state of liberation itself, is described in
terms that are more akin to bhakti as love of God and total
surrender to Him.
As a consequence of this overridingbhakti attitude the
system accepts five stages in the process of liberation, viz.
living in God's world (salokya), enjoying His glories
(sar~ti), being close to Him (samfpya), enjoying likeness
with Him (sarupya), and being united with Him (sayujya).80
These indicate that liberation is gradatory and cumulative,
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and finds fulfilment only after death. ViSi~t.advaita
therefore rejects the doctrine of jlvanmukti (embodied
liberation), and accepts only videhamukti (disembodied
liberation).
Ethical striving in the vi~i~~advaita system is characterised
by a consistency of attitude along a single dimension. This
dimension is bhakti or loving surrender to God, which is
closely correlated with the metaphysical speculations of the
system. So far as the ideal of mok~a is concerned, and in
terms of its relation to metaphysics, we have seen that
Ramanuja's formulations clearly show that it is bhakti and
bhakti alone that meets the ethical requirements for the
attainment of the soteriological goal of life.
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Chapter Ten: Conclusions
In this chapter the major conclusions of the investi- -
gation are reviewed and set out systematically, with
regard to the twin theses of the differentiality of
ethical ber~viours and the perception of tensions.
The conclusions are reinforced with some evidence in




The major investigation undertaken in this work has been the
demonstration of a differential pattern in the ethical
parameters as operating in classical Indian thought, and
especially with respect to the sarnkhya, advaita and yisi~j­
advaita systems. The three systems, proposing among them
specific and widely differing metaphysical standpoints, and
operating within a highly generalised ethico-religious
social milieu using a generalised cluster terminology,
give the appearance of a unified tradition.
However, after specifying briefly the metaphysical doctrines
and assumptions unique to each system, and considering each
system in terms of the detailed analysis of vital ethical
values proposed in Indian thought, viz. dharma, ~arma and
mok~a, it has been clearly seen that each system established
itself along substantially divergent ethical dimensions. It
has also been seen that the lines of divergence appeared to
flow~quite naturally from the metaphysical presuppositions
as these have been stated and fixed in the classical period.
The view has also been allowed that both metaphysics and
ethics arising in a socio-historical setting, can be subject
to variations and revisions which must affect, in some ways,
our assessment of the dynamics obtaining between them. With
regard to the saIDkhya system, this perspective has revealed
that the Indian experience is partial to some type of
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theistic orientation in metaphysics (advaita notwithstanding),
and so largely absorbed and theicized the sBmkhya, making it
a part of the general religio-cultural milieu. Samkhya
dialectics are now largely confined to academic interests,
and is valuable as a realist-mystical system offering
grounds for pursuing a comparative interest with advaita
and Buddhism particularly.
With regard to the advaita and vi~i~~advaita systems the
processes of history and social change have rather accentu-
J
ated the fundamental theses proposed by Samkara and Ramanuja
respectively, though we have to qualify this assessment
somewhat in the case of the advaita, which has shown
distinct tendencies to develop along a limited theistic
dimension. In the case of visi~tadvaita, no noticeable
tendency in the direction of idealism or impersonalism is
revealed, except for the solitary case of Vallabha. On the
contrary a pronounced entrenchment of theistic values is
evident in the development of the Vadakalai and Tenkalai
sects in the Ramanujist tradition, reinforced by significant
developments from the side of the Madhva or ~vaitavad~
schools.
This is not to say that there are no new developments in
Indian philosophy. In fact fresh and innovative approaches
to old problems are being experimented with in some philo-
sophical circles. Of interest to us however, is that in the
field of theology and ethics, the lines drawn in the
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classical traditions of ~qvaita and visi~~advaita still
largely obtain, enabling us to declare a kind of persistent
and innate morphology of the Vedantic dialectic that
survives the accidents of history and pressures of the
environment.
The clearly divergent relationships of each system with the
ethical imperatives that appear closely connected to their'
several metaphysical formulations, has also been seen along
negative-positive dimensional approaches to the world of
common experience. In the case of the ~amkh~~ a clearly
negative attitude to life was discerned which, in addition,
was also seen to conform closely to the definition of
spiritual reality as mere consciousness without a specifi~
cally ethical content such as "bliss".
The ~dvaita formulation of the relationship was also seen to
reflect a severely negative and life-denying ethic, and the
more so as this attitude was considered to be logically
implied in its primary metaphysical constructs of the sole
reality of the nirguna Brahman and complete identity of the
jlva with that reality. This advaitic position has been
shown by us to be the basic and primary formulation true to
SaIDkara's major lines of thought. It has also been seen
that the two-tier model of reality as transcendental and
relative, pertaining to absolute spiritual reality and the
empirical world of human relationships respectively, does
not represent a true compromise of the major adv~itiQ thesis,
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so far as the classical theory is concerned, but reflects
rather a concessionary, accomodatory overture to the
"frailties" of human nature.
The nirguna Brahman, in the ~dva~ti~ formulation, is not
only the ultimate reality, but it is also conceived as the
only true and proper goal of the ethics of liberation. As
unchanging~homogeneous, distinctionless and beyond relations,
Brahman cannot be conceived to be in any meaningful relation
with human beings in the ultimate sense, and necessarily
imnlies the negation of all human experience. The identity
relationship between the individual and Brahman is therefore
projected in terms of a mystical understanding or realisation
of it as such, and ethical striving in terms of the path of
~~g or knowledge, in its exclusive sense, is conceived as
the only path appropriate to Brahman-experience •
.-----
Samkara's own formulation of the four-fold path of ethical
discipline was seen as a faithful exemplification of the
negative evaluation of human experience.
The advaitic position, despite the austerity of its major
metaphysical premis~and the ethical behaviours projected as
their ·logical consequence, was nevertheless not seen to be
operating along a single ethical dimension. The two-tier
model of reality appeared to validate, within the advaita
tradition itself, the projection of a multiple ethical
dimensionality confined within the parameters of human
experience.
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This pragmatic deployment of the system's ethical energies
along variable lines gave rise to strong tensions of an
essentially unresolvable nature, for the reason that it
did not signal a relaxation of its essential premises but
merely "tagged" the world of human experience, as a lower
order of reality, onto the higher order reality of Brahman.
Despite the fact that ultimate reality in the advaitic view
could not be truly understood through the human sentiment
of devotion or works in the world (ritualistic or otherwise),
. within the advaita tradition itself arose men of distinction
~~d great influence who declared the supremacy of bhakti,
or at least its equality with jnana. The earliest is
probably Jnane~lvara "an enthuisiaetic bhaktra" whose
20 OOO-line cOlIl.-rnentary on the Glta is "advaitist in tone".1
The Bhagavatam ranks as the single most important text of
devotion in the entire Indian tradition. Yet it was an
advaitin, SrIdhara SvamI, the high prie st of the PUn monastery
established by Samkara and who, around 1400 A.D., wrote a
commentary on it "which is by far the most famous exposition
of the work." 2
Srldhara also produced a commentary on the Glta, in which
"his lealming and devotion as opposed to knowledge is so
very marked that the orthodox section at first refused to
accept his commentary as authoritive.,,3 Legend., has it
that the commentary was placed before the temple deity in
Banares for the Lord's decision, which ultimately confirmed
the advaiticacceptability of the work through a Sanskrit
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couplet miraculously given by God. 4 These events attest the
development of conflicts and tensions of a serious ethical
nature from quite early in the tradition.
One of the most ancient religious sects, the Bhagavatas,
were worshippers of Vi~~u, but were also strongly predisposed
-:
to the monistic doctrines of Samkara. The resulting
ambiguities and ambivalences in belief and attitude are
clearly discerned by Farquhar when he says
"The Bhagavatas, being both SmartaE? and
devotees of Vi$~u, occupied from the first
rather an unstable position between the
orthodox and the sects, and their acceptance mthe
Bhagavata Pur~a deepened the difficulty for
them. The results are visible in their
history•••••• Occasionally individual
Bhagavatas pass over to the Sri- Vai~~ava
community...... All the other sects depend-
ent on the Bhagavata Pur~a have experienced
the same difficulty of maintaining the
Vedic position, and most are in consequence
now frankly sectarian."5
The volatile and unstable ethico-religious situation is thus
seen not to depend on merely personal choice of deity, but
on the more underlying doctrinal and metaphysical differences
that separate the advaita from the visi~tadvaita, not dis-
counting the influence of the m~mamsa with its emphasis on
a ritualistic life-style. The tensions that characterise
the overt religious lives of individuals and whole
communities, as they are seen to surface in the religious
context, are really the end product of a spiral whose base
lies in fundamental metaphysical structures of "t hought .
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Among the relatively modern advaitic personalities, Svaml
Vivekananda's thoughts and activities are outstanding
because of their wide and continuing influence in both
East and West. Inspired with the zeal for Indian national
unity on the one hand, and the spread of the gospel of
Vedanta on the other, he combined in his characteristic
message the thesis that all the traditional ethical
approaches, those of jnan~karma,~ and bhakti were
essentially the same. He held that lIthe grandest idea in
the religion of Vedanta is that we may reach the same goal
6by different paths". In his zeal Vivekananda initiated
the characteristic note of modern neo-Hinduistic
eclecticism that all religions are equal as means to the
attainment of the spiritual goal, a theme that recurs
throughout his speechre and writings, and sometimes reaches
high eloquence.
It is interesting to note, however, that this is a modern
version of the samuccaya-vada doctrine of the equality of
means, and Vivekananda simply equates the different reli~
gions to one or other of the traditional Indian ethical
dimensions, by ignoring their metaphysical peculiarities.
However, his-espousal of the advaita doctrine of total
identity between man and God runs strong and deep, and
at t imes he explicitly denounces all dualistic doctrines
(which we m~st presume to include non-Hindu religions as
well).
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To arrive at a fair estimate of Vivekananda's differential
emphasis on ethico-metaphysical topics strewn rather
confusingly and unsystematically throughout his works, we
have to say that his views clearly compromise classical
advaita in that he seriously and faithfully espoused
samuccayavada, which was for him a major requirement for
religious harmony in the world. This position of his
was closely related to his outlook of wide sYmpathy and
humanitarianism. His genuine feeling for the suffering of
fellow-man, though it had its origin in the plight of the
poverty-stricken millions of India, really extended to all
mankind. And Vivekananda looked upon every creature as
a veritable manifestation of God, a form of the Divine,7 to
whose service every true reformer should dedicate his every
effprt.
It cannot be denied that Vivekananda saw a genuine need
for the development of a universal ethics of humanity,
especially in relation to the masses of India, though he
did not discount its loginal extension to all the world.
In so setting a basis for a world-affirming ethics, Vivek-
ananda was certainly developing the great promise held in
the advaitic doctrine of oneness. Et the same time it
also cannot be denied that Vivekananda must have felt some
difficulty and clash of interests in trying to infuse a
sort of intrinsic value into the world, which by the
standards of classical ~dvaita, possessed only an instru-
mental value.
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We have to contend for the validity of this criticism,
which holds that there is a necessary gulf between_a
negatively derived ethical value and its positive appli-
cation for pragmatic purposes. Human nature is highly
pliable and through force of will and sentiment it is
easily possible to sustain the practices of positive
ethics. Vivekananda's powerful personality imposed the
stamp of his pragmatic social ethics upon the Ramakrishna
movement that he founded. But he did not attempt to reform-
ulate advaita doctrine at the metaphysical level. Rather
he accepted the full tradition, as is so clearly evident
in his moving Song of the Sannyasin, which must have been
composed in a patient and studied fashion. We may
consider two revealing excerpts:
(a) "Strike off th'y fetters! Bonds that bind thee down,
Of shining gold, or darker, baser ore;
Know, slave is slave, caressed or whipped, not free."
(b) "They know not truth who dream such vacant dreams
As father, mother, children, wife and friend."
8
There is unmistakable undervaluat ion of the world, together
with the most basic human relationships, in these words,
which are thus seen to be consistent with the classical
advaita position. The confusion resulting from the split-
level val~es, that is, the denial of worldly relationships
reflected in the above lines, on the one hand, and their
affirmation in the enactment of a humanistic ethics on the
other hand,must affect an individual's peace of mind and
unity of purpose. The excessively individualist ethical
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flavour reflected in the poem is not consistent with
Vivekananda's declarations of humanitarian ethics. If
the sentiments expressed in the poem be said to apply
only to sannyasins, it would be admitting to a split-level
value system and to differential ethical ideals, attesting
to some form of tensions in pursuing those ideals. While
Vivekananda's reconstruction of the advaita ethics
along the lines of a humanitarian social dimension retained
~
intact Samkarats theoretical postulates of the utter trans-
cendence of Brahman and the significance of m-aya for the
process of world-creation and society, the poet Rabindranath
Tagore moved away from the strict advaita position as he
felt that true religion should be centered in man in his
operations in society. Though bred in the soil of
Upani~adic and advaitic idealism, he felt the need to match
more closely the historical reality of man in social evo_
lution with the metaphysical constructions of religion and
philosophy. He gave expression to the general advaitic
basis of his faith, whenJspeaking of man in his highest
moments, he said: "a man can transcend the utmost bounds
of his humanity and find himself in a pure state of con-
~9sciousness of his undivided unity with Brahman. Yet he
held the concept of nireuQa Brahman. too cold an abstraction
and too far removed from man and society to have much
meaning. He accepted rather the testimony of those "who
have felt a profound love, which is the intense feeling of
union, for a Being who comprehends in himself all things
that are human in knowledge, will and action.,,10
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Tagore acknowledged the presence in Indian thought of the
metaphysical conception of other-worldliness, but he did not
promote a dialectic against it. He rather pursued the line
of a tfdevotionalistic theism,"holding that "God as truth is
known through the insight of love rather than reason_,,11
The need for the meaning of God and religion in terms of man
and his relations with fellow-men is basic to his thought,
which is clearly revealed when he says that "God is the
Father, the Friend, the Lover, whose service must be
realised through serving all mankind. For the God in man
depends upon man's service and man's love for his own love's
fulfilment".12
Our statement of Tagore's position highlights to a consider-
able degree the operation of genuine tensions at the
individual and social levels, associated with the metaphysics
of advaita. And this becomes the clearer when compared with
the thought of Vivekananda. For quite obviously both men
were dealing with highly similar social situations against
the same metaphysical background. It is immaterial to our
thesis that Tagore opted for a theistic orientation. For
him that was perhaps a personal resolution of an aspect of
-
the conflict. But the fact of differential responses to a
highly similar situation against a background of highly
similar metaphysical presumptions, indicates at least, the
existence of tensions as operating factors in their
differential responses.
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The fact that Vivekananda responded to the situation with
his reformulation, along a purely ethical dimension, of the
advaitic metaphysic of oneness, may be seen as the fulfil-
ment of what several writers see as the promise inherent in
advaita. That such advaitic oneness, by itself, is very
much with Tagore as well, calls for the isolation of the
notion of "other-worldliness" or "mere instrumentality", as
the factors in which the tensions are rooted. It is our
contention that these factors are integral to classical
advaita metaphysics.
Radhakrishnan's position in this matter is highly interest-
ing as well as instructive. He certainly does not confess
to a theistic position, though he is ~cutely aware of the
problem of the nirgUQa Brahman both at the level of
philosophy and at the level of ethics. His position is a
reformulation of the advaitic concept of ultimate reality
that expresses the sentiments of Vivekananda in an eloquent
way. Although Radhakrishnan is conscious that the theistic
ways of speaking are justifiable on the ground of the
advaitic doctrine of the vyavaharika, he tends to give the
impression that ultimate reality is organically bound up
with the world. 13 In a statement of personal philosophy he
concedes that in some way the ultimate of philosophy must be
seen to be continuous with the God of religion, when he
affirms
"God is the timeless spirit attempting to
realise timeless values on the plane of
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time ••••••• The values which the cosmic
process is attempting to achieve are only
a few of the possibilities contained in
the Absolute. God is the definitisation
of the Absolute in reference to the
values of the world."14
In these words the distinction between the vyavaharika and
the paramarthika becomes a little blurred. Radhakrishnan
continues, referring to a theistic type of religious
experience :
"On the other hand there are features of . -.
our religious experience which require .
us to look upon God as a self-determining
principle manifested in a temporal
development, with wisdom, love and good-
ness as His attributes. From this point
of view God is a personal being with
whom we can enter into personal relation-
ship. Practical religion presupposes a
God who looks into our hearts, knows our
tribulations and helps us in our needs
••••••• To leave the Absolute in
abstract isolation dwelling in Epicurean
felicity is to reduce it to an ornamental
figurehead who lends an atmosphere to an
essentially agnostic view of the cosmic
process·"15
Radhakrishnan continues, further on in the text, to speak of
the Absolute in true philosophic style,but in the above
extract he admits that the Absolute should not be left "in
abstract isolation." Wha t ever meaning the words "God who
looks into our hearts, knows our tribulations and helps us
in our needs lt might have for the advaitin in terms of the
split-level conception of reality, even Radhakrishnan must
concede that they must mean infinitely more to the theist.
This does not detract from Radhakrisr~an as a committed
advaitin, but it certainly serves to underline the peculiar
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type of tension, and the conflict it must engender in men of
lesser mettle, arising directly out of the structure of
advaita metaphysics and with regard to the ethical disci-
plines appropriate to them. Radhakrishnan states the
philosophical problem with his usual clarity when he says:
"But for philosophy of religion, the cep.tral
problem is to reconcile the apparently
conflicting views of the supreme as eter-
nally complete and of the supreme as the
self-determining principle manifesting in
the -temporal process."16
This means that juxtaposing God as timeless spirit (the
adyai~~~ i~vara) does not really reduce the need to see the
Absolute (the supreme) as the "self-determining principle"
acting in the world. We might consider the critique that
seeing the Absolute as "the self-determining principle
manifesting in the temporal process" already reduces the
status of the Absolute (as a philosophically precise
category). We take Radhakrishnan to concur with this line
of reasoning when he says :
"The Question of immanence and transcendence
does-not arise with reference to the
Absolute, " 17
and thig l~aves the Absolute precisely where it belongs _
"in abstract isolation." For the advaitin, then, the
problems inherent in advaita metaphysics become tensions of
the soul, as they are sought to be translated into the realm
of religious practice and ethical action.
On the side of the ethics of social morality, our work has
shown that, while the s~~k~~~ parted company from the advaita
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in disavowing a traditional interpretation of ~harma, both
the advaita and the visis~advaita supported the strict
division of human society into castes. This traditional
hierarchical structure, being based on heredity, manifested
a clearly disproportionate allotment of privileges and
duties among the four general classes, and has been the
source of continued tension and conflict throughout the
history of Indian society. Because of the peculiar meta-
physical interpretation in terms of which dharma served as
the vehicle of a type of invariable mechanical precision in
the social field, SaIDkara's advaita felt bound 'to sanction
it as a necessary part of ~~arta (smrti-bound) tradition.
In the visistadvaita the effects of the caste system appear
_' "~" '~_C~_
to have been allayed, due to the reliance on bhakti as the
chief means of religious endeavour. As thi~ did not obtain
in advaita, with its religious leaders upholding caste
distinctions as inviolable, the problem is a continuing one.
Insofar as the concept of dharma in its traditional
interpretation is seen as tied up with advaita metaphysics,
it has given rise to obvious tensions and conflicts over a
wide spectrum of Indian society. We have argued that dharma
in its peculiar metaphysical interpretation need not be a
part of advaita, but in terms of the classical presentation,
~~~a~t~ thinkers have appeared to support it, at least by
implication. In this connection Larson points out
"That so many Indian intellectuals and
academicians have adopted such an inter-
pretive philosophy (two levels of truth)
is surely one important reason why modern
Indian philosophy has failed to develop a
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significant tradition of social criticism.",8
Tagore, giving credit to the spirit of the European civili-
zation, hopes that it will give new life to Indians "still
conditioned by our surrender to the fatalism of the
almanac.,,19 Radhakrishnan has spoken continuously and
eloquently for the principle of social change as an inherent
part of Indian culture. He insists that "institutions and
dogmas that lose their stuff of life must be scrapped.,,20
He pleads for the urgent introduction of changes that would
"make the content of Hindu dharma relevent to modern
conditions". 21 As an acarya of immense authority, he has
taken a most significant step towards a fairer and more
humane -i nt er pr et a t i on of the concept of dharma, by including
in his translatio!l of the Upani~ads, the short Vajrasucika
Upani~ad, which is concerned almost wholly with the
categorical rejection of hereditary castes and privileges.
In the introductory paragraph Radhakrishnan gives us his
motivation for the inclusion of the Vajrasucika :
"The Upanisad is valuable in that it under-
mines- caste distinctions based on birth. "'22
In an atmosphere of apparently ubiquitous moral vacillatknon
the part of the academic community among Indians, the
inclusion of the Vajrasucika as a part of Radhakrishnan's
selection, will hopefully help to reduce moral tensions
associated with social ethics. In any event, it is certain
to help correct the "metaphysical perversio~" with which the
concepts of dharma and ~~~a have -been injected since
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ancient times, as our work has shown.
In our treatment of these vital ethical concepts we have
argued that their ethico-metaphysical schema of relation-
ships is already an arbitrary interpretation, especially
with regard to the advaita and visistadvaita systems.
Nevertheless, we have consistently shown that, in terms of
these systems as formulated by Safukara and Ramanuja
respectively, as well as in terms of the saIDkhya, which in
some ways was seen to be a unique category, the ethical
corollaries flowed from their metaphysical backgrounds in a
clearly differentiated pattern specific to the metaphysical
presuppositions in each case. Further, we have demonstrated
that the tensions and conflicts that become apparent at the
level of ethical action are in fact traceable to the actual
metaphysical formulations themselves. Our investigations in
this respect have dealt largely with a~vaita metaphysics,
which, in operating along the two dimensions of the absolute
and the relative, give rise to those metaphysical intri-
cacies with which the perceived tensions and conflicts are
in fact related. The saIDkhya and the visi~tadvaita, being
undimensional, are relatively free of tensions and conflicts,
and promote relatively simplistic models of ethical
behaviour.
As a concluding paragraph, we may be allowed the privilege
of a quotation from Crawford, which, in our perception,
holds out the hope that the tensions and conflicts that are
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a real part of the ethico-metaphysical actuality of Indian
life and religion may be somewhat reduced through a more
sympathetic and accomodating interpretation of an ancient
and hallowed concept :
"The basic message of Hindu ethics, rooted
in the ancient idea of ~ta, is that
harmony is already here; that we do not
have to create it - only discover it:
Since Brahman' and Nature are one, we must
see the Supreme Being in the whole world
and the whole world in Him:"23
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